Stephen O. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.

STEPHEN O. and BRIDGET M., individually and on behalf of J.O., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-1991

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

December 29, 2021

OPINION

Slomsky, J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND 1

A. Statutory Background 1

1. IDEA 2

a. The IEP 3

b. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 3

c. Settlement Agreements and the IDEA 4

d. Remedies 5

2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 5

3. Americans with Disabilities Act 6

4. Remedies under Section 504 and the ADA 6

B. Factual Background 7

1. Settlement Agreement 8

2. Interim IEP and Beginning of First Grade Year 10

3. Formulating an IEP for J.O. 12

4. Extended School Year Services 14

5. Final Status of J.O.'s IEP and Enrollment at Orchard Friends 15

C. Procedural Background 15

D. The Case Before this Court 16

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 17

IV. ANALYSIS 19

A. The Modified De Novo Standard of Review Applies to Plaintiffs' Section 504 and ADA Claims and No Trial Is Required 20

1. The Modified De Novo Standard 20

2. No Trial Required for Section 504 and ADA Claims 23

B. The Hearing Officer Correctly Found the Settlement Agreement Controlled the District's Obligations to Plaintiffs from August 9, 2018 to December 3, 2018 27

1. Hearing Officer's Consideration of Settlement 27

2. FAPE Was Not Denied from August 9, 2018 to December 3, 2018 32

C. The Hearing Officer Correctly Found J.O Was Provided with a FAPE from December 3, 2018 to March 22, 2019 34

D. The Hearing Officer Correctly Found J.O. Was Provided with a FAPE from March 22, 2019 to May 7, 2019 39

E. Section 504 and ADA Claims 44

F. Summary Judgment as to Counts I and II of the Complaint 45

1. Compensatory Education 46

2. Tuition Reimbursement 47

G. ESY Reimbursement 48

V. CONCLUSION 50

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves the appeal of an administrative hearing decision that came about because parents were dissatisfied with the public education provided to their disabled child. The subject of this case, J.O., ^[1] is a child with several disabilities that adversely impact his ability to learn. On April 22, 2020, J.O., along with his Parents (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought suit against the School District of Philadelphia (“Defendant”), appealing a decision in part made by Brian Jason Ford, a Pennsylvania Special Education Hearing Officer, who presided over a due process hearing. In appealing the decision, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to provide J.O. with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). On September 17, 2020, the 6, 230-page administrative record was filed under seal with this Court.

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment on the administrative record filed by Plaintiffs and Defendant. (Doc. Nos. 41, 42.) Having carefully considered the parties' briefing and the voluminous administrative record, the Court will affirm the Hearing Officer's decision. For reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [on the Administrative Record] (Doc. No. 41) will be denied and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 42) will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background

Before proceeding, it is important to review the statutes relevant to this case and to define the various legal terms used throughout this Opinion.

1. IDEA

The first statute pertinent to Plaintiffs' claims is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The IDEA's purpose is to require states to “make available a free and appropriate public education to all children with disabilities residing within [the state's] borders.” D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. Of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010). This requirement is enforced through contingent federal funding to State Educational Agencies (“SEAs”) and Local Educational Agencies (“LEAs”), where eligibility for funding is conditioned upon submission of a plan demonstrating that the state complies with the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1413. Thus, the IDEA strikes a bargain where, in return for federal government funds to educate students with disabilities, a state must comply with the IDEA. Here, it is undisputed that Defendant School District of Philadelphia is an LEA receiving federal funding and that it is bound to comply with the IDEA.

The central promise of the IDEA is to provide a free and appropriate public education-a FAPE, for short-to every eligible disabled student. What constitutes a FAPE, however, depends upon the needs of each child. The statutory definition of a FAPE includes “special education, ” or a specifically designed instruction to meet the child's unique needs, and “related services, ” or support services required to help the child benefit from such instruction. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (citing §§ 1401(26), (29)). To implement these statutory requirements, a state must provide each child with an individualized education program-or IEP-which is “the means by which special education and related services are tailored to the unique needs of a particular child.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d).

a. The IEP

In sum, the IEP is “the centerpiece of the [IDEA]'s education delivery system for disabled children, ” and it must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.” See Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 996 (internal citations omitted). The IEP must provide the student with a “basic floor of opportunity, ” but need not rise to the level of providing the student with “the optimal level of services” or grant all of the parents' requests. D.S., 602 F.3d at 557. Each IEP is required to include: (1) present levels of academic achievement and functional performance; (2) a statement of measurable annual goals; (3) how the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals is to be measured; and (4) special education and supplementary aids and services, as well as other details regarding how the IEP will be implemented. See § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); see also N.H. by & Through S.H. v. Phoenixville Area Sch. Dist., No. CV 21-1066, 2021 WL 5998445, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2021).

An LEA, such as Defendant, is tasked with developing the IEP. This process typically involves the child's parents and school personnel working together to identify the child's needs and to develop a plan to achieve educational goals. As noted by the Supreme Court, “parents play[] ‘a significant role' in this process.” Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524 (2007). A child's IEP “should evolve with the child's development, and should be continually revised as appropriate.” Charlene R. v. Solomon Charter Sch., 63 F.Supp.3d 510, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing § 1414(d)(4)). Thus, assessing the content and implementation of a child's IEP is crucial to the determination of whether a child was provided-or denied-a FAPE.

b. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

For a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim pursuant to the IDEA, a claimant must first exhaust the administrative remedies available under the statute. See Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Komninos by Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1994)). This requirement “encourage[es] parents and the local school district to work together to formulate an IEP for a child's education.” Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 275. Administrative remedies under the statute involve filing a complaint with the child's LEA, and corresponding SEA, and participating in a due process hearing. Id. at 272; see also §§ 1415(a), (b)(6)(A), (f)(1)(A). “Upon receipt of a proper due process complaint, the SEA assigns the matter to a special education hearing officer who schedules a due process hearing.” T.L. by & through Latisha G. v. Pennsylvania Leadership Charter Sch., 224 F.Supp.3d 421, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2016). At the close of the due process hearing, the hearing officer will enter a decision. If either the child's parents or the LEA are dissatisfied with the decision, they “have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the [due process] complaint . . . in a State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, ” as Plaintiffs have done in this case. See id. at 425.

c. Settlement Agreements and the IDEA

Additionally many disputes involving the IDEA are resolved with settlement agreements. Parties may finalize these agreements after mediation, and they are “enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction, or in a district court of the United States.” § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). In IDEA cases, settlement agreements are “encouraged as a matter of public policy because they promote amicable resolution of disputes and lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by courts.” D.R. by M.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a settlement agreement is a binding contract. Courts apply contract law principles when interpreting settlement agreements negotiated as part of the IDEA administrative process. See generally id. Because some settlement agreements contain reservation of rights clauses or because parties dispute which claims were waived in...