State v. Woolard

894 S.E.2d 717

STATE of North Carolina

v.Melvin Ray WOOLARD, Jr.

No. 208PA22

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed December 15, 2023

On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review order granting defendant's motion to suppress entered on 29 March 2022 by Judge Darrell B. Cayton Jr. in District Court, Beaufort County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 September 2023.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kathryne E. Hathcock, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

The Robinson Law Firm, P.A., Greenville, by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendant-appellee.

EARLS, Justice.

On 11 April 2020, Captain Rodney Sawyer arrested Melvin Woolard Jr. for driving while impaired. Before trial, Mr. Woolard moved to suppress evidence seized during his arrest. The district court preliminarily granted his motion, ruling that Captain Sawyer lacked probable cause to suspect Mr. Woolard of drunk driving.

The State appealed that decision to superior court. That court also found that Mr. Woolard’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. At the superior court’s instruction, the district court entered a final order suppressing the evidence. Dissatisfied with that ruling, the State sought review in the Court of Appeals and then this Court. We agreed to review the district court’s final order.

The question before us is simple: Did Captain Sawyer have probable cause to arrest Mr. Woolard for impaired driving? Our answer is yes. Drawing on the district court’s factual findings, we hold that Captain Sawyer’s "belief of guilt" was objectively reasonable and rooted in concrete evidence. See Maryland ?. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). Because Mr. Woolard’s arrest thus satisfied the Fourth Amendment, we reverse the district court’s suppression order and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. Facts

A. The Arrest

On the afternoon of 11 April 2020, Captain Sawyer—a State Highway Patrol Officer— was driving along a rural road in Beaufort County. For a while, he found himself a solo traveler.

That changed when a truck pulled onto the road in front of him. Captain Sawyer and the truck were the only cars in sight. About a mile separated them. Like Captain Sawyer, the truck travelled south. But unlike Captain Sawyer, the truck wove in and out of its lane.

The officer watched as the truck darted over the centerline—six to seven times by his count. Twice, the truck lurched into the on- coming lane. And at one point, it even skidded onto the road’s right shoulder.

Concerned, Captain Sawyer flashed his lights to stop the truck. The other driver quickly pulled over. Although canals and ditches flanked both sides of the road, the truck avoided them as it stopped.

As Captain Sawyer approached the truck, he saw Mr. Woolard behind the wheel. A woman sat beside him. On first glance, Mr. Woolard seemed normal. Captain Sawyer saw no alcohol or contraband in the truck, and nothing in the vehicle alarmed him.

The officer told Mr. Woolard the reason for the stop: Mr. Woolard’s erratic driving. Mr. Woolard replied that he was headed to work. He explained that he noticed bees inside the truck, and his efforts to shoo them out the window’ caused him to swerve. At Captain Sawyer’s request, Mr. Woolard produced his driver’s license and registration.

As they spoke, Captain Sawyer smelled alcohol on Mr. Woolard’s breath and from inside his truck. The officer’s suspicions grew when he noticed Mr. Woolard’s flushed cheeks, and red and glassy eyes. Still, Mr. Woolard seemed coherent—he chatted normally with Captain Sawyer and appeared in control of his mind and body.

Captain Sawyer returned to his patrol car to check Mr. Woolard’s license and registration. He found "nothing unusual." But back at Mr. Woolard’s truck, Captain Sawyer questioned him about the smell of alcohol. Mr. Woolard confessed that he drank "a couple of beers earlier."

At that point, Captain Sawyer asked Mr. Woolard to take a preliminary breath test (PBT). Mr. Woolard agreed. As he exited his truck, Mr. Woolard’s balance was unremarkable.

Captain Sawyer gave Mr. Woolard two PBTs and a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. During an HGN test, an officer checks for involuntary nystagmus—the jerking or fluttering of the eyes—as a person watches an object move.¹ See State ?. Helms, 348 N.C. 578, 579, 504 S.E.2d 293 (1998). As that object "travels toward the outside of the subject’s vision," the officer monitors whether the eyes twitch or bounce. Id. at 580, 504 S.E.2d 293. If they do—especially before the "object has traveled 45 degrees from the center of the person’s vision"—it signals intoxication. Id. At six points during the HGN test, an officer notes "clues" of impairment. The more clues he gathers, the more likely the driver is impaired. When Captain Sawyer tested Mr. Woolard, he logged all six possible clues.

After the HGN test, Captain Sawyer arrested and charged Mr. Woolard for driving while impaired in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20- 138.1(a)(1). In relevant part, that statute prohibits people from "driv[ing] any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area within this State" while "under the influence of an impairing substance." N.C.G.S. § 20438.1(a)(1) (2021).²

B. The Suppression Ruling

Mr. Woolard’s case came before Judge Darrell B. Cayton Jr. of District Court, Beaufort County. Before trial, Mr. Woolard moved to suppress portions of the State’s evidence.

Mr. Woolard first challenged the PBT results. In his view, Captain Sawyer broke from the procedures set by N.C.G.S. § 20- 16.3(c). That provision—aptly titled "Tests Must Be Made with Approved Devices and in Approved Manner"—instructs that "No screening test for alcohol concentration is a valid one" unless "conducted in accordance with the applicable regulations of the Department as to the manner of its use." N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3(c) (2021). When Captain Sawyer tested Mr. Woolard, those "applicable regulations" required him to first ensure that Mr. Woolard "removed all food, drink, tobacco products, chewing gum and other substances and objects from his mouth." 10A N.C. Admin. Code 41B.0502 (2022). Because the officer neglected to do so, Mr. Woolard faulted the PBTs as unreliable and procedurally defective. The district court agreed and excluded them.

Mr. Woolard also disputed the HGN test. Although no statute sets specific protocols, Mr. Woolard pointed to the procedures recommended by the National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA). Because Captain Sawyer diverged from those protocols, Mr. Woolard argued, the HGN test—like the PBTs—should be discarded. The district court disagreed. Although Captain Sawyer strayed from the NHTSA’s guidelines, the court reasoned that his oversight went to the weight of the HGN results, "not their admissibility."³

Most relevant here, Mr. Woolard urged the district court to suppress evidence seized during his arrest. In his view, that arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because Captain Sawyer lacked probable cause to suspect him of impaired driving. The district court agreed and entered a Pre-Trial Indica- tion to suppress the evidence. It filed a written order soon after.

C. The State’s Appeals

The State sought review from the Superior Court, Beaufort County as permitted by statute. See N.C.G.S. 20-38.7(a) (2021). That court also found that Captain Sawyer lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Woolard for impaired driving. The superior court thus directed the district court to suppress the evidence. A few weeks later, the district court entered its final suppression order.

The State disagreed with that ruling and petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari. When that court denied its request, the State sought this Court’s review. We granted certiorari to examine the district court’s final suppression order.

II. This Court’s Jurisdiction and the Scope of Our Review

A. Jurisdiction

Before reaching the merits, we resolve two procedural issues. First, Mr. Woolard disputes whether this Court may hear his case at all. In his view, the State improperly leapfrogged the superior court. According to Mr. Woolard, the State needed to go to superior court before seeking review from the Court of Appeals. And since the State broke the proper chain of appeal, Mr. Woolard urges, it improperly sought certiorari and we improperly granted its petition.

[1, 2] However, the State’s petition does fall within our certiorari jurisdiction. Under Rule 21, parties may seek a writ of certiorari in "appropriate circumstances" to appeal the "orders of trial tribunals when … no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists." N.C. R. App. P. 21. The State’s petition here fits that condition. For one, the district court’s final suppression order is interlocutory. Though it excludes portions of the State’s evidence, it requires "further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy." Veazey ?. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377 (1950); cf. State ?. Fowler, 197 N.C. App. 1, 5-6, 676 S.E.2d 523 (2009), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 364 N.C. 129, 696 S.E.2d 695 (2010) (concluding that a superior court order allowing motion to suppress did not end a criminal case because, even if the ruling "may have the same ‘effect’ of a final order," it "requires further action for finality").

The question, then, is whether the State could appeal that interlocutory order as of right. If not, Rule 21 allowed it to petition this Court for certiorari. The parties disagree on that score. According to the State, it lacks a statutory vehicle to challenge the district court’s ruling. And because the order is not a "final disposition" of Mr. Woolard’s case, the State is suspended in procedural limbo—an "interlocutory no-man’s land." With no avenue to appeal the suppression order, the State contends, a writ of certiorari was its only opportunity to seek review.⁴ Mr. Woolard, on the other hand, points to statutes...