State v. Williams

199 So.3d 1222

STATE of Louisiana

v.Jabari WILLIAMS.

No. 2013–KA–0283.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Sept. 7, 2016.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 2016.

Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Parish of Orleans, Kyle Daly, Assistant District Attorney, Donna R. Andrieu, Assistant District Attorney, Donald G. Cassels, III, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee/State of Louisiana.

Michael Admirand Rachel Lindner, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.

(Court composed of Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge ROSEMARY LEDET ).

ON REMAND

ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge.

The defendant, Jabari Williams, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In State v. Williams, 13–0283 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/23/14), 137 So.3d 832 (“Williams I ”), we affirmed Mr. Williams' conviction and sentence. In State v. Williams, 14–1231 (La.1/16/15), 157 So.3d 1128 (“Williams II ”), the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Mr. Williams' application for supervisory writ.

In Williams v. Louisiana, 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2156, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2016 WL 3369515 (2016) (“Williams III ”), the United States Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court”) granted Mr. Williams' petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this court's judgment in Williams I, and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016). In Foster, the Supreme Court reversed a defendant's capital murder conviction based on a Batson violation.¹

On remand, we entertained additional oral and written argument from Mr. Williams and the State. For the reasons that follow, we reinstate Mr. Williams' conviction and sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This court set forth in detail the facts of the underlying crime for which Mr. Williams was convicted in Williams I.² The underlying crime was a shooting that occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, on April 10, 2011. On that date, Selvin Gonzales, a Honduran national who had been living in New Orleans for about five years, was shot and killed shortly after leaving a gas station located near his home. Seeking help in identifying the perpetrator, the New Orleans Police Department “NOPD”), nine days after the shooting, released a portion of the gas station surveillance video to the news media.³ The next day, Mr. Williams voluntarily came to NOPD headquarters and identified himself as the person in the gas station video. Two NOPD detectives conducted a videotaped interview of Mr. Williams. Initially, Mr. Williams denied shooting the victim. One of the detectives told Mr. Williams that the police had a video of him shooting the victim, which was untrue. Ultimately, Mr. Williams confessed to shooting the victim; however, he claimed that he did so in self-defense.

In August 2011, the State indicted Mr. Williams for second degree murder. He pled not guilty. In June 2012, a jury trial was held in this matter. During jury selection, the parties questioned potential jurors across two panels and, following the voir dire of each panel, exercised cause and peremptory challenges. Back strikes were not allowed. (A minute entry reflects that both Mr. Williams and the State excused a total of eleven jurors and that six jurors were excluded for cause.)

At the end of the voir dire of the first panel, the State exercised six of its twelve peremptory challenges. In response, the defense made its first Batson challenge. The basis for this challenge was that the six potential jurors the State used its peremptory challenges to strike were all African Americans—“black male or female.”⁴ In ruling on the first challenge, the district court judge commented that she was “counting [her] numbers” and then remarked: “we had 16 potential jurors. And I believe, if my count is right, there are five non African–American—well, six non African–American; five white American jurors seated. I'm not sure what Mr. Fulgencio's origin is.”⁵ The district court then required the prosecutor to provide race-neutral reasons; the prosecutor did so as to each of the six potential jurors.⁶

The district court then denied the defense's first Batson challenges.

At the end of the voir dire of the second panel, the State exercised five of its remaining six peremptory challenges to strike the following potential jurors: Mr. West, Ms. Carter, Mr. Washington, Mr. Jackson, and Ms. Ballard. In response, the defense raised its second Batson challenge, noting that all five excused jurors were African–Americans. The following colloquy ensued:

BY MR. ENGELBERG [Defense counsel]:

One second. Again, I believe all these are African–American jurors, judge.

THE COURT:

Let me just say this. Just because the people are African American doesn't mean you can't strike them. Now, if you have a reason to believe that—

MS. PARKER [Defense counsel]:

Well judge, I'd like to know the reason for Miss Carter. Because I never heard her open her mouth the entire time.

BY MR. ENGELBERG [Defense counsel]:

And, judge, clearly, there's a pattern, 11 for 11. That's a pattern, judge.

Disagreeing, the district court reasoned as follows:

Well, but I disagree with you. I mean, I don't know that it's a pattern that because the people are African American. I mean, the pattern may be that they're African American; but they have to strike them simply because of that. And what I'm saying to you is I do recognize that as to [Mr.] West, I recall the answer that he gave, Mr. Washington.

Christopher Jackson, I don't know that I have anything for him. For Miss Ballard I do recall the answers that she gave and Miss Ballard's body language. But I will ask the state specifically as to Miss Carter—Miss Carter and Miss—Mr. Jackson—excuse me.

The State the provided reasons as to Ms. Carter and Mr. Jackson, stating:

With regards to Miss Carter ... [Defense counsel] was asking for ratings of the New Orleans Police Department. Mr. West responded that he would give ‘em a zero and started laughing about it. And Miss Carter was who he was talking to.

She was laughing along with Mr. West, as well. During the actual voir dire of this panel, she appeared disinterested and kind of had a—you know, slouched down in the chair, as if she didn't want to be asked any questions....

... Mr. Jackson has a prior arrest.

After the State provided reasons as to Ms. Carter and Mr. Jackson, which the district court found acceptable, the defense attorney requested race-neutral reasons for the other three jurors—Mr. West, Mr. Washington, and Ms. Ballard (the “Challenged Three Jurors”). The following colloquy occurred:

BY MR. ENGELBERG (Defense counsel):

And, Judge, I'd ask for race-neutral reasons for the other African Americans that they struck in the—

BY THE COURT:

Well, I'm going to deny your request. Because I specifically recall the responses of these particular jurors. And I do believe that those would be based on the responses valid for them to strike them. But I did not hear from [Ms.] Carter or [Mr.] Jackson. And that is why I asked them to place those on the record. So I'll note your objections.

BY MR. ENGELBERG (Defense counsel):

My—my—for the record, judge, for the Court to provide those race-neutral reasons.

BY THE COURT:

I'm not providing them. But I'm not allowing—I'm not making them provide them; because I do believe there was sufficient conversation with them, as far as the state striking those individual jurors. I don't know what specifically their reason is. But I do recall that they gave answers to both of you in the voir dire. And I believe that it is not an issue of a pattern for a Batson Challenge. So I will note your objection.

The district court thus denied the second Batson challenge.

Following a two-day trial, the jury unanimously found Mr. Williams guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Mr. Williams to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) (providing that the mandatory sentence for second degree murder is “life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”).

DISCUSSION

As noted at the outset, this case is presently before us on remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of the Foster case. Shortly after it handed down its decision in the Foster case, the Supreme Court issued a trio of “GVRs” in three pending writ applications-one from Louisiana, one from Alabama, and one from Mississippi—Williams III, supra ; Flowers v. Mississippi, 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2157, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2016) ; and Floyd v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2484, –––L.Ed.2d –––– (2016).

“GVR” is the Supreme Court's acronym for its “practice of granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding for further consideration in light of some intervening development.” Does 1–7 v. Round Rock Indep. Sch. Dist., 540 F.Supp.2d 735, 748 (W.D.Tex.2007) (citing Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir.1997) ). The Supreme Court generally uses the GVR device when it believes that “the lower court should give further thought to its decision in light of an opinion of this Court that (1) came after the decision under review and (2) changed or clarified the governing legal principles in a way that could possibly alter the decision of the lower court.” Flowers, 579 U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., dissenting).

A GVR is not a decision on the merits. Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 378 (5th Cir.2013) (citing Kenemore v. Roy, 690 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir.2012) ; and Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666, n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) ). A GVR thus “does not bind the lower court to which the case is remanded; that court is free to determine whether its original decision is still correct in light of the changed circumstances or whether a different result is more appropriate.” Kenemore, 690 F.3d at 642.

Although a GVR is not a full blown opinion, the GVR in Williams III was accompanied by both concurring and...