State v. Williams

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICARDO K. WILLIAMS

AC 43226

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Submitted on briefs April 6, 2020

September 29, 2020

DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Bright, Js.^*

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of alleged prosecutorial improprieties during the state's closing argument and the state's examination of its witnesses, which resulted in a denial of his due process right to a fair trial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the court pursuant to statute (§ 53a-70 (b) (2)). Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial as a result of alleged prosecutorial improprieties: the prosecutor's references to the complainant as the "victim" did not constitute prosecutorial impropriety as the prosecutor's use of the word "victim" was relatively infrequent, the court repeatedly instructed the jurors that the arguments of counsel were not evidence, the prosecutor reminded the jury at the beginning of her rebuttal that closing arguments were "arguments," and, when defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's use of the word "victim" during closing argument, the trial court sustained the objection and immediately instructed the jury to disregard it, whereby the prosecutor promptly apologized in front of the jury; moreover, the prosecutor's statements expressing her opinion on the credibility of the victim during closing argument were proper argument because they reflected reasonable inferences that the jury could have drawn from the evidence produced at trial, and, as it was the defendant's theory of defense that the evidence showed that that the victim made up the allegations against the defendant, the prosecutor was allowed to address that argument in her closing argument; furthermore, the prosecutor did not improperly elicit comments on the credibility of the victim from the state's witnesses, as the witnesses' inappropriate answers to otherwise proper questions did not constitute prosecutorial impropriety.

2. The defendant's unpreserved claim that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was under ten years of age at the time of the first sexual assault to support the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the court pursuant to § 53a-70 was unavailing, as the victim testified that she was nine years old at the time of the first sexual assault, and this testimony, in conjunction with her testimony concerning the dates of the other incidents, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to answer the interrogatory in the affirmative; moreover, even though the jury was presented with conflicting evidence as to the victim's age at the time of the first sexual assault, the jury was free to believe the victim's testimony that she was nine years old at the time, and, therefore, this court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding.

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of sexual assault in the first degree and one count each of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, and tried to the jury before Vitale, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Samantha L. Oden, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, Mary A. Sanangelo, senior assistant state's attorney, and Maxine Wilensky, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The defendant, Ricardo K. Williams, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2), one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) he was deprived of the right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the court under § 53a-70 (b) (2). We are not persuaded and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In 2012, the victim¹ lived on the second floor of a multifamily apartment with her mother and her siblings. The defendant was in a relationship with the victim's mother at the time and often would spend the night at the apartment.

In the autumn of 2012, when the victim was nine years old, she was sleeping on the couch in the living room of the apartment. She awoke to the defendant hovering over her. The defendant picked her up, carried her into her bedroom, laid her on her back on the bed and, after putting on a condom, sexually assaulted her by vaginal intercourse, causing her to bleed and to experience pain.

A second incident occurred sometime that winter, after the victim and her family had moved to a new apartment. On that night, the victim and her younger brother had fallen asleep on the floor of their playroom. She awoke to the defendant tapping her and telling her to come into the adjoining living room. The defendant laid her on the floor, removed her underwear and sexually assaulted her, also by vaginal intercourse.

A third incident occurred on December 14, 2013. That morning, the victim was lying on the bed in her sibling's bedroom. The defendant, who had been making breakfast, entered the room, got onto the bed with the victim and kissed the victim's mouth and neck, as well as her chest, breasts, stomach, vagina and inner thighs above the clothes. The assault ended when the victim's mother called for the defendant. On June 18, 2015, the victim met with Brian Schweinsburg, a clinical psychologist specializing in neuropsychology, in New Haven. Her mother had arranged the appointment due to her concerns about the victim's increased levels of depression and recent suicide attempts. Schweinsburg conducted an assessment interview with the victim, who revealed that the defendant had "raped" her on multiple occasions. Following the interview, Schweinsburg arranged for an ambulance to transport the victim to the hospital for further psychiatric evaluation. Schweinsburg also made oral and written reports to the Department of Children and Families (department) regarding the victim's disclosure of the sexual assaults.

The victim was discharged from the hospital the following morning and returned to her mother's apartment. That day, a department investigator made an unannounced visit to the home, but was denied access by the victim's mother. On July 8, 2015, the victim was brought to Yale New Haven Hospital for a forensic interview regarding her disclosures of sexual assault by the defendant. Following the interview, Lisa Pavlovic, a physician at the Yale Child Abuse Clinic, conducted a medical examination of the victim. The examination revealed that the victim had suffered a penetrating injury to her vagina.

Thereafter, on July 29, 2015, Kristine Cuddy, a detective with the New Haven Police Department, interviewed the defendant concerning the victim's allegations. In October, 2015, the defendant was arrested and, in a 2017 long form information, was charged in counts one and two with sexual assault in the first degree, in count three with sexual assault in the fourth degree and in count four with risk of injury to a child. The case proceeded to a trial by jury on that information. On January 11, 2018, the jury found the defendant guilty of all counts. The jury, in response to a written interrogatory, specifically found that the victim was under ten years of age at the time of the sexual assault alleged in the first count of the long form information.

Following the verdict, the defendant filed a motion for new trial nunc pro tunc, claiming prosecutorial impropriety. The court denied the motion and thereafter sentenced the defendant on count one to ten years of incarceration in accordance with the statutory minimum under § 53a-70 (b) (2),² followed by five years of special parole, on count two to ten years of incarceration, five years mandatory, followed by five years of special parole, on count three to two years and one day of incarceration followed by two years of special parole, all to be served consecutively, and on count four to ten years of incarceration to be served concurrently to all of the other counts, for a total effective term of twenty-two years and one day of incarceration, fifteen years of which are mandatory, followed by twelve years of special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor's impropriety during direct examination and closing arguments deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. The defendant contends that the prosecutor acted improperly in three ways: (1) by referring to the complainant as the "victim," (2) by expressing her opinion concerning the credibility of the victim in closing argument and (3) by eliciting comments on the credibility of the victim from the state's witnesses. In the alternative, he argues that this court should exercise its supervisory powers to reverse his conviction because of "the flagrant...