Staton v. City of Butte-Silver Bow

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RHONDA STATON, Plaintiff, v. CITY & COUNTY OF BUTTE-SILVER BOW and DOES 1-10, Defendants.

No. CV-20-60-BU-BMM

United States District Court, D. Montana, Butte Division

June 3, 2024

ORDER

Brian Morris, Chief District Judge United States District Court

INTRODUCTION

The Court held a jury trial in this matter from February 12 2024, to February 16, 2024. (Doc. 221; Doc. 225; Doc. 228; Doc. 229; Doc. 234.) The jury found in favor of Defendant City and County of Butte-Silver Bow (“BSB”) on Plaintiff Rhonda Staton's claims for hostile work environment and disability discrimination. (Doc. 241 at 1-2.) The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Staton on Staton's retaliation claim and awarded Staton $349,000 in damages. (Id. at 1, 3.) Staton has filed a motion for attorney's fees. (Doc. 247.) BSB opposes this motion. (Doc. 260).

BACKGROUND

Staton worked for BSB's Law Enforcement Department (“LED”) from December 10, 2001, until August 24 2020. (Doc. 217 at 3.) Staton brought claims against BSB for hostile work environment, sex discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and emotional distress. (Doc. 7 at 17-27.) Staton also asserted a claim for punitive damages. (Id. at 28.)

The Court dismissed Staton's claims for emotional distress punitive damages, and violation of FMLA. (Doc. 63 at 10; Doc. 160 at 37.) The Court also dismissed Sheriff Ed Lester as a defendant. (Doc. 63 at 10.) Staton voluntarily dismissed the Butte-Silver Bow LED and the Board of County Commissioners of Butte-Silver Bow. (Doc. 27 at 2.) Staton also voluntarily dismissed her claim of sex discrimination and one claim for disability discrimination before submitting the case to the jury. (Doc. 234.) Staton submitted claims of retaliation, failure to accommodate, and hostile work environment to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Staton on the retaliation claim and in favor of BSB on the other two claims. (Doc. 241.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2000e-5(k) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that the Court may allow the prevailing party in any action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. “a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” A court exercises discretion in awarding attorney's fees under Title VII. Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). A court must follow, however, the two-prong approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit for determining the appropriate amount of attorney's fees to award. “A court must first calculate a ‘lodestar' figure by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.'” Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1541 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1988)). “After computing the lodestar, the district court should assess whether additional considerations that [the Ninth Circuit] has enumerated require the district court to adjust the figure.” Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Staton seeks an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $629,137.75. Staton further seeks an award for $59,713 for paralegal fees and $39,759.83 for non-taxable costs. (Doc 248 at 15.) BSB argues that the Court should deny Staton's request for attorney's fees and non-taxable costs. BSB contends that an insufficient evidentiary basis exists to support the jury verdict on Staton's retaliation claim. (Doc. 260 at 1.) The Court has addressed this argument previously and refers to its earlier order on this issue. (Doc. 279.) BSB further contends that Montana law prohibits an award of attorney's fees and that Staton does not constitute a prevailing party. (Doc. 260 at 2.)

BSB argues alternatively that if Staton is awarded attorney's fees, the Court must reduce the requested award significantly. (Id. at 1.) BSB again cites Staton's lack of success on her other claims and argues that the amount of time and hourly rate claimed prove unreasonable. (Id.)

I. Attorney's Fees

Both Title VII and the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA) permit the Court, in its discretion, to award attorney's fees to a party that prevails in an action brought under those acts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-511(3)(a). No doubt exists that retaliation represents an action under both Title VII and the MHRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-301. The jury found in favor of Staton on her retaliation claim but found in favor of BSB on Staton's other Title VII and MHRA claims. BSB argues that Staton may not recover attorney's fees despite her success on her retaliation claim.

a. Prevailing Party

“[A] prevailing plaintiff should recover attorneys' fees unless ‘special circumstances' make the award unjust.” Dosier, 656 F.2d at 1301 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978)). The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a plaintiff meets the definition of a prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees “if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see also Davis, 976 F.2d at 1541 n.1. A party need not prevail on all claims in order to constitute a “prevailing party.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 517-18 (9th Cir. 2000). A court may not award fees, however, for time spent on unrelated claims on which the party failed to prevail. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.

Staton prevailed on her retaliation claim. The jury awarded $349,000 in money damages related to that claim. Staton constitutes a prevailing party because she succeeded on a significant issue in the litigation (her retaliation claim) and received a benefit sought in bringing the suit (money damages). The question remains whether Staton's other claims proved unrelated to her retaliation claim such that the Court should prohibit Staton from recovering fees for work done on those other claims. Civil rights cases often involve claims for relief that “involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. An attorney's time in such cases “will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]uch a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit addressed an issue nearly identical in Passantino. The claimant in Passantino brought claims for both sex discrimination and retaliation. 212 F.3d at 504. The jury found in favor of the claimant only on her retaliation claim. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the claimant's retaliation claims “were inextricably intertwined with her discrimination claims.” Id. at 518. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “to prevail on her retaliation claims, [the claimant] had to prove that she reasonably believed that [her employer] was engaged in discriminatory activity.” Id. (citing Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he time spent on [the claimant's] discrimination claims contributed to the success of her retaliation claims.” Id. The Ninth Circuit accordingly upheld the award of attorney's fees.

This Court similarly has awarded attorney's fees where a claimant brought 13 other claims related to wrongful discharge and discrimination but succeeded only on a retaliation claim. Rhoten v. Rocking J Ranch, LLC, CV 21-46-M-DLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211722, at *11 (D. Mont. Nov. 22, 2022). The Court noted that “each claim stemmed from the same allegations of harassing treatment and relied on the same legal theories.” Id. The Montana Supreme Court has awarded attorney's fees for time spent in a multi-plaintiff case where only one plaintiff succeeded on their claim. Edwards v. Cascade County, 212 P.3d 289, 294 (Mont. 2009). The district court in that case reduced the attorney's fees award by 74 hours to account for time spent on the unsuccessful plaintiffs' cases. Id. at 292. The Montana Supreme Court determined that the claims “involve[d] a core set of facts and [were] based on the same legal theory.” Id. at 293. The Court further determined that substantial evidence existed that the attorney's time could not be segregated between the claims. Id. at 294.

The Court finds unpersuasive BSB's argument that Staton's retaliation claim proved wholly distinct from her other claims. The Court applies the same reasoning used in Rhoten, Passantino, and Edwards. Staton's retaliation claim involved substantially the same facts, related legal theories, and substantially the same allegations as her other claims. Moreover, the Court instructed the jury, as requested by BSB, that for Staton's conduct to constitute protected activity, Staton must have had a reasonable belief that she was reporting illegal conduct. (Doc. 246 at 10; Doc. 206 at 15.) BSB may have stipulated to the fact that Staton filed an HR complaint, but Staton still had the burden of proving “that she reasonably believed that [BSB] was engaged in discriminatory activity” when she filed her complaint. Passantino, 212 F.3d at 518. The time spent on Staton's other claims contributed to the success on her retaliation claim and thus, proves inextricably intertwined with the time spent on the claim on which she prevailed. Id.

The Court finds that Staton constitutes a prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees and that...