Stephens v. Colvin

200 F.Supp.3d 349

Duane STEPHENS, Plaintiff,

v.Carolyn W. COLVIN Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

3:15-CV-00622(TWD)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed August 2, 2016

LACHMAN & GORTON, 1500 E. Main St., P.O. Box 89, OF COUNSEL: PETER A. GORTON, ESQ., Endicott, New York 13761, Counsel for Plaintiff.

HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Room 218, James T. Foley U.S. Courthouse, OF COUNSEL: SIXTINA FERNANDEZ, ESQ., Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albany, New York 12207, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, Social Security Administration, 26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904, OF COUNSEL: STEPHEN P. CONTE, ESQ., Chief Counsel, Region II, New York, New York 10278, Counsel for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

THERESE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Duane Stephens brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (Administrative Transcript at 13.¹ ) This case has proceeded in accordance with General Order 18 of this Court which sets forth the procedures to be followed when appealing a denial of Social Security benefits. Both parties have filed briefs. Oral argument was not heard. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the disposition of this case by a United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. No. 11.) For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion is denied, Plaintiff's motion is granted, and the case is remanded for reconsideration.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Duane Stephens filed for Disability Insurance Benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on June 27, 2012, claiming disability as of March 12, 2012. (T. at 13.) Plaintiff was born on January 3, 1966, and alleges disability due to asthma, emphysema, depression, and limited cognitive abilities. (T. at 15, 35.) His application was denied on October 10, 2010, and he subsequently filed a written request for a hearing on October 31, 2012. (T. at 13.) A hearing was held on November 6, 2013, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Barry E. Ryan. Id. The ALJ issued his decision on January 15, 2014, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (T. at 13-26.) The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on April 8, 2015. (T. at 1.) Plaintiff timely commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on May 21, 2015. (Dkt. No. 1.)

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard for Benefits

To be considered disabled, a plaintiff seeking disability insurance any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental benefits or SSI disability benefits must establish that he or she is "unable to engage in impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2006). In addition, the plaintiff's

physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(B).

Acting pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority (42 U.S.C. § 405(a) ), the Social Security Administration ("SSA") promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2016). Under that five-step sequential evaluation process, the decision-maker determines:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a "residual functional capacity" assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

McIntyre v. Colvin , 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir.2014). "If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further." Barnhart v. Thomas , 540 U.S. 20, 24, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003).

The plaintiff-claimant bears the burden of proof regarding the first four steps. Kohler v. Astrue , 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Perez v. Chater , 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1996) ). If the plaintiff-claimant meets his or her burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defendant-Commissioner at the fifth step to prove that the plaintiff-claimant is capable of working. Id. (quoting Perez , 77 F.3d at 46 ).

B. Scope of Review

In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Featherly v. Astrue , 793 F.Supp.2d 627, 630 (W.D.N.Y.2011) (citations omitted); Rosado v. Sullivan , 805 F.Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (citing Johnson v. Bowen , 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir.1987) ). A reviewing court may not affirm an ALJ's decision if it reasonably doubts whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. Johnson , 817 F.2d at 986.

A court's factual review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to the determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012) ; Rivera v. Sullivan , 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir.1991). An ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying his findings with sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Roat v. Barnhart , 717 F.Supp.2d 241, 248 (N.D.N.Y.2010) ; Ferraris v. Heckler , 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir.1984). "Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ " Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen , 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1988) (citations omitted). It must be "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record. Featherly , 793 F.Supp.2d at 630 ; Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ).

"To determine on appeal whether an ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams , 859 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ's findings must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [ALJ's]." Rosado, 805 F.Supp. at 153. A reviewing court cannot substitute its interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ's decision. Rutherford v. Schweiker , 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir.1982).

III. THE ALJ'S DECISION

The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of March 12, 2012. (T. at 15.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments consisting of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), asthma, and intellectual disability. Id. The ALJ found Plaintiff's depression and left knee pain to be non-severe. (T. at 15, 17.) He then found at step three that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of listed impairments 3.02 (chronic pulmonary insufficiency), 3.03 (asthma ), 12.02 (organic mental disorders), or 12.05 (intellectual disability) in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (" Appendix 1"). (T. at 17-18.)

Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and found that he was capable of performing light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). (T. at 20.) The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff "should avoid concentrated exposure to environmental pollutants and airborne irritants." Id. As to Plaintiff's mental capabilities, the ALJ found that he:

retains the ability (on a sustained basis) to understand and follow simple instruction and directions, perform simple tasks with supervision and independently, maintain attention and concentration for simple tasks, regularly attend to a routine and maintain a schedule, relate to and interact with others appropriately, and handle reasonable levels of simple work-related stress in that he can make decisions directly related to the performance of simple work and handle usual work place changes and interactions associated with simple work.

Id.

In support of his determination that Plaintiff was capable of performing light work activities despite any physical limitations, the ALJ accorded great weight to the opinion of Family Nurse Practitioner Lynn Verduin ("FNP Verduin"). (T. at 21.) The ALJ gave some weight to the opinion of consultative examiner Mushaq Sheikh, M.D. ("Dr. Sheikh"). Id. With respect to Plaintiff's mental RFC, the ALJ afforded some weight to FNP Verduin's opinion. (T. at 22.) He accorded partial...