State v. Young

314 A.3d 688

STATE of Delaware,

v.Devon D. YOUNG, Defendant.

I.D. No. 2304008917

Superior Court of Delaware.

Submitted: October 20, 2023

Decided: January 31, 2024

Upon Defendants Motion to Suppress Evidence, DENIED

Evan D. Sweeney, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Cara M. Brophy, Esquire, Office of Defense Services, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.

OPINION

Primos, J.

Before the Court is a Motion to Suppress filed by Defendant Devon Young based on evidence that was seized from his home because he had allegedly violated the terms of his probation. Because the motion raised a legal issue, the Court held oral argument, and supplemental briefing followed.

Defendant Devon Young argues that 11 Del. C. § 4821(d), which addresses warrantless searches of probationers, is unambiguous and allows searches only of probationers’ persons, not of their homes. The State agrees that Subsection 4321(d) is unambiguous but argues, contrary to the defense, that it authorizes searches of probationers’ homes as well as their persons. The State argues in the alternative that, should the Court find the statute ambiguous, available legislative history establishes the General Assembly’s intent to codify the then-current practice of allowing probation officers to search probationers’ homes as well as their persons.

In the Court’s view, Subsection 4321(d) is ambiguous because there are two reasonable, but divergent, interpretations of its plain language. After reviewing the pertinent legislative history for House Bill 524, the Court finds that the legislature’s intent was for "searches of individuals" to include probationers’ homes as well as their persons. This finding is further but-tressed by the legal principle of stare decisis. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Defendant Devon Young’s Motion to Suppress should be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

On April 17, 2023, members of the Delaware State Police ("DSP") Kent County Governor’s Task Force and Dover Probation and Parole responded to a probation check at 3978 Barratts Chapel Road in Frederica, Delaware, with negative results.² At that time, Defendant Devon Young ("Mr. Young") was on Level III probation.³ Mr. Young was contacted by two law enforcement officers—his supervising officer, PO James, and DSP Detective Ciglinsky—at 10544 South DuPont Highway in Felton, Delaware.⁴ Mr. Young was handcuffed for a purported curfew violation, placed into Detective Ciglinsky’s vehicle, and transported back to 3978 Barratts Chapel Road without incident.⁵

Subsequently, Mr. Young’s residence was subjected to an approved administrative search that revealed a large amount of drugs, paraphernalia, and cash.⁶ On July 3, 2023, Mr. Young was indicted on four counts of Drug Dealing, three counts of Drug Possession, one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.⁷

Title 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) provides in pertinent part as follows:

Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as constables under the laws of this State and may conduct searches of individuals under probation and parole supervision in accordance with Department [of Correction] procedures while in the performance of the lawful duties of theiremployment ….⁸

On August 16, 2023, Mr. Young filed a motion to suppress evidence that was found at his residence (the "Motion"), arguing that 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) is unambiguous in that the General Assembly intended to authorize probation officers to conduct "searches of individuals," i.e., warrantless searches of individual probationers, but not of their homes or vehicles.⁹ Prior to searching a probationer’s home, according to Mr. Young, a probation officer must first obtain a search warrant based upon probable cause.¹⁰ In advancing this argument, Mr. Young points to the Delaware Supreme Court’s statement that "[p]articularly when conducting warrantless searches, probation officers may act only pursuant to explicit statutory authority."¹¹ According to Mr. Young, Department of Correction ("DOC") Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 ("Procedure 7.19")¹² exceeds that statutory authority in purporting to authorize warrantless searches of probationers’ residences.¹³

In its written response filed on September 12, 2023, the State agreed that Subsection 4321(d) is unambiguous, but argued that it unambiguously authorizes searches of probationers’ homes and vehicles as well as their persons.¹⁴ The State pointed to the language "in accordance with Department procedures"—i.e., because Procedure 7.19 authorizes warrantless searches of probationers’ homes and vehicles as well as their persons, the statutory language authorizes such searches.¹⁵ The State further relied upon Supreme Court precedent finding that Subsection 4321(d) authorizes searches of probationers’ homes, as well as a bench decision of this Court finding Subsection 4821(d) to be unambiguous in authorizing such searches.¹⁶

On September 20, 2023, the Court held oral argument on the Motion. At the close of the argument, the Court shared with the parties its inclination to find Subsection 4321(d) ambiguous and asked the parties to address, in supplemental briefing, five questions germane to the interpretation of the statute: (1) an explanation of the record of the committee vote on House Bill 524 ("HB 524");¹⁷ (2) what, if any, additional legislative history exists regarding HB 524; (3) whether the fact that Subsection 4231(d) has been interpreted for over thirty years to authorize searches of probationers’ residences, along with the fact that the General Assembly has not amended it during that period, sheds light on the appropriate interpretation of the provision; (4) the importance of committee reports as legislative history; and (5) the relevance to this case, if any, of the Delaware Supreme Court decision in State v. Barnes.¹⁸ On October 20, 2023, both parties submitted their supplemental briefs.¹⁹

DISCUSSION

[1] To justify a warrantless search and seizure, the State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer’s actions complied "with the requirements of the United States Constitution, the Delaware Constitution, and any applicable statutes."²⁰

[2] By consenting to probationary supervision, offenders "sacrifice some of their privacy rights in exchange for freedom from incarceration."²¹ Our Supreme Court has consistently held that probation officers have authorization to conduct warrantless administrative searches of probationers’ homes.²² The Supreme Court has also held that a probation officer needs only "a reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds to justify an administrative search of a residence or car,"²³ and that probation officers act "reasonably so long as they substantially comply with [DOC] regulations."²⁴ DOC Procedure 7.19 was promulgated pursuant to statutory authority under Subsection 4321(d),²⁵ and thus, lack of substantial compliance with it is a statutory violation warranting exclusion of evidence.²⁶

I. Title 11 Del, C, § 4321(d) Is Ambiguous.

[3, 4] When construing a statute, the Court must first examine its text to address whether it is ambiguous.²⁷ In doing so, the Court considers whether (1) the statute is reasonably susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations, or (2) a literal interpretation of its words would lead to "a result so unreasonable or absurd it could not have been intended by the legislature."²⁸

[5–8] If the Court finds that there is uncertainty, then "rules of statutory construction are applied … [and] the statute must be viewed as a whole, and literal or perceived interpretations which yield mischievous or absurd results are to be avoided."²⁹ Ambiguity is not found in a situation in which the parties merely disagree about the meaning of the statutory language.³⁰ If the intent of the legislature is clearly reflected by the unambiguous language in the statute, then there is no need for statutory interpretation because the plain meaning of the words controls.³¹ "The legislative body is presumed to have inserted every provision for some useful purpose and construction[.]"³²

[9] Mr. Young argues that the language of 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) is unambiguous in that it does not authorize administrative searches of anything beyond a probationer’s person because (1) the terms "home" or "vehicle" are not expressly included, but only "individual" is, and (2) the exclusion of "home" and "vehicle" is important because these terms or their equivalents are included in other statutory or constitutional provisions but not in Subsection 4321(d).³³ Conversely, the State argues that the language unambiguously allows searches of probationers’ homes,³⁴ but that even if the Court finds the statute ambiguous, Subsection 4321(d) authorizes administrative searches of probationers’ homes and vehicles because (1) the legislative history of HB 524 makes clear the intent behind the legislature’s use of the word "individual," and (2) the statute has been judicially construed as such for decades with no amendment or change to it.³⁵

The Court finds that Subsection 4321(d) is ambiguous because it is reasonably susceptible of two different conclusions or interpretations. One is that "searches of individuals" includes only searches of probationers’ persons, not their homes. The second is that "searches of individuals" includes searches of probationers’ persons and homes. For the following reasons, both interpretations are reasonable.

A. The Defense’s Interpretation

As to the first interpretation of Subsection 4321(d), it is a reasonable position that "searches of individuals" on its face, and giving its express words their plain meaning, includes only probationers’ persons, not their homes.

An "individual" is defined as (1) "a single human being or item as distinct from a group" and (2) "a distinctive or original person."³⁶ It is therefore reasonable to interpret "searches...