State v. Willis

898 N.W.2d 642

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Berry Alan WILLIS, Appellant.

A16-0275

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: July 12, 2017

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth A. Scoggin, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

In this case we are asked to decide whether the Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply to restitution hearings held under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2016).¹ The district court overruled objections to documents the State offered during the restitution hearing, concluding that the Rules of Evidence did not apply. The court of appeals affirmed in relevant part, concluding that because restitution is part of a defendant's sentence and Minn. R. Evid. 1101 exempts sentencing from the Rules of Evidence, the rules do not apply to restitution hearings. Because we conclude that Minn. R. Evid. 1101 requires application of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence to restitution hearings, we reverse.

FACTS

The crime at issue here occurred after a bank foreclosed on property that appellant Berry Alan Willis owned. The bank sold the foreclosed property to P.H., who made several improvements to the property with the help of her adult son, J.H. After the sale to P.H., Willis filed a forged quitclaim deed that purported to transfer the foreclosed property from P.H. back to Willis. When P.H. and J.H. later attempted to sell the foreclosed property, Willis's forged quitclaim deed and continual harassment of potential buyers interfered with those efforts. Based on the forged quitclaim deed, the State charged Willis with aggravated forgery, Minn. Stat. § 609.625, subd. 3 (2016). Willis pleaded not guilty and, after a jury trial, the jury found Willis guilty of aggravated forgery.

At Willis's February 2015 sentencing, the district court imposed a presumptive guideline sentence. The court also told Willis that it was "reserv[ing] restitution for 90 days to allow the State and the victims to come forward with a claim or claims and then [Willis] would have that right to challenge it through the restitution process set forth by statute."²

The State made a restitution request and in April 2015, the district court filed Restitution Findings and a Restitution Order. In that order, the court ordered Willis to pay $25,400 to P.H. and J.H. Willis requested a restitution hearing.

At the restitution hearing, the State presented a letter from P.H.'s attorney describing the $2,000 in legal fees P.H. incurred to clear the title to the foreclosed property. The district court asked if Willis had any objections to the letter, and Willis replied, "Yes, I would object to this exhibit here." The court overruled Willis's objection and admitted the letter. Later in the hearing, the State offered a group of e-mails exchanged between J.H. and several real estate agents that described how Willis had interfered with the agents' efforts to show the foreclosed property to prospective buyers. Willis objected to the admissibility of the e-mails on hearsay grounds. When the court asked the State to respond to Willis's objection, the State replied, "the Rules of Evidence ... don't strictly apply ... to a restitution hearing and [J.H.] is qualified to explain the document." The court responded, "Okay. On that basis I'll overrule the objection." Willis made similar objections to five additional exhibits during the restitution hearing, all of which were admitted over his objections.

About 3 weeks after the restitution hearing, the district court filed a written order requiring Willis to pay P.H. restitution in the amount of $10,742, including the $2,000 in legal fees outlined in the letter from P.H.'s attorney.³ The order contained findings of fact that were based on the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, including the evidence to which Willis objected. Willis appealed the restitution order.

On appeal, Willis challenged the district court's evidentiary rulings, arguing that the district court erred in failing to apply the Minnesota Rules of Evidence at the restitution hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings. The court of appeals concluded that "the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence," and because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings, "it follows that the evidentiary rules do not apply to restitution hearings." State v. Willis , 883 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn.App. 2016). We granted Willis's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

The Minnesota Rules of Evidence "apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state," except for those proceedings described in Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b). Minn. R. Evid. 1101(a). The specific part of paragraph (b) at issue in this case is clause 3, titled "Miscellaneous proceedings." Under clause 3, the Rules of Evidence do not apply to:

Proceedings for extradition or rendition; probable cause hearings; sentencing , or granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise.

Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3) (emphasis added).

The court of appeals concluded, and the State argues, that restitution hearings are part of "sentencing" for purposes of Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3). Willis disagrees. The parties' competing arguments on the meaning of the word "sentencing" in Rule 1101(b)(3) present a question of law subject to de novo review. See State v. Stone , 784 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn. 2010). When interpreting the Rules of Evidence, we first look at the plain language of the rule. Id. Words and phrases are construed according to the rules of grammar and their common and approved usage. State v. Dahlin , 753 N.W.2d 300, 306 (Minn. 2008). If the plain language of a rule is unambiguous, we must apply it. State v. Davis , 864 N.W.2d 171, 182 (Minn. 2015). But "if the rule ... [is] ‘subject to more than one reasonable interpretation,’ will we look beyond the plain language of the rule." Madison Equities, Inc. v. Crockarell , 889 N.W.2d 568, 571-72 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014) ).

According to the State, we should interpret the word "sentencing," as used in Rule 1101(b)(3), to include restitution hearings because a defendant's restitution obligation is part of the sentence. Willis contends that such an interpretation is unreasonable for two reasons. First, Willis notes that we recently interpreted the word "sentencing" to mean "the proceeding at which a judge listens to the parties' sentencing arguments; considers all the relevant facts, including the special verdicts returned at an earlier Blakely trial; and then announces the sentence." State v. Sanchez-Sanchez , 879 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. 2016) (concluding that the word "sentencing" as used in Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3) does not include a Blakely court trial). Willis contends that what happens at a restitution hearing does not constitute sentencing as we interpreted that term in Sanchez-Sanchez . Second, Willis argues, the State's interpretation fails to acknowledge an important distinction between the act of imposing a restitution obligation as part of a sentence and the hearing under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b), to resolve factual disputes regarding the proper amount or type of restitution. According to Willis, the fact that the imposition of a restitution obligation occurs at sentencing is irrelevant to the issue of whether the restitution hearing under section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), is one of the "[m]iscellaneous proceedings" to which the Rules of Evidence do not apply under Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3). Willis contends that the issue turns on whether restitution hearings are listed in Rule 1101(b)(3). Because the plain language of Minn. R. Evid 1101(b)(3) makes no reference to restitution hearings, Willis argues the only reasonable interpretation of the rule is that a restitution hearing is not a miscellaneous proceeding.

We agree with Willis that under Minn. R. Evid. 1101, as we have interpreted it, the Rules of Evidence apply to restitution hearings. The only basis to exclude restitution hearings would be if they were one of the "[m]iscellaneous proceedings" listed in Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3). But that rule makes no reference to restitution hearings. We have interpreted similar silence to mean that the Rules of Evidence apply to any unlisted proceedings. See Sanchez-Sanchez , 879 N.W.2d at 329-30 (holding that the Rules of Evidence apply during a Blakely court trial because such proceedings are not mentioned in Rule 1101(b)(3) ); State v. Rodriguez , 754 N.W.2d 672, 683-84 (Minn. 2008) (holding that because Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3) does not reference jury sentencing trials, the Rules of Evidence apply to those proceedings). We reach the same conclusion here. Because restitution hearings are not expressly excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3), the plain language of Rule 1101 dictates that the Rules of Evidence apply in those proceedings.⁴

In urging us to reach the opposite conclusion, the State and the dissent rest on the premise that restitution is part of a defendant's criminal sentence. We do not disagree that restitution is part of a defendant's sentence.⁵ Our precedent, however, tells us that this superficial conclusion does not answer the question of whether the Rules of Evidence apply to restitution hearings under section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), which resolve factual disputes regarding the proper amount or type of restitution.⁶

In Sanchez-Sanchez , the question was whether the Rules of Evidence applied to a Blakely court trial. 879 N.W.2d at 326. The aggravating factors found to exist during a Blakely trial are obviously an integral part of a defendant's...