Stevens v. Carlin

286 F.Supp.3d 1092

Edward STEVENS, Petitioner,

v.Terema CARLIN, Respondent.

Case No. 3:14–cv–00403–REB

United States District Court, D. Idaho.

Signed February 7, 2018

Dennis Benjamin, Nevin Benjamin & McKay, Boise, ID, for Petitioner.

L. LaMont Anderson, Office of Attorney General, Boise, ID, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Honorable Ronald E. Bush, United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Idaho state prisoner Edward Stevens ("Petitioner" or "Stevens"). Petitioner challenges his Ada County conviction for first-degree murder. (Dkt. 1.) The Petition is fully briefed. (Dkt. 15, 23, 28.) The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner's state court proceedings, which have been lodged by the State. (Dkt. 10.) See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) ; Dawson v. Mahoney , 451 F.3d 550, 551 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006).

All named parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Dkt. 9.) Having carefully reviewed the record in this matter, including the state court record, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order granting Claim 1 of the Petition and requiring the State to release or to begin new trial proceedings against Petitioner within 120 days.

SUMMARY OF DECISION

Edward Stevens, the Petitioner in this case, was convicted in Idaho state court of the first-degree murder of an eleven-month-old child. Prosecutors based their case against him on the theory that Stevens violently shook the child and hit the child's head against a bathtub, causing a fatal skull fracture. Stevens has always maintained that the child's injuries resulted from an accidental fall down the stairs. The first-degree murder charge was based on the prosecution's theory that Stevens violently shook the child; without such shaking, the prosecution could not have obtained a conviction for first-degree murder.

At trial, the strongest evidence against Stevens was expert testimony that a certain type of tissue damage found in the child's eyes after death was highly specific to shaken-baby syndrome. However, after Stevens had been convicted, two types of relevant evidence surfaced. First, it was discovered that the child's eyes might have been removed from the body for examination not at the autopsy, but after the body was released from State custody and embalmed. This fact would have established a break in the evidence chain of custody of the eyes. Second, Stevens obtained evidence that the tissue damage in the child's eyes might have been caused by the embalming process, instead of by shaking. These pieces of evidence, if true, would have called into question the prosecution's expert witness testimony, which was that the condition of the child's eyes was specific evidence showing that the child had been violently shaken.

Upon finding the new evidence, Stevens's attorneys investigated whether Stevens could assert a claim under the decision in the case of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Brady , the United States Supreme Court ruled that due process of law requires a prosecutor to discover and disclose to the accused all of the evidence known to the prosecutor's investigative team that is favorable to the accused regarding guilt or punishment. In this case, the State did not disclose to Stevens available evidence suggesting that its expert had examined and based his testimony on eyes that had been embalmed. In response, prosecutors argued both that they did not know of the evidence before trial and that that they did not know the potential significance of the evidence.¹

Stevens filed a motion for a new trial in the state district court, based on this new evidence. When that was unsuccessful, he pursued a state court appeal. He then filed a state petition for post-conviction relief, in which he argued that prosecutors had failed to disclose evidence required by Brady and that Stevens had received ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial and appellate proceedings. The last step of Steven's state court proceedings was an appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals. In that appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals considered Stevens's Brady claim. In doing so, the court assumed that the child's eyes were removed after embalming; however, the court rejected the claim nonetheless. The Idaho Supreme Court declined to review the decision.

When a person has sought and been denied relief from the state's highest court on alleged federal constitutional violations, as Stevens has, he may raise those challenges in federal court in a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is an order directing the custodian of a prisoner to produce the prisoner at a time and place stated in the order to prove that the prisoner is lawfully in custody. It is sometimes known as the "Great Writ," and has existed in various forms since the earliest days of English common law. The writ was a part of early American colonial jurisprudence and later incorporated in the United States Constitution, which provides that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

In modern times, federal statutes and United States Supreme Court rulings govern how and when a federal court can issue a writ of habeas corpus. The authority of a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus regarding a state criminal conviction has been narrowly limited, so as to give deference to state court decisions. However, issuance of a writ of habeas corpus remains a proper exercise of a federal court's jurisdiction when the law, facts, and circumstances call for its application.

As described in this decision, this Court concludes that the finding made by the initial post-conviction state district court that the child's eyes were removed at the autopsy, before release and embalming, was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented to that court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Court further concludes that, even though the Idaho Court of Appeals assumed for the purposes of its decision that the eyes were removed after embalming, that court unreasonably ruled that the prosecution did not violate Brady by failing to discover and disclose the evidence of post-embalming removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In particular, the Court rules that the evidence of post-embalming removal of the child's eyes could have been used to impeach the expert testimony regarding the cause of the injuries to the child's eyes. This important impeachment evidence would have lent support to Stevens's contention that the child died from an accidental fall rather than from shaking and abuse. This evidence may have been enough to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror as to Stevens's guilt.

Because the Court finds that the state post-conviction court's factual finding was unreasonable, the Court is not bound by statutory standards that would otherwise require the Court to defer to the state court, as set forth in the habeas statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d), (e)(1). Instead, applicable law allows this Court to review Stevens's Brady claim "de novo," meaning anew.

For the reasons that follow, on de novo review, the Court rules that Stevens is entitled to relief on his Brady claim. Therefore, the Court issues a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus does not require the responding prison warden to immediately release Stevens from custody. This Order allows the State 120 days to decide whether to release Stevens or retry him.

Because the Court has ruled that Stevens is entitled to relief and to issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus based upon his Brady claim, it is not necessary for the Court to rule upon the other claims made in his Petition.

Table of Contents

Background...1099

Habeas Corpus Standard of Law...1105

Discussion...1109

1. Clearly–Established Law...1109

2. In Denying Claim 1, the Idaho Court of Appeals Unreasonably Applied Brady v. Maryland, Kyles v. Whitley , and Bagley v. United States ...1110

A. Assuming Post–Release and Post–Embalming Removal of the Eyes, the State Court's Conclusion that the Evidence Was Not in the Government's Possession or Control Was Unreasonable...1110

B. Assuming Post–Release and Post–Embalming Removal of the Eyes, the State Court's Implied Conclusion that the Evidence Was Not Impeaching Was Unreasonable...1112

3. On De Novo Review, Petitioner Is Entitled to Habeas Relief on His Brady Claim...1114

A. The Court Need Not Defer to the Idaho Post–Conviction Court's Factual Finding that C.W.'s Eyes Were Removed Before Release and Embalming...1114

i. The evidence presented in state court...1114

ii. The state post-conviction court's finding of pre-release and pre-embalming removal...1122

iii. The factual finding that C.W.'s eyes were removed at the autopsy was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented to the state court, and thus this Court need not apply the presumption of correctness...1126

B. The Prosecution Failed to Disclose Material Impeachment Evidence to the Defense...1129Conclusion...1131BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Ada County, Idaho, Petitioner was convicted of the first-degree murder of C.W., the eleven-month-old son of Petitioner's girlfriend.² The following facts are taken from Petitioner's state court proceedings:

On the afternoon of December 27, 1996, [C.W.] sustained a serious head injury while in the care of Stevens, the child's mother's boyfriend. The child died the next day after he was declared brain dead and removed from life support. Stevens claimed the head injury was the result of an

...