Steckelberg v. Chamberlain Sch. Dist.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

LAURENCE L. PIERSOL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioners/Appellees (Steckelbergs”), parents of AMS, filed a motion for attorney fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)3)(B), a provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). (Doc. 68.) Steckelbergs seek at least $173,429.37 in attorney fees for work done on AMS's case at the administrative level, before this Court, and on appeal to the Eighth Circuit. Respondent/Appellant, Chamberlain School District (“School District”), agrees that the Steckelbergs are prevailing parties entitled to attorney fees and costs, but the School District opposes most of the fees requested for a variety of reasons which will be discussed below.

BACKGROUND

This case has an extensive history. The Eighth Circuit's decision (Doc. 67), and this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 36), provide a more detailed background of the case. In January 2019, Steckelbergs filed a Due Process Complaint with the South Dakota Office of Hearing Examiners alleging that the School District violated the IDEA, and that their child AMS's placement at an academy in Utah (“Academy”) for therapy and a standard education should be paid for by the School District. An administrative hearing was held on February 22 through February 26, 2021. On July 8, 2021, the hearing examiner issued a decision, concluding, in part:

The Petitioner has met their burden of proof as to five of the six issues. Respondent failed to adequately develop an IEP [Individual Education Plan] for the 2018-2019 school year. Respondent did not develop an IEP for AMS for the 2019-2020 school year

Respondent did not follow the 2018-2019 IEP and failed to provide a FAPE [Free Appropriate Public Education] to AMS Respondent did not place AMS with any private school placement or make any plans for AMS to receive an education at home with supports for the 2019-2020 school year Respondent did not acknowledge or respond to Petitioners Notice of Placement when Petitioner placed AMS in Kaizen Academy. Petitioners are entitled to receive reimbursement for tuition and fees spent with Kaizen Academy, in the amount of $90,375. I am also ordering reimbursement to Petitioners for the amount of $11,686 for travel for Petitioners and AMS to and from Utah on six (6) different occasions.

(Doc. 1-1, p. 11.) The only issue decided against the Steckelbergs was whether the School District violated the IDEA by failing to produce a copy of AMS's education records by the time that the School District was required under the IDEA. (Doc. 25-3, p. 11-13.) The hearing examiner found a technical violation of the IDEA by the School District for failing to produce educational records in a timely fashion, but the hearing examiner did not believe this particular violation impeded provision of a FAPE to AMS. (Id.) The Steckelbergs' failure to “prevail” on this claim is de minimis compared to the overall success on the other issues which led to the Steckelbergs obtaining everything they sought.

The School District sought review of the hearing examiner's decision in state court, and the Steckelbergs removed the case to this Court. After careful review of the entire administrative record, this Court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision and directed the School District to reimburse the Stecklbergs for tuition and travel costs. (Doc. 36.) The School District appealed. On August 15, 2023, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the School District violated the IDEA by denying AMS a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (Doc. 67.) The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the decision to require the School District to reimburse the Steckelbergs for tuition and the cost of traveling to the Academy. The Steckelbergs now seek to recover attorney fees for the work performed on this case.

DISCUSSION

The IDEA permits a court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney fees as part of the costs to “a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). “A litigant is a ‘prevailing party' if he obtains ‘actual relief on the merits of his claim [that] materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.' ” Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992)).

“A party does not need to succeed on the entirety of the litigation to be considered the prevailing party under the IDEA; ‘[a] party prevails if it succeeded on any significant issue which achieved some of the benefit it sought' ” Artichoker v. Todd Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:15-CV-3021-RAL, 2017 WL 2495197, at *2 (D.S.D. June 9, 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1377 (8th Cir. 1996)).

The administrative hearing examiner, this Court, and the Eighth Circuit all determined that the School District denied AMS a FAPE. The legal relationship between the parties has been altered by requiring the School District to pay for tuition and travel expenses related to AMS's placement at the Academy. This was a total and not a partial success. The Steckelbergs achieved the benefit they sought, and they are prevailing parties.

The starting point in determining reasonable attorney fees is the lodestar calculation: the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2005). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar calculation represents a reasonable fee award. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). After calculating the lodestar, courts may consider the twelve factors identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).^[1] However, “many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9.

The party seeking attorney fees has the burden to prove that its request for attorney fees is reasonable. Johnston v. Comerica Mortg. Corp., 83 F.3d 241, 246 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). To meet its burden, the fee petitioner must “submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

The court has “broad discretion” in considering the amount of the fees. Wescott Agri-Prods., Inc. v. Sterling State Bank, Inc., 682 F.3d 1091, 1095 (8th Cir. 2012). A district court should use its own knowledge, experience, and expertise in determining the fee to be awarded. See Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Ark, 867 F.2d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 1989). The Eighth Circuit has explained: “The trial court knows the case best. It knows what the lawyers have done, and how well they have done it. It knows what these efforts are worth. It knows how to balance portions of the case together to reach a just and reasonable award.” Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 737 (8th Cir. 2001). An important factor to consider when evaluating attorney fees is the degree of success the claimant obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 (“We hold that the extent of a plaintiff s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”). Here, the Steckelbergs achieved total success.

Attorney Ruggieri lists 542 hours for her work at the administrative level from 2018 through 2021. (Doc. 70-1.) Steckelbergs request an hourly rate of $175 for this work, for a total of $94,850.00. (Doc. 70-1.) The hours Attorney Ruggieri spent on this case before this Court, CIV 21-4147, are documented at 54.97, which at $175 per hour equals $9,619.75. (Doc. 79-4, $10,202 with tax.) Attorney Ruggieri documented 37.28 hours of work on the companion case she filed in this Court to recover attorney fees for the administrative proceedings, CIV 21-4130, which at$175 per hour equals $6,524.00. (Doc. 70-3.) She spent 82.55 hours on the Eighth Circuit appeal. An hourly rate of $200 is requested for Ms. Ruggieri's appellate work, which equals $16,510.00. (Doc. 70-5, $17,583 including tax.)

The Beardsley Law Firm's bills for work on the Eighth Circuit appeal are found at Doc. 70-5. Four billing statements are included. Attorney Steve Beardsley charged a reasonable hourly rate of $350 and Attorney Conor Casey charged a reasonable hourly rate of $250. In his Affidavit, Attorney Beardsley documents 30.2 hours of work at an hourly rate of $350, for a total of $10,570. (Doc. 70-7.) Attorney Casey documents 38.2 hours at $250 per hour, for a total of $9,550. (Doc. 70-9.) The Beardsley Law Firm invoices show they charged the Steckelbergs $435.50 for copies and $111.89 for postage.

In support of the motion for attorney fees, Attorney Ruggieri submitted a brief where she succinctly summarized the work she has done on the Steckelbergs' case over the last six years:

The lawsuit commenced in December 2018, when petitioners hired Gina Ruggieri, Chamberlain, South Dakota. Their final Fourth Amended Complaint was submitted to the ALJ in the summer of 2019. Under the IDEA, either party can request to mediate the matter by submitting a request to mediate to the South Dakota Conflict Dispute Resolution Coordinator, Pierre, South Dakota.

There were two appeals filed to circuit court by the School District, one in which the district won, and another which they lost. After the district won their discovery appeal, they filed for their attorney