State v. Yonis

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Amil Abdi Yonis, Appellant.

A19-0655

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

March 23, 2020

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-17-25578

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kassius O. Benson, Sara B. Perlmutter, Kassius Benson Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges her convictions of malicious punishment, neglect, and endangerment of her stepson. She argues that (1) the prosecutor committed multiple prejudicial discovery violations, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, (3) the district court erred in deferring her motion for judgment of acquittal, and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Amil Yonis married Thomas Kastigar in 2007, becoming stepmother to his two sons, 8-year-old C.K. and 4-year-old M.O. They lived with Kastigar's mother (grandmother) and her husband. Yonis and Kastigar had a daughter in 2009. They moved to their own apartment in 2010 after experiencing conflict with grandmother, who believed their parenting style was too strict.

In the following years, Yonis and Kastigar had additional children, and their treatment of M.O. and C.K. became more extreme. M.O. and his brother were not allowed to sit on chairs or sleep in a bed. They had to get permission to use the bathroom, and Yonis became increasingly strict about bathroom privileges. When they were unable to hold it any longer, they wet themselves. For M.O., this happened "pretty often," up to several times a week.

Yonis and Kastigar inflicted various punishments for the boys' wetting and misbehavior, often more frequent and more severe for M.O. Kastigar hit the boys on the bare buttocks with a belt, while Yonis hit them all over their bodies with a thick wooden spoon or a hanger. Sometimes they were hit two or three times a week, and sometimes not for a week or two.¹ Each time he was hit, M.O. was bruised and sore for days; althoughhis clothing generally covered the marks, he had difficulty sitting down, going to the bathroom, and writing. Yonis and Kastigar also withheld food from the boys as a punishment. This occurred sporadically, but sometimes the boys went days in a row with little or no food at home.

In June 2013, C.K. ran away from home, and M.O.'s circumstances worsened. Yonis and Kastigar began forcing M.O. to stand bent over with his arms wrapped around his legs and gripping his ears, holding the painful position for hours. They also forced him to stand in a particular spot in the hallway for long periods of time, often the entire day. When he was given food, he ate in that spot. He still had to ask to use the bathroom, and Yonis and Kastigar began having his sisters watch him to make sure he did not "do something like vandalize their bathroom or . . . steal their Q-tips."

During the 2016-17 school year, when M.O. was in eighth grade, Kastigar and Yonis refused to let M.O. have a key to the apartment, so the boy waited in the building hallway after school, often for hours. Kastigar also began punishing M.O. by tying the boy's hands above his head with a jump rope and affixing them to the top hinge of a door, where he would spend the night.

On July 4, 2017, M.O. used money he had found to buy a package of cookies. He ate "a whole bunch of them," then vomited in the apartment. Yonis and Kastigar yelled at him for vomiting, telling him, "You're going to regret it tomorrow." The following morning, M.O. ran away. He contacted grandmother, whom he had not seen in four years, and she took him in. He weighed 87 pounds and had not grown appreciably since she last saw him; medical examination confirmed that his growth had plateaued from "chronicmalnutrition." But with regular access to food, he quickly grew and put on weight. He also stopped having trouble with wetting because he was able to use the bathroom freely.

In August, grandmother contacted Hennepin County Child Protection. M.O. consistently recounted Yonis and Kastigar's treatment of him to a county social worker, a pediatrician, and a forensic interviewer at CornerHouse, a child advocacy center. He was placed in grandmother's care.

Yonis and Kastigar were charged with child neglect, child endangerment, and two counts of malicious punishment of a child (substantial bodily harm and great bodily harm). After a two-week joint trial, beginning with 15-year-old M.O.'s testimony, a jury found them both guilty of all charges except for malicious punishment resulting in great bodily harm. Yonis appeals.²

DECISION

I. Yonis has not demonstrated prejudicial discovery violations.

A prosecutor must disclose (1) known written or recorded witness statements, (2) written summaries of oral statements, and (3) the substance of oral statements that relate to the case. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1. This obligation applies "before and during trial," and a disclosure must be made "in time to afford counsel the opportunity to make beneficial use of it." Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 2(a), (c). If the prosecutor does not comply, the district court "may, on notice and motion, order the party to permit thediscovery, grant a continuance, or enter any order it deems just in the circumstances." Id., subd. 8.

"The imposition of sanctions for violations of discovery rules and orders is a matter particularly suited to the judgment and discretion of the [district] court." State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979). In determining the appropriate sanction, courts consider (1) the reason for the nondisclosure, (2) prejudice to the objecting party, (3) whether the prejudice can be remedied by a continuance, and (4) any other relevant concern. Id. We will reverse a conviction only if the appellant demonstrates both a discovery violation and resulting prejudice. State v. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d 470, 479 (Minn. 2009).

Yonis contends the prosecutor violated her discovery obligations by failing to disclose the audio recording of interviews she and Kastigar and two of their daughters gave to the county social worker in August 2017. The issue arose in the second week of trial, during Yonis's cross-examination. During a break, the prosecutor informed counsel that she intended to question Yonis about a particular section of the interview transcript. Yonis's counsel objected, stating she had not known the interviews were recorded or transcribed. The prosecutor noted that the social worker's summary of the interviews was previously disclosed as part of the child-protection file, and stated that her records indicated the recording itself was disclosed more than five months earlier. But the prosecutor acknowledged that something may have gone wrong in transmitting the recording. Yonis's counsel agreed that the prosecutor had not intentionally withheld the recording.

After an extended discussion, the district court and the parties agreed to a four-part solution. First, Yonis's counsel was afforded time to fully review the recording and transcript, and compare them to previous testimony and the child-protection file, including the social worker's summary. Second, the district court permitted Yonis's counsel to re-call Yonis for further direct examination before the prosecutor continued her cross-examination. Third, after the court indicated its willingness to exclude the recording and transcript, the parties stipulated to the admission (through Yonis's testimony) of segments of the daughters' interviews. Fourth, the district court permitted Yonis's counsel to re-call the social worker.

Yonis now argues that the district court, in helping to fashion this "remedy," found a discovery violation, and that "this remedy was inadequate and there should have been a mistrial." We disagree. Yonis did not ask the district court to find that the prosecutor committed a discovery violation, and the court made no such finding. Nor is a violation clearly apparent from the record; the prosecutor stated that she disclosed, or attempted to disclose, the recording, and Yonis's counsel acknowledged that any disclosure failure was unintentional. But even if we assume there was a discovery violation, the parties and the district court crafted an appropriate remedy. The four agreed-to steps remedied any prejudice to Yonis.

Yonis also asserts that the prosecutor deprived her of a fair trial by failing to disclose until mid-trial (1) photographs taken during an August 2017 medical examination of M.O., (2) emails Yonis sent in March 2018, and (3) photographs of M.O. "engaged in various different activities." This argument lacks merit. While Yonis cites to a portion in therecord where she objected to the disclosure of these items, she overlooks her acceptance of the prosecutor's statement that she disclosed the evidence as soon as she received it. More importantly, Yonis fails to acknowledge that the prosecutor ultimately agreed to and did not use the evidence in question. In sum, the record demonstrates neither error nor prejudice that would entitle Yonis to a new trial due to discovery violations.

II. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument.

Where, as here, the appellant did not object to claimed prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a modified plain-error standard. State v. Parker, 901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017). The appellant must show that the prosecutor erred and the error was plain. Id. If the appellant establishes plain error, the state must show that the appellant was not prejudiced. Id.

In evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on closing argument, we consider...