Stepnosky v. Silgan Holdings, Inc.

RICHARD STEPNOSKY, Plaintiff, v. SILGAN HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 21-cv-00319-KM-ESK

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

July 2, 2021

OPINION

Kevin McNulty United States District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on plaintiff Richard Stepnosky's motion to remand this case to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County (State Court). (“Motion”, DE 4.) The Motion also seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1447(c). Defendants Silgan Holdings, Inc. (Silgan) ^[1] Bryce Bedford, Mark Kwiatkowski, and Scott Garboski filed an opposition to the Motion. (DE 7.) Stepnosky filed a reply brief in further support of the Motion. (DE 8.)

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED insofar as it seeks an order remanding the case to State court. The component of the motion that seeks attorney's fees and costs, however, is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from Silgan's alleged retaliatory discharge of Stepnosky for blowing the whistle on health and safety issues at Silgan's manufacturing plant. Silgan, “the largest provider of metal food packaging in the United States, ” operates a manufacturing facility in Edison, New Jersey (Facility).^[2] (DE 1-1 ¶1.) Stepnosky was employed with Silgan as a management trainee and production supervisor from October 14, 2019 to October 12, 2020, the date he was terminated. (Id. ¶¶6, 7, 63.)

According to the complaint, Stepnosky identified numerous safety issues at the Facility and reported them to Silgan's management. (Id. pp.7, 8.) He believed the issues constituted violations of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. (Id. ¶¶10-19.) Stepnosky was told not to “focus on” those issues and not to “ask so many questions.” (Id. ¶¶21, 33.)

When Stepnosky continued to raise safety and health concerns, including questions over Silgan's compliance with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) guidelines related to COVID-19, his plant supervisors became hostile and threatened to terminate his employment. (Id. ¶¶38-45, 50-56.) Stepnosky reported one incident of hostile treatment to a Silgan human resources representative, but Silgan took no action and the incident was never documented. (Id. ¶¶46-49.)

Stepnosky met with another representative on October 5, 2020 to advise that “he did not feel safe working in the … [F]acility because of [Silgan's] disregard for safety[.]” (Id. ¶¶57, 60.) The representative “questioned out loud whether [Stepnosky] was a good fit for Silgan.” (Id. ¶58.) Stepnosky's employment was terminated on October 12, 2020. (Id. ¶63.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 7, 2020, Stepnosky filed the complaint in State Court, alleging he was subjected to a hostile work environment and terminated in retaliation for blowing the whistle on various safety issues at the Facility. (Id. ¶¶64, 67.) The complaint asserts the following causes of action, all under state law: (1) violation of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) for hostile work environment and wrongful discharge (count one); (2) a public policy wrongful discharge claim pursuant to Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp. 84 N.J. 58 (1980) (count two); and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (count three). (Id. pp.16, 22, 23.) Stepnosky alleges that he “reasonably believed” the conditions he reported constituted violations of federal and state laws, regulations, and public policy, and that his whistleblowing to Silgan's management constituted protected activity. (Id.)

Defendants filed a notice of removal on January 7, 2021. (DE 1.) The notice states that this Court has “original jurisdiction under … 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1337” because “even though Plaintiff alleges only state law claims, ” federal issues are “necessarily raised, … actually disputed, … substantial, and … capable of resolution” in this Court under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, along with a counterclaim against Stepnosky, on January 28, 2021. (DE 3.) The counterclaim asserts a cause of action for breach of the duty of loyalty.^[3] (Id. p.16.) Stepnosky has yet to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the counterclaim.

Defendants filed this Motion to remand on February 5, 2021. (DE 4.) The Motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.)

III. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Stepnosky raises a number of arguments in support of the Motion. (ECF Nos. 4-1, 4-2). He contends the complaint does not raise any federal issues because he seeks no relief under federal law and is only alleging state law claims. (DE 4-1 pp.8, 9.) Stepnosky also submits that the complaint does not entail an analysis or construction of a federal statute or application of federal legal principles. (Id. p.22.) Furthermore, he argues that, since he need not prove that defendants actually violated any law or regulation in connection with his CEPA claim, “no federal issue is necessarily raised in [the] Complaint.” (DE 4-2 p.4.)

Stepnosky points to decisions from this district, and other federal districts, where courts have found no federal issue actually raised where CEPA plaintiffs have sounded the alarm on violations of federal law. (Id. pp.8, 9.) Addressing the Grable test, Stepnosky also submits that no federal issue is actually disputed or substantial (DE 4-1 p.8; DE 4-2 p.4), and that consideration of the “federal-state balance” weighs in favor of remand (DE 4-2 p.6).

Furthermore, Stepnosky claims Defendants' removal to this Court was improper in the first instance insofar as the complaint alleges state law claims under CEPA and New Jersey common law only. (Id. p.8.) As such, he seeks attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) to the extent Defendants had no “objectively reasonable” belief that removal to this Court was proper. (Id. p.9.)

In opposition to the Motion, Defendants contend that “[p]laintiff['s complaint] raises substantial and disputed questions of federal law that confer federal jurisdiction over his state law claims.” (DE 7 p.6.) They note that the complaint is “replete with numerous allegations … related to[] federal safety violations.” (Id.) According to Defendants, Stepnosky's “fundamental grievance” is that Silgan “systematically violated federal law, which, in turn, created an unsafe work environment.” (Id. p.7.)

Defendants also argue that these “serious allegations of impropriety [concerning federal regulations and guidelines] require resolution in the forum best equipped to resolve these distinctly federal issues.” (Id.) They add that the exercise of federal jurisdiction here will not “disturb the balance of responsibility between federal and state courts … Silgan's removal … was proper[.]” (Id.) Defendants acknowledge that the complaint “alleges no express federal cause of action” and that “diversity of citizenship does not presently exist.” (Id. p.11.)

In his reply brief, Stepnosky disputes Defendants' contention that “complaints of multiple violations of federal law in a CEPA claim trigger[] federal subject matter jurisdiction” under Grable. (DE 8 p.7.) Stepnosky reiterates that he “is not complaining [that] Defendants in fact or actually violated a federal law[.]” (Id. p.10.)

IV. REMOVAL AND REMAND: LEGAL STANDARDS

“[D]efendants may generally remove civil actions from state court to federal court so long as the district court would have had subject-matter jurisdiction had the case been originally filed before it.” A.S. ex rel. Miller v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 769 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) (providing that “[e]xcept as … provided by … Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts … have original jurisdiction[] may be removed”). Federal courts “are courts of limited jurisdiction, ” and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. §1331 (providing that district courts have federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States”)

“Upon the removal of an action, a plaintiff may challenge such removal by moving to remand the case . . . to state court.” Rutgers, The State Univ. v. BioArray Sols., Ltd., No. 16-04183, 2017 WL 1395486 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. §1447). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). “[R]emoval statutes are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.” Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “[T]he party asserting federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of showing, at all stages of the litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 292, 396 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Third Circuit has described that burden as a “heavy” one. See Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 325 (3d Cir. 2009).

“[A] defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under' federal law.”^[4]Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). “Ordinarily, determining whether a particular case arises under federal law turns on the ‘well-pleaded complaint' rule.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004); see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“federal...