Sterk v. Zimmer, Inc.

MICHAEL STERK, Plaintiff, v. ZIMMER, INC., Defendant.

Cause No. 3:14-CV-1525

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

April 19, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Zimmer, Inc. (docket entry 35). Plaintiff Michael Sterk filed a response in opposition to the motion (DE 38) and Zimmer filed a reply (DE 43). For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant on all clams asserted by Plaintiff.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael Sterk worked at Zimmer as a production machinist from 2006 until September 5, 2013, when he was fired. Sterk alleges in his complaint that he was fired because of his age (he was over 40 at the time), in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626 et seq. He also alleges that his termination violated Indiana common law because he was fired "in retaliation for exercising his duty and/or his right to report Defendant's failure to follow standard operating procedures." Complaint (DE 1), p. 3, ¶ 25. As to this second count, Sterk contends that his "termination . . . for reporting Defendant's failure to conform to procedure is contrary to public policy and actionable under common law." Id., ¶ 26. Zimmer maintains, however, that it fired Sterk "after it investigated a complaint by a co-worker and concluded that Sterk had mistreated the co-worker on several occasions . . . and purposely damaged Zimmer machinery." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 36), p. 1. For these reasons, Zimmer argues that Sterk was not meeting the company's expectations and so it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing him. Zimmer contends that Sterk's age claim fails from the outset, as he "cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reason Zimmer terminated his employment, nor even establish a prima facie case of discrimination." Id. Zimmer also argues that Sterk's wrongful discharge claim under state law also fails "because . . . he cannot show that he was fulfilling a legal duty when he made a report to Zimmer's compliance hotline." Id.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255. However, neither the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id., 477 U.S. at 247, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).

Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989). If it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003).

Courts must also be mindful "that employment discrimination cases typically involve questions of intent and credibility," and resolution of those issues is the sole province of the jury. Alexander v. Wisc. Dep't of Health and Family Svcs., 263 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2001). Weighing evidence and making credibility decisions are jury functions, and it is not appropriate for a judge to assume those functions when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Accordingly, the court "'appl[ies] the summary judgment standard with special scrutiny to employment discrimination cases, which often turn on issues of intent and credibility.'" Bob-Maunuel v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 854, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2002)).

DISCUSSION

Zimmer claims that it is entitled to judgment because its decision to fire Sterk was not based on his age or the fact that he lodged a complaint about the company's operating procedures, but rather because "he bullied [a] co-worker with an apparent physical impairmentand intentionally destroyed company property." Defendant's Brief, p. 2. Sterk claims that Zimmer's stated reasons for discharging him are pretextual. He claims that his comments to his co-worker, which Zimmer characterizes as bullying, were actually innocent, and that he did not destroy Zimmer property but instead altered a piece of equipment (known as a "burring wheel") only to make it usable. Plaintiff's Response, pp. 12-13. In short, this is a pretty typical employment discrimination case, with a plaintiff who is convinced he was fired illegally by a defendant who is convinced it was merely terminating a "bad apple."

I. Age Discrimination Claim.

A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination can establish a prima facie case by utilizing either the direct or indirect method of proof. Bisluk v. Hamer, 800 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2015). In this case, Sterk uses both methods to try to establish his age claim. See Plaintiff's Response, pp. 9, 16. Under the direct method, a plaintiff must show that his employer made an adverse employment decision "on an impermissible discriminatory basis." Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff meets his initial burden by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. Id. (citing Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2006)). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to submit evidence that the employer's explanation is pretextual." Id.

However, as the Seventh Circuit has explained, the terms "direct" and "indirect" are "somewhat misleading," and "[t]he distinction between the two avenues of proof is 'vague.'" Luks v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sylvester v. SOS Children's Villages Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-03 (7th Cir. 2006)). Because of this vagueness, the assessment of a plaintiff's discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage has become a finely nuanced endeavor, and so a careful examination of the applicable legal rules is necessary.

To start, in Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2008), the court, discussing the direct method of proof, wrote as follows:

The nomenclature is misleading because the phrase "direct method" tends to imply that an employee only may proceed under the direct method with "direct evidence." See Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902-03. We recently have explained, however, that this is not the case. "[D]irect" proof of discrimination is not limited to near-admissions by the employer that its decisions were based on a proscribed criterion (e.g., "You're too old to work here."), but also includes circumstantial evidence which suggests discrimination through a longer chain of inferences. Luks, 467 F.3d at 1053 (emphasis supplied).

The focus of the direct method of proof thus is not whether the evidence offered is "direct" or "circumstantial" but rather whether the evidence "points directly" to a discriminatory reason for the employer's action. Burks v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 751 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that the "'direct method' . . . requires the plaintiff to put forth evidence that demonstrates that she was a member of a protected class and 'as a result suffered the adverse employment action of which [s]he complains'" (quoting Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902)).

Atanus, 520 F.3d at 671-72.

It is also important to note that in recent years the Seventh Circuit has sharpened the pencil a bit regarding the standard under which employment discrimination claims should be analyzed, regardless of the method of proof a plaintiff employs. As the court noted in Good v. Univ. of Chicago Med. Ctr, 673 F.3d 670, 680 (7th Cir. 2012): ". . . we recognize that the directand indirect methods for proving and analyzing employment discrimination cases are subject to criticism. They have become too complex, too rigid, and too far removed from the statutory question of discriminatory causation. See Coleman [v. Donahoe], 667 F.3d [835], 862-63 [(7th Cir. 2012)] (Wood, J., concurring)." In fact, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that it is often important for courts to "look away from the intricacies of the direct and indirect methods . . . and focus on the summary judgment evidence as a whole" in order to assess the...