State v. Williamson

348 So.3d 48

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Tarvis Lorraine WILLIAMSON, Appellee.

Case No. 5D21-2624

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion Filed September 23, 2022

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Ryan Belanger, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

SASSO, J.

The State appeals the order granting Tarvis Lorraine Williamson's motion to dismiss count one of the information for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, contending the lower court erroneously concluded there was no disputed issue of material fact. We agree because the evidence presented by the State created a disputed factual issue sufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilt against Williamson. As a result, we reverse.

On or about April 29, 2021, Officer Daniel Glidden and Sergeant Rodney Vance responded to a call from Williamson's sister, where she requested to have Williamson trespassed from her apartment. Central to the issue raised¹ in the State's appeal is bodycam footage depicting the events following the officers’ arrival to the residence.

The footage depicts Officer Glidden speaking with Williamson's sister when Williamson leaves the apartment with his hands full of various personal items. Approximately one minute later, Williamson walks back toward the apartment and the officer. Just after the officer asks Williamson's sister if Williamson has a gun on him, Williamson pulls what appears to be a gun from his pocket. Both Officer Glidden and Sergeant Vance then give multiple verbal commands for Williamson to put his hands up, but Williamson does not comply. Instead, the footage depicts Williamson walking towards the officer while repeatedly raising and lowering his gun from a resting position by his leg, to a position parallel to the ground, to a position over his head. Williamson continues to act in this manner while still moving forward, in the direction of Officer Glidden. When the officers get close enough, Sergeant Vance knocks the gun out of Williamson's hand, and Officer Glidden tasers him in the back.

Ultimately, Williamson was secured, and Officer Glidden locked the gun in his patrol vehicle. At that point, Officer Glidden was able to identify the gun as an airsoft gun.

Following this incident, the State charged Williamson by information with one count each of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count I) and resisting an officer without violence (Count II). Williamson filed a Motion to Dismiss Count I, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), arguing that the State could not establish a prima facie case of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In support, Williamson referred to the bodycam footage of the incident giving rise to Count I, arguing that an objective factual view of the bodycam recording left no material fact to be disputed because there was no evidence Williamson intentionally and unlawfully threatened the officer. Williamson emphasized that "a witness’ interpretation of events is not a material fact to be disputed."

In response to Williamson's motion, the State filed a traverse, asserting that there were material facts in dispute and that those facts did establish a prima facie case of aggravated assault. Specifically, the State asserted that Williamson's actions in "refusing to comply with lawful orders, brandishing a suspected firearm, and waiving [sic] and pointing that suspected firearm towards Officer Glidden while moving in his direction all comprise an overt act that the defendant, Mr. Williamson, intentionally and unlawfully threatened Officer Glidden."

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties stipulated to the admission of Officer Glidden's bodycam video. After viewing the video, the trial court labeled it a "close call" but determined the evidence failed to demonstrate an "overt act intended to place [Officer Glidden] specifically in fear." Instead, the trial court determined the evidence only supported the determination that Williamson intended to not comply with instructions. As a result, the trial court granted Williamson's motion to dismiss.

Rule 3.190(c)(4) "permits a defendant to move to dismiss a charge when ‘[t]here are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant."

We review an order granting a rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss de novo. See State v. Paul , 299 So. 3d 542, 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020).

In conducting our review, the State is entitled to the most favorable construction of the evidence with all inferences being resolved against the defendant. Id. In addition, we bear in mind that a trial judge may not try or determine factual issues nor consider the weight of conflicting evidence or the credibility of witnesses when considering a rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss. Id. (internal citations omitted).

In applying these principles, we first examine the elements required to establish a prima facie case. Pursuant to section 784.011(1), Florida Statutes (2021), an "assault" is "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent." Section 784.021(1), Florida Statutes (2021), then defines "aggravated assault" as including assault "[w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to kill."

At issue in this appeal, as framed by the State, is whether the State's evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of an intentional act. To satisfy the intent element of section 784.011, "the State must prove that the defendant did an act that was substantially certain to put the victim in fear of imminent violence, not that the defendant had the intent to do violence to the victim." Pinkney v. State , 74 So. 3d 572, 576 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ; see also Cambell v. State , 37 So. 3d 948, 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("The only intent inherent in the statutes is the intention to make a threat to do violence.").

Here, both the trial court and Williamson acknowledge that Officer Glidden was in fear, but Williamson argued, and the trial court determined, that what placed him in fear was the fact Williamson had a gun and was not listening, "as opposed to an overt act intended to place him specifically in fear." Specifically, Williamson argues that "brandishing and waiving [sic] an airsoft gun while within shooting range is not an overt act within the meaning of the assault statu...