State v. Woldt

293 Neb. 265

876 N.W.2d 891

State of Nebraska, appellee,

v.Adam T. Woldt, appellant.

No. S–14–573

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed April 8, 2016

Thomas B. Donner, West Point, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson and Jon Bruning, Attorneys General, and Austin N. Relph for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Kelch, JJ.

Heavican, C.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Adam T. Woldt was convicted in the county court for Cuming County of driving under the influence and was sentenced to 6 months' probation. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the district court. On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals found that police did not act reasonably in stopping Woldt. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed Woldt's conviction and remanded the cause with directions.¹ Upon further review, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts leading up to Woldt's stop are as follows: Officer Randy Davie of the Wisner, Nebraska, police department received a report from dispatch of multiple traffic cones having been knocked down on Highway 275, the main street in Wisner. Dispatch indicated that the party responsible was driving a white Chevrolet pickup.

Davie stopped to pick up the cones. While doing so, he heard squealing tires nearby. Davie finished picking up the cones, returned to his cruiser, and began looking for the pickup. He found the pickup nearby and, recognizing the driver as Jacob Biggerstaff, made eye contact and motioned with his arm for Biggerstaff to pull over. Biggerstaff pulled up about four or five car lengths farther and parked along the opposite curb from Davie's location. Following Biggerstaff by one car length or less was another pickup, driven by Woldt. When Biggerstaff pulled his pickup over, Woldt also pulled his pickup over.

Davie approached Biggerstaff's vehicle, smelled the odor of alcohol, and saw signs that Biggerstaff might have been impaired. Davie brought Biggerstaff back to his patrol car.

At that time, the pickup driven by Woldt reversed into the intersection as if to drive away. Davie testified that he recognized Woldt "[b]y sight" as an employee of the city of Wisner. Davie motioned for Woldt to stop and to come over to Davie. Davie testified that he did not recall whether he verbally requested that Woldt stop, but both Woldt and Biggerstaff testified that he did so. Davie testified that he wanted to talk to Woldt because he thought that Woldt might have information about Biggerstaff's activities.

Davie approached Woldt's vehicle and smelled the odor of alcohol. Davie asked Woldt if he had been drinking, and Woldt put his head down. Davie asked Woldt if he was drunk, and Woldt turned off his vehicle and handed Davie his keys. Woldt was arrested for driving under the influence. Woldt stipulated that chemical test results of his breath registered an alcohol content of .148.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2013, Woldt was charged in the county court for Cuming County with misdemeanor driving under the influence. He pled not guilty. Woldt then filed a motion to suppress his stop, detention, arrest, and any statements he had made. The motion to suppress was denied on December 3. Woldt was found guilty following a trial on stipulated facts and was sentenced to 6 months' probation.

Woldt appealed to the district court, sitting as an intermediate court of appeal. The district court affirmed.

Woldt then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed his conviction and remanded the cause with directions. The Court of Appeals concluded that law enforcement's stop was not reasonable under Brown v. Texas² and Illinois v. Lidster.³ Specifically, the Court of Appeals focused on the balancing test set forth in Brown, which requires a "weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."⁴

The Court of Appeals agreed that it was "reasonable for Davie to believe that Woldt was a potential witness to any crimes by Biggerstaff and might have information for Davie that would advance his investigation of those crimes," but also stated that because Davie recognized Woldt as a city employee, he could have contacted Woldt at a later date if necessary.⁵ The Court of Appeals further noted that "the degree of intrusion on Woldt's liberty interest was not great."⁶ But the Court of Appeals found that the "matters under investigation under the circumstances of this case were not of grave public concern"⁷ and concluded that the intrusion still was not "outweighed by the degree of public concern and the extent to which questioning Woldt at that time advanced any investigation of Biggerstaff."⁸

We granted the State's petition for further review.

IV. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On further review, the State assigns that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) concluding that the stop of Woldt was not reasonable, and thus unconstitutional, under Brown and (2) refusing to address the State's alternative argument that the stop of Woldt was reasonable based upon Davie's observation of conduct by Woldt that amounted to traffic violations.

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review.⁹ Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's findings for clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protection is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court's determination.¹⁰ The ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and probable cause to perform a warrantless search are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the trial judge.¹¹

VI. ANALYSIS

The issue presented by this case is whether Davie's stop of Woldt was reasonable. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the "reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest" in Brown v. Texas.¹² The Court held that such reasonableness

depends " ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ " [Citations omitted.] Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.¹³

The Court applied Brown in Illinois v. Lidster.¹⁴ In Lidster, law enforcement conducted a checkpoint in order to gather information about a hit-and-run accident that had occurred a week earlier at a location near the checkpoint. During the course of the operation of the checkpoint, the defendant was stopped and determined to be driving under the influence.

The Court declined to apply Indianapolis v. Edmond¹⁵ to the checkpoint at issue in Lidster. In Edmond, the Court found that the intent of the checkpoint was to detect criminal activity and that such violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court distinguished Lidster from Edmond, because the purpose of the checkpoint was for information gathering purposes, and noted that such did "not mean the stop is automatically, or even presumptively, constitutional. It simply means that we must judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances."¹⁶ The Court then applied the Brown balancing test and held that the checkpoint advanced a grave public concern, was narrowly tailored to fit law enforcement's investigatory needs, and interfered only minimally with a driver's liberty.

1. WAS THERE SEIZURE FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PURPOSES?

The State concedes that Woldt was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. A seizure in the Fourth Amendment context occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.¹⁷ We agree that on these facts, Davie seized Woldt for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when Davie motioned to Woldt and possibly verbally requested Woldt to not leave the scene.

2. DOES LIDSTER APPLY TO NON–CHECKPOINT CASES ?

Having concluded that the Fourth Amendment is implicated here, we turn to Woldt's contention that Lidster and Brown are inapplicable because this case is not a checkpoint case.

We have found multiple cases where a court discussed or applied Lidster to a non-checkpoint stop.¹⁸ And in any case, by its terms, Brown envisions that its balancing test should be applied when assessing "the reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest."¹⁹ The situation presented by these facts is such a seizure, and the application of the Brown balancing test is appropriate here.

3. WAS STOP REASONABLE UNDER BROWN ?

Under Brown, a court should consider the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty, in order to determine whether a stop was reasonable.

In this case, the district court concluded that the stop was reasonable. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court of Appeals agreed that "the degree of intrusion on Woldt's liberty interest was not great," but further concluded that the "matters under investigation under the circumstances of this case were not of grave public concern" and that "the evidence does not show that stopping and questioning Woldt at that time would have advanced the investigation to a greater degree than contacting him the following day at his workplace would have."²⁰ As such, the Court of Appeals found the stop unreasonable.

(a) Gravity of Public Concern

We turn first to the public concern at issue. The Court of...