State v. Young

322 So.3d 830

STATE of Louisiana

v.Aaron Maurice YOUNG

2020 KA 0412

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment Rendered: MARCH 18, 2021

Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney, Dylan C. Alge, Assistant District Attorney, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, State of Louisiana

Bruce G. Whittaker, New Orleans, Louisaiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Aaron Maurice Young

BEFORE: GUIDRY, McCLENDON, AND LANIER, JJ.

McCLENDON, J.

The defendant, Aaron Maurice Young, was charged by bill of information with one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (count I), a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(C) ; and one count of illegal carrying of a weapon while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance (count II), a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:95(E). He initially pled not guilty on both counts. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence the State intended to use against him, alleging it was seized in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. Following a hearing, the motion to suppress evidence was denied. Thereafter, in exchange for the dismissal of count II and forfeiture of the seized firearm, the defendant pled guilty to count I,¹ reserving his right to seek review of the court's ruling on the motion to suppress. See State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 588 (La. 1976). The court sentenced the defendant to two years at hard labor. The defendant now appeals, contending the court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On January 15, 2018, Baton Rouge City Police Officer Gabrielle Collins was on patrol in the area of North 26th Street in Baton Rouge, a high-crime area that Officer Collins testified was known for the illegal sale of narcotics. Officer Collins saw a vehicle driven by the defendant fail to signal before turning. Officer Collins activated the lights and siren on her police car to initiate a traffic stop for the traffic regulation violation.

The defendant did not immediately stop the vehicle; rather, he made two turns before ultimately stopping on North 27^th Street. On the basis of her almost five years experience with the Baton Rouge City Police Department, including a year and one-half experience in the Street Crimes Unit in high-crime areas, Officer Collins was aware that when someone fails to submit to a traffic stop "it's usually indicative, ... that they're hiding something or attempting to conceal something in the vehicle." Accordingly, Officer Collins asked the defendant, who was the sole occupant of the vehicle, to exit the vehicle. The defendant complied with the request.

Officer Collins then conducted a pat down search of the defendant. During the search, Officer Collins felt something that was consistent with or felt like pebbles in the defendant's pocket and asked him what he had in his pocket. The defendant did not respond. Thereafter, Officer Collins retrieved several "crack rocks" from a bag in the defendant's pocket. A subsequent search of the vehicle that the defendant had been driving also revealed the presence of a .25 caliber handgun in "the driver's[-]side door" and a "baggie of marijuana" in the center console.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the court erred in denying the motion to suppress because Officer Collins failed to articulate particular facts upon which to reasonably conclude that there was a substantial possibility that the defendant was armed and dangerous prior to frisking him for weapons.

When the constitutionality of a warrantless search or seizure is placed at issue by a motion to suppress the evidence, the State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence seized without a warrant. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). When a court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. However, a court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. State v. Conklin, 2018-0718 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19), 274 So.3d 675, 680, writ denied, 2019-00665 (La. 10/8/19), 280 So.3d 591.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. art. I, § 5, protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Measured by this standard, LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, as well as federal and state jurisprudence, recognizes the right of a law enforcement officer to temporarily detain and interrogate a person whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. In making a brief investigatory stop on less than probable cause to arrest, the police must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. The police must therefore articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. This level of suspicion, however, need not rise to the probable cause required for a lawful arrest. The police need only have some minimal level of objective justification. A reviewing court must take into account "the totality of the circumstances—whole picture," giving deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained police officer "that might well elude an untrained person." State v. Huntley, 97-0965 (La. 3/13/98), 708 So.2d 1048, 1049 (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ).

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 215.1(B) provides that when a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning and reasonably suspects that he is in danger, he may frisk the outer clothing of such person for a dangerous weapon. Further, if the law enforcement officer reasonably suspects the person possesses a dangerous weapon, he may search the person. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(B). It is not necessary for an investigating officer to establish that a detained individual was more probably than not armed and dangerous in order to justify a pat-down for weapons. Rather, it is sufficient if the officer establishes a substantial possibility of danger by pointing to particular facts that support such a reasonable inference. State v. Lowery, 2004-0802 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/17/04), 890 So.2d 711, 719, writ denied. 2005-0447 (La. 5/13/05), 902 So.2d 1018. Additionally, if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). "[I]mmediately-apparent" requires no more than "probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity." State v. DuPont, 2014-0497 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/14), 2014 WL 5801488 at *3, writ denied, 2014-2595 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So.3d 145, cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1121, 136 S.Ct. 985, 194 L.Ed.2d 8 (2016) ; see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).

The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. The standard is a purely objective one that does not take into account the subjective beliefs or expectations of the detaining officer. Although they may serve, and may often appear intended to serve, as the prelude to the investigation of much more serious offenses, even relatively minor traffic violations provide an objective basis for lawfully detaining the vehicle and its occupants. State v. Waters, 2000-0356 (La. 3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1056 (per curiam). Officer Collins therefore acted lawfully in...