State v. Willoughby

1

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANIEL LEWIS WILLOUGHBY, SR.

No. COA23-3

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

January 16, 2024

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 October 2023.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 April 2022 by Judge Richard Kent Harrell in Pender County No. 20 CRS 50730 Superior Court.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Michael T. Wood, for the State.

Mark Montgomery for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, JUDGE.

Defendant Daniel Lewis Willoughby, Sr., appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction for second-degree murder. After careful review, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.

BACKGROUND

On 3 May 2020, Defendant was at home with four of his friends and family members, including Defendant's son Danny Junior. Early in the morning, Danny Junior discovered his former girlfriend ("Ms. Brannon") yelling and knocking on his bedroom window from outside in the front yard. Ms. Brannon and Danny Junior had dated periodically for approximately eight years and Ms. Brannon lived with Danny Junior in Defendant's home until recently. On the morning of 3 May 2020, Ms Brannon went to Defendant's home to retrieve her clothing and demanded to take a shower, and she and Danny Junior argued about those matters through the window. Although Ms. Brannon eventually left, she returned, and the pair resumed their argument through the window; this recurred throughout the day.

Around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., Defendant heard Ms. Brannon and Danny Junior arguing through the window again, and Defendant announced, "[e]nough of this" or that he had "had enough[.]" Defendant walked onto the front porch of his home, about 38 feet from Ms. Brannon, who was standing in the front yard beside Danny Junior's window. Defendant brandished his handgun and Ms. Brannon said, "Oh, well, you're going to [expletive] shoot me, well then shoot me." A houseguest who observed this interaction from the front doorway testified that Defendant then "drew his weapon and shot her." Defendant shot Ms. Brannon twice. She fell to the ground and died at the scene.

On 31 August 2020, a Pender County grand jury indicted Defendant for second-degree murder. This matter came on for trial on 25 April 2022. On 28 April 2022, the jury returned its verdict finding Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court entered judgment upon the verdict and sentenced Defendant to 200-252 months in the custody of the North Carolina Division of Adult Correction. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by declining to instruct the jury on the defense of habitation by declining to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter; by striking a portion of a witness's testimony; and by redacting a portion of the officer's bodycam footage introduced by the State. We disagree.

Statutory Defense of Habitation

We first address Defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it denied his request at the charge conference to instruct the jury on the defense of habitation. Defendant maintains that "[t]here was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that [Defendant] shot [Ms. Brannon] as she was within the curtilage of [Defendant]'s house after she had been told to stay away[,]" thereby warranting a jury instruction on the defense of habitation.

Our General Assembly enacted legislation codifying the common-law defense of habitation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 (2021). A defendant is entitled to the statutory defense of habitation when the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the defendant, supports that the defendant used deadly force "to prevent unlawful entry into the home or to terminate an unlawful entry by an intruder." State v. Kuhns 260 N.C.App. 281, 285, 817 S.E.2d 828, 831 (2018) (emphases omitted) (citation omitted).

In Kuhns, this Court explained that our defensive force "statutes provide two circumstances in which individuals are justified in using deadly force, thus excusing them from criminal culpability." Id. (quoting State v. Lee, 370 N.C. 671, 674, 811 S.E.2d 563, 566 (2018)). "Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a), a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat in any place he or she has the lawful right to be if" (1) that "person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself . . . or another;" or "(2) under the circumstances permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2." Id. (cleaned up).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 states, in relevant part, that a "lawful occupant of a home . . . is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm . . . when using defensive [and deadly] force . . . if both of the following apply":

(1) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a home, . . . or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the home . . . .

(2) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b)(1)-(2).

The presumption under section 14-51.2 is rebuttable, and it will not apply if the person against whom the defensive force is used had "the right to be in . . . the home" and was not subject to any domestic violence or pretrial supervision order of no contact. Id. § 14-51.2(c)(1). The presumption also does not apply where the person against whom force was used had "discontinued all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter" or had "exited[.]" Id. § 14-51.2(c)(5).

"The prime purpose of a court's charge to the jury is the clarification of issues, the elimination of extraneous matters, and a declaration and an application of the law arising on the evidence." Kuhns, 260 N.C.App. at 284, 817 S.E.2d at 830 (citation omitted). "[I]t is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on all substantial features of a case raised by the evidence." Id. (citation omitted). "The trial court must give a requested instruction that is a correct statement of the law and is supported by the evidence." Id. (cleaned up). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 348, 372 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1988). On appeal, we review the trial court's jury instructions de novo. State v. Osorio, 196 N.C.App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009).

We conclude that the evidence in this case, even viewed in the light most favorable to Defendant, rebutted the presumption that Defendant had a reasonable fear of death or bodily injury warranting his use of deadly force against Ms. Brannon. The trial court therefore did not err when it declined to instruct the jury on the defense of habitation.

The facts presented in the instant case are plainly distinguishable from those of Kuhns, in which the evidence supported a jury instruction on the defense of habitation where "[d]espite numerous requests to leave and multiple orders from law enforcement, [the alleged attacker] continued to return to [the] defendant's property while repeatedly threatening him with bodily harm." 260 N.C.App. at 288, 817 S.E.2d at 832.

By contrast, in the case at bar, an eyewitness to the shooting testified that Ms. Brannon was standing in the front yard and was not coming toward Defendant before Defendant shot at her from his front porch. Defendant also admitted to officers that Ms. Brannon was not acting in a threatening manner, and there was no evidence that Ms. Brannon charged at him or threatened him in any way. Rather, the evidence showed that Ms. Brannon stood approximately 38 feet away and exclaimed, "Oh, well, you're going to . . . shoot me," a sentiment that she reiterated, in shock, after Defendant then shot her. Additionally, evidence showed that Defendant was "calm" when officers arrived at the scene, and Defendant repeatedly told officers that he did not intend to shoot Ms. Brannon, but rather that he was aiming at a brick pile in the front yard. Thus, even viewed in the light most favorable to Defendant, the evidence did not support that Defendant was in fear of imminent harm when he shot Ms. Brannon, and the State sufficiently rebutted the presumptions accorded to him under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-51.2 and 14-51.3.

Moreover, we note that “a defendant who testifies that he did not intend to shoot [his alleged] attacker is not entitled to an instruction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 because his own words disprove the rebuttable presumption that he was in reasonable fear of imminent harm.” State v. Cook, 254 N.C.App. 150, 155, 802 S.E.2d 575, 578 (2017), aff'd per curiam, 370 N.C. 506, 809 S.E.2d 566 (2018); see also id. at 156, 802 S.E.2d at 579 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Under holdings of our Supreme Court, it is unlawful for a person to use a warning shot as a means of self-defense . . . instead of shooting to kill one's attacker.”).

Defendant repeatedly told officers that he aimed the gun and fired at a brick pile near Ms. Brannon. Because Defendant merely intended to fire a warning shot, he did not, as a matter of law, subjectively believe that he needed to use deadly force against the victim. Id. at 155, 802 S.E.2d at 578 (majority...