Staten v. Barlow, Case No. 3:17cv697/LAC/EMT

SAMUEL LEE STATEN, III, Plaintiff, v. SGT. D. BARLOW, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:17cv697/LAC/EMT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

March 13, 2019

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This prisoner civil rights case, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment and evidentiary materials in support thereof (ECF No. 56). Plaintiff filed a response, with evidentiary materials, in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 66). The matter is referred to the undersigned for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C). The undersigned concludes that the summary judgment motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Samuel Lee Staten, III ("Staten") is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections confined at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution. Staten sues three prison officials at Santa Rosa C.I: Sergeant D. Barlow, Officer V. Mitchell, and Officer King (Amended Complaint, ECF No. 10). Staten claims that on April 22, 2017, Defendants used excessive force on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment (id.). As relief, Staten requests compensatory and punitive damages (id.). Defendants move for summary judgment claiming that Staten's requests for compensatory and punitive damages must be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), and that they are entitled to judgment on Staten's Eighth Amendment claims because he did not request nominal damages (ECF No. 56).

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standards

1. Summary Judgment

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support his or her case or present affirmative evidence that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove his or her case at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the moving party successfully negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with evidentiary material demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id., 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. The nonmoving party must show more than the existence of a "metaphysical doubt" regarding the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Speculation or conjecture from a party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. See Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). "A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party must either point to evidence in the record or present additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. See Celotex Corp., supra; Owen v. Wille, 117 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 1997) (Rule 56 requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his or her own affidavits, or by the depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, admissions, interrogatory answers or other materials on file designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial); Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 1994).

Regarding the factual positions asserted by the parties, the court must apply the standard set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

....

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2010).

Facts asserted in hearsay statements which are not subject to a hearsay exception, and thus would not be admissible in evidence, are insufficient to show that a fact is genuinely disputed. "The most obvious way that hearsay testimony can be reduced to admissible form is to have the hearsay declarant testify directly to the matter at trial." Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Pritchard v. S. Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1135 (11th Cir. 1996)). If a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence, it cannot be used for purposes of summary judgment. See Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court will consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion for summary judgment or grant summary judgment if the moving party's motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the moving party is entitled to it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2, 3).

Evidence presented by the nonmoving party in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and all reasonable factual inferences arising from it, must be viewed in the light most favorable to him or her. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F. 3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, the nonmoving party still bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must prove. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317. A motion for summary judgment should be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

2. Limitation on Recovery Imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." The Eleventh Circuit has decided that the phrase "Federal civil actions" means all federal claims, including constitutional claims. See Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Where a prisoner plaintiff alleges constitutional violations, he is prevented under § 1997e(e) from seeking punitive or compensatory damages in the absence of a physical injury. See Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1199 (11th Cir. 2011) (punitive damages), and Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory damages), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part en banc, 216 F.3d 970).

B. Material Facts

As this case comes before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to Staten, the nonmoving party. See Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The court does so here, referring to Staten's verified Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10) and taking those facts from the parties' pleadings and summary judgment materials of record.¹ See Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that specific facts pled in a sworn complaint must be considered in opposition to summary judgment); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 56.1(B), (C), (F). The court includes only those facts relevant to the issue presented in Defendants' motion for summary judgment, i.e., what, if any, physical injury Staten suffered as a result of Defendants' use of force on April 22, 2017. Matters stated below as "facts" for purposes of summary judgment review may not be the actual facts. See Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 182 (11th Cir. 1997).

On April 22, 2017, Defendants conducted a use of force on Staten because he refused to remove a towel covering his cell window (Amended Complaint at 5; Defendants' Statement of Material Facts). Staten alleges the following occurred during the use of force: (1) Defendants Mitchell and King pulled him off the top bunk in his cell and slammed him to the floor (Defendants state Staten jumped down off the top bunk toward them when they entered the cell (see Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. C, Report of Force Used, ECF No. 56-4 at 2-3)); (2) Defendant Mitchell punched him in the face; (3) Defendant King kicked him in the body; (4) Defendant Mitchell laid on Staten's back and bent his left wrist to cuff it; (5) Defendant Barlow kicked him in the face six or seven times...