State v. Young-Kirkpatrick

846 S.E.2d 525

STATE of North Carolina

v.Deontrae YOUNG-KIRKPATRICK, Defendant.

No. COA19-1138

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 7, 2020

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kelly A. Moore, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Andrew J. DeSimone, for Defendant.

BROOK, Judge.

Deontrae Young-Kirkpatrick ("Defendant") appeals from judgment entered upon jury verdicts for common law robbery and habitual misdemeanor assault and judgment entered upon plea of guilty for attaining the status of habitual felon. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the common law robbery charge. Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence and that the admission of such evidence was prejudicial. Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in entering a civil judgment for attorney's fees against him.

For the following reasons, we hold that Defendant has failed to demonstrate error in regard to the first two issues; however, we agree that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant to pay attorney's fees.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

After spending the evening at her friend's house on 22 April 2018, Paige Lineberry pulled into her driveway in her new car. Though Defendant, her then-boyfriend, had purchased the car for her two days prior, Ms. Lineberry testified that her father had paid him back either that same day or the next with her tax return money.

Defendant was waiting for Ms. Lineberry in his car parked in her driveway. Ms. Lineberry testified at trial that she got out of her car and into Defendant's car, and the two started talking. After about 30 minutes, they got into an argument when Defendant called Ms. Lineberry "an ass kisser" and "said [her] parents control [her]." Ms. Lineberry testified that she got back into her car, and Defendant moved his car directly behind hers. She backed her car into Defendant's car but did not cause any damage to his car; however, Defendant "jumped out of his car[,]" approached Ms. Lineberry's driver's side window, and began yelling at her. She testified that Defendant told her she was going to have to "fix his mama's car."

Defendant told Ms. Lineberry to get out of the car, but she refused. Ms. Lineberry testified that Defendant proceeded to hit her windows with his fists, then with a tire iron, and finally with a piece of slate that was sitting on the driveway. While Defendant was trying to break into her car, Ms. Lineberry testified that she honked her horn and called her brother, who was inside the house, to try and get his attention. Jade Lineberry, Ms. Lineberry's brother, testified that he answered the phone and then called 911. Defendant eventually broke through one of the car's windows and grabbed Ms. Lineberry by the throat. Ms. Lineberry testified that she felt like she was going to die while he was squeezing her throat.

As Defendant was grabbing her throat, he opened her car door with his other hand and pulled Ms. Lineberry out of the car. She was able to get away from Defendant and ran to her front porch where he cornered her for about 10 minutes. Mr. Lineberry testified that at this point he opened his front door and saw Defendant blocking Ms. Lineberry's path and yelling at her. He put his hand on Defendant's shoulder to "calm the situation[,]" and Ms. Lineberry ran into the house. Defendant "tried to force his way" into the house "for a brief minute[,]" but then followed Mr. Lineberry away from the porch and down to the driveway.

Mr. Lineberry testified that Defendant repeatedly told him that Ms. Lineberry "was the problem and he needed his money." Defendant then went to Ms. Lineberry's car and took out her keys and car title, saying "something to the effect of, ‘This is mine,’ or ‘She don't deserve this. This is mine.’ " Officer Adam Gleave, who responded to the scene about 20 minutes after Mr. Lineberry called the police, testified that he found the keys and car title either on top of Defendant's car or in his driver's seat. Officer Gleave also testified that Defendant told him he had taken the keys and the title.

Ms. Lineberry also testified that Defendant provided her with heroin during the course of their relationship.

After a trial running from 1 to 2 April 2019 before Judge Crosswhite, the jury returned verdicts of guilty for habitual misdemeanor assault and common law robbery. Defendant then pleaded guilty to attaining habitual felon status. The trial court consolidated the convictions and sentenced Defendant to 110 to 144 months’ active imprisonment. In an undated order, the trial court also entered a civil judgment for attorney's fees against Defendant in the amount of $5,640.50.

Defendant gave oral notice of appeal following entry of the criminal judgment.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the robbery charge because there was insufficient evidence that Defendant used violence or intimidation to take the property or that he took property from Ms. Lineberry's presence. Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Defendant provided heroin to Ms. Lineberry and that the error was prejudicial. Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay attorney's fees without notice and opportunity to be heard.

We consider each argument in turn.

A. Motion to Dismiss for Insufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of common law robbery because the State failed to prove that he (1) used force or intimidation to take property and (2) took property from Ms. Lineberry's person or presence. For the following reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err.

i. Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Robledo , 193 N.C. App. 521, 525, 668 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2008). "Under a de novo review, th[is C]ourt considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." State v. Williams , 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (internal marks and citation omitted).

ii. Merits

When a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence (a) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (b) of defendant's being the perpetrator of the offense. If so, the motion to dismiss is properly denied.

State v. Earnhardt , 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651-52 (1982). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 66, 296 S.E.2d at 652 (internal marks and citation omitted). "In deciding a motion to dismiss, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the State[,]" State v. Mucci , 163 N.C. App. 615, 618, 594 S.E.2d 411, 414 (2004), "giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom[,]" State v. Bates , 70 N.C. App. 477, 479, 319 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1984).

Common law robbery under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87.1 (2019) is the "felonious, non-consensual taking of money or personal property from the person or presence of another by means of violence or fear." State v. Porter , 198 N.C. App. 183, 186, 679 S.E.2d 167, 169 (2009) (citation omitted). In assessing whether the State has established the requisite connection between the taking and the force employed, our Supreme Court has held that "it makes no difference whether the intent to steal was formulated before the use of force or after it, so long as the theft and the use or threat of force can be perceived by the jury as constituting a single transaction." State v. Fields , 315 N.C. 191, 203, 337 S.E.2d 518, 525 (1985) ; see also State v. Rasor , 319 N.C. 577, 587, 356 S.E.2d 328, 335 (1987) (holding whether defendant formulated intent to take wallet before or after use of force immaterial to armed robbery charge so long as taking and force were a part of a continuous transaction). Furthermore, "[t]he exact time relationship ... between the violence and the actual taking is unimportant as long as there is one continuing transaction." State v. Bellamy , 159 N.C. App. 143, 149, 582 S.E.2d 663, 668 (2003) (internal marks and citation omitted); see also Porter , 198 N.C. App. at 187-88, 679 S.E.2d at 170 (applying continuous transaction doctrine to common law robbery charge).

Accordingly, even when there is some attenuation between the use of force and the taking, the action can still amount to a continuous transaction. In State v. Reaves , this Court found no merit in the defendant's argument that his use of force and subsequent taking of a patrolman's revolver and patrol car were not joined in time because he only formed the intent to take them after he had scuffled with the officer and then tried to escape in his own automobile and found it locked. 9 N.C. App. 315, 317, 176 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1970). Relatedly, in Bellamy , the defendant stole videos from a video store and fled with a store employee in pursuit. 159 N.C. App. at 145, 582 S.E.2d at 665-66. Given that "[t]he chase ended only about twenty feet from the video store[,] at no time did the chase cease or Edison lose sight of defendant[,] and defendant did not make good his escape until after threatening Edison with the knife[,]" we held that "the taking and threatened use of force was so joined by time and circumstances so as to constitute a single transaction." Id. at 149, 582 S.E.2d at 668 ; but see State v. Frogge , 345 N.C. 614, 618, 481 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1997) (holding "a reasonable person could have concluded that there was no continuous transaction" in felony murder case where defendant perpetrated violent act, left the premises, and returned to take property hours later).

Building on the above case law,

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