Steele v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

51 F.4th 1059

Kathleen STEELE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-11656

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed: October 12, 2022

Enrique Escarraz, III, Attorney, Law Offices of Enrique Escarraz, III, Saint Petersburg, FL, Roger Plata, Law Office of Roger W. Plata, Saint Petersburg, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jerome M. Albanese, Nathaniel Heber, Nadine DeLuca Elder, Brian C. Huberty, Natalie Liem, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Atlanta, GA, U.S. Attorney Service - Middle District of Florida, U.S. Attorney's Office, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before Newsom, Branch, and Lagoa, Circuit Judges.

Lagoa, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to apply old statutes to new problems. Philip Steele cryopreserved several sperm samples before his death. His surviving wife, Kathleen Steele, relied on those sperm samples and in vitro fertilization to conceive a child, P.S.S. She then sought child's insurance benefits ("CIB") under the Social Security Act on behalf of P.S.S. The Social Security Administration (the "Administration") denied the claim for CIB, and the administrative law judge, the magistrate judge, and the district court all upheld the Administration's denial of the claim.

The central issue in this appeal is whether P.S.S. is entitled to recover CIB under the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). To answer that question, we must determine whether Florida law authorizes P.S.S. to inherit a child's share of Mr. Steele's intestate personal property, as is required in order to recover CIB. See id. § 416(h)(2)(A). The district court, the magistrate judge, and the administrative law judge all concluded no, reasoning that, under Florida Statute § 742.17(4), a child posthumously conceived—like P.S.S.—could inherit property only through the decedent's will, and not through intestacy, as required to be entitled to CIB.

Because the Florida Supreme Court, which is the final arbiter of Florida law, has not published a decision addressing this question, principles of comity and federalism suggest that the Florida Supreme Court should decide this issue. See WM Mobile Bay Env't Ctr., Inc. v. City of Mobile Solid Waste Auth. , 972 F.3d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 2020). We therefore respectfully certify the issues of Florida law discussed below to the Florida Supreme Court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Phillip and Kathleen Steele married in August 1997. The couple decided to have children late in life. In 2009, through in vitro fertilization, Ms. Steele conceived her first child. The couple decided to have more children, and Mr. Steele, before his death, provided additional sperm samples to the fertility clinic that had assisted the couple with their first child. Using one of those samples after Mr. Steele's death, Ms. Steele again conceived through in vitro fertilization. Her second child, P.S.S.—for whom Ms. Steele seeks CIB in this case—was born in March 2013, seventeen months after Mr. Steele's death.

Before his death, Mr. Steele prepared a will through his attorney, Louie Adcock. The will specifically listed his living children, but it also stated, "The terms ‘children’ and ‘lineal descendants’ shall include those later born or adopted and whenever used in this instrument shall be equivalent to blood relationship and relationship by adoption."

Shortly after P.S.S.’s birth, Ms. Steele applied for CIB under the Social Security Act on behalf of P.S.S. In support of her application, she attached P.S.S.’s birth certificate, which listed Mr. Steele as the father. She also submitted letters from Mr. Adcock, who had helped prepare Mr. Steele's will, and Dr. Julio Pabon, who had carried out the in vitro procedures. In his letter, Mr. Adcock opined that Mr. Steele's preserving sperm before his death, which was then used by Ms. Steele to conceive P.S.S. after Mr. Steele's death, was "an indication that this was a planned pregnancy," given that Mr. Steele was aware of his age and health and was "devoted" to Ms. Steele. As such, Mr. Adcock stated that he believed Mr. Steele would consider the "pregnancy as being planned." But Mr. Adcock admitted that he did "not recall having had a conversation with [Mr. Steele] about the preservation of sperm." Dr. Pabon, in his letter, stated that Ms. Steele had conceived P.S.S. using Mr. Steele's preserved sperm and that Mr. Steele had "documented his desire for his wife to use the sperm for a future conception even if he were to be incapacitated or deceased."

In February 2014, the Social Security Administration denied the CIB claim. The Administration explained that P.S.S. did "not meet the dependency requirement for benefits" and upheld the denial after Ms. Steele sought reconsideration.

Ms. Steele then sought review of the agency's decision by an administrative law judge, who denied the claim. The administrative law judge explained that, to qualify for CIB, the claimant must be the deceased individual's "child" within the meaning of the Social Security Act, which in turn depended on whether "the claimant could inherit a child's share of the insured individual's intestate personal property under the law of the State in which the insured individual was domiciled when he died"—here, Florida. Applying Florida law, the administrative law judge concluded that P.S.S. could not recover intestate property. The administrative law judge determined that the relevant Florida statute was section 742.17(4),¹ which provides that a posthumously conceived child "shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's will." The administrative law judge concluded that, under section 742.17(4), posthumously conceived children could "only inherit through the person's will," not through intestacy. The administrative law judge further found that Mr. Steele had not provided for P.S.S. in his will because the will did not "specifically provide for the claimant or otherwise indicate his intent to provide for any child conceived after his death." The Appeals Council declined Ms. Steele's request for review of the administrative law judge's decision.

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Steele filed suit in federal court against the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who issued a report and recommendation that recommended affirming the administrative law judge's decision that upheld the denial of the CIB claim. The magistrate judge agreed with the administrative law judge that P.S.S. "did not qualify as an ‘afterborn heir’ under Florida intestacy law because he was born seventeen months after the death of Mr. Steele." The magistrate judge also found that the administrative law judge's interpretation of section 742.17(4) was correct in determining that "posthumously conceived children cannot inherit property intestate under Florida law, but rather can only inherit property through a person's will ." In doing so, the magistrate judge rejected Steele's argument that section 742.17(4) allowed P.S.S. to inherit under Florida intestacy laws because there was a will—Mr. Steele's—providing for P.S.S. The magistrate judge reasoned that "intestacy, by its nature, is inheriting a decedent[’]s estate absent the existence of a valid will."

Ms. Steele filed objections to the report and recommendation. The district court overruled her objections and adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. This appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Ms. Steele argues that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and by not granting CIB to P.S.S. Specifically, Ms. Steele contends that the phrase "unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's will" in Florida Statute § 742.17(4) effectively vests such a child with intestate rights in the event he or she is provided for by the decedent's will. Relying on this interpretation, Ms. Steele asserts that P.S.S. was provided for in Mr. Steele's will such that P.S.S. is entitled to inherit intestate a share of the personal property of his parent, Mr. Steele, under Florida law. And, as such, Ms. Steele contends that P.S.S. is considered a "child" within the meaning of the Social Security Act and is entitled to CIB. In response, the Commissioner contends that the interpretation of the administrative law judge, magistrate judge, and district court is correct—i.e., that, under section 742.17(4), a posthumously conceived child may inherit only through the decedent's will, if provided for, and thus not through intestacy.

We first turn to the relevant statutory provisions and case law. Under the Social Security Act, an applicant qualifies for CIB if he "meets the Act's definition of ‘child,’ is unmarried, is below specified age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of the insured's death." Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. , 566 U.S. 541, 547, 132 S.Ct. 2021, 182 L.Ed.2d 887 (2012) ; 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). Title 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) defines "child," in relevant part, as "(1) the child or legally adopted child of an individual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3) ... the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [who meets certain conditions]." Astrue , 566 U.S. at 547, 132 S.Ct. 2021. Additionally, a subsequent definitional provision addresses the term "child." This statute— 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) —provides that "[i]n determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual's domiciliary State]." Astrue , 566 U.S. at 548, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (some alterations in original) (quoting § 416(h)(...