Stevens v. Ritenior Sch. Dist.

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ANTHONY STEVENS, SR., o/b/o D.S., Plaintiff, v. RITENOUR SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:22-CV-1181 JAR

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

May 24, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN W ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is plaintiff, Anthony Stevens, Sr.'s response to the Order to Show Cause why this matter should not be dismissed due to his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that defendants failed to provide his minor child (“D.S.”) with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”). After review of the record the Court finds that plaintiff is unable to represent his son in this action, thus any claims brought on behalf of his son are subject to dismissal. Additionally plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his own claims brought pursuant to the IDEA. Accordingly, this action will be dismissed.

Legal Standard

This Court is required to review a complaint filed in forma pauperis and must dismiss it if it is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Additionally, if the Court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P 12(h)(3).

The Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even pro se complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282,1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

Background

Plaintiff Anthony Stevens, Sr., filed the instant civil action under the Court's federal question jurisdiction against defendants, employees of Ritenour School District in St. Louis, on November 7, 2022. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff asserts that defendants failed to provide his minor child (“D.S.”) with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). On February 17, 2023, the Court granted plaintiffs motion for leave to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. [ECF No. 4], In that same Memorandum and Order, the Court directed plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed due to plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed a response to the Court's Order on March 6, 2023. [ECF No. 5]. He filed a supplemental response on March 22,2023. [ECF No. 6]. The facts, as laid out infra, are taken from the civil complaint, as well as plaintiffs response briefs.

In plaintiffs complaint he asserts he is pursuing claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. He claims that his son, D.S., a black fourth-grade student at Wylend School in the Ritenour School District, was subjected to “race discrimination” when he was taken from his fourth-grade class by the principal, Dr. Greenstein, after a conflict with other students and “placed in another classroom with first, second and third grade students.” [ECF No. 1].

Plaintiff admits that his son was placed in a special education classroom. However, he states that he was not told that it was a special education classroom despite D.S. having an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). Plaintiff claims that not only was D.S. denied equal protection when he was taken from his classroom and placed in a new special education classroom, but he was also placed in the new classroom without the benefit of a hearing or meeting under his IEP.

Plaintiff alleges that prior to being moved to the special education classroom, D.S. was bullied and harassed in his fourth-grade classroom and his teacher, defendant Rossa failed to properly separate D.S. and protect him from his bullies. He asserts that rather than place the alleged bullies in the special education classroom, his son was placed in special education classroom that was supposed to be taught by his prior third-grade teacher, defendant Grander. Although plaintiff claims that the placement of D.S. into the special education classroom was racially motivated, he acknowledges that the alleged bullies who were kept in the grade level were also black, like his son.

Plaintiff claims that he was told that D.S. would be provided fourth-grade work in his new classroom, however, “when they evaluated him, they found out he was doing second and third grade work and not prepared for the fifth-grade level.” Plaintiff states that D.S. was “not given fourth-grade work” and “he did not use fourth-grade books in the classroom they placed D.S. in.” Plaintiff believes that this was the fault of both defendant Grunder and Dr. Greenstein.^[1]

D.S. was allegedly only supposed to be placed in the special education classroom for a short time to “keep him away from the bullies to see if he would be comfortable in the class.” Plaintiff complains that Dr. Greenstein “refus[ed] to keep her agreement to. . .return him back if he wasn't comfortable in being in the class.” Plaintiff does not indicate when this alleged agreement was made. Whether the agreement was part of an IEP, or an informal agreement.

Plaintiff believes D.S. was also “discriminated” against when D.S. got into a fight on the playground with another black student and defendant Crossland attempted to stop the fight by restraining D.S. by pulling his coat up over his arms and “press[ing] his thumbs into his arms muscles until they became numb.” Defendant Crossland walked D.S. to the principal's office and told him, “This is for everyone's safety so you will not hurt anybody else.” Crossland allegedly told D.S., “You should not be hitting little girls.”

Plaintiff states that he brought up defendant Crossland's actions at an IEP meeting on an unnamed date and he was told that defendant Crossland was not trained to handle “IEP students.” Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Greenstein did not address the physical way defendant Crossland handled D.S.^[2]

Plaintiff additionally asserts that D.S. got into an altercation at his school on two separate occasions with other students which involved spitting. Plaintiff complains that in the first instance, teachers on yard duty failed to use cameras to ascertain who spit first to see who should be punished.

In the second altercation, plaintiff complains that D.S. told him a white female student spit on him, and he spit on her back. D.S.'s teacher at the time, Ms. Damian, said the teachers saw D.S. spit on her but did not see her spit on him. As a result, D.S. was sent to the principal's office, and he was told to sit on a bench. Plaintiff states that the female student was sent to the nurse's office and then allowed to go back to her classroom until her parents could pick her up. Dr. Mueller, the Special Education Principal, called plaintiff to pick up D.S. and allegedly told plaintiff that if he picked up D.S. he would not be suspended. However, when plaintiff got to the school to get D.S., defendant Mueller provided plaintiff with a letter indicating that D.S. was suspended. Dr. Mueller indicated her decision had been overruled by Dr. Greenstein.

Last, plaintiff claims that D.S. was also “discriminated” against when he was suspended from his “assistance to ride” to and from school. D.S. claimed another black student was calling him names and threw a bag of candy at his eye. D.S. purportedly retaliated and “defend[ed] himself and hit the kid back.” Plaintiff states that the school failed to contact the students' parents or the IEP team to address the situation.

On February 17, 2023, the Court granted plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and reviewed plaintiff's complaint as required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for frivolousness, maliciousness and for failure to state a claim. [ECF No. 4]. The Court found that although plaintiff, D.S.'s father, had standing to bring his own claims under the IDEA in this matter, he was not entitled to represent D.S. pro se under the IDEA, or under Title VI or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for his Fourteenth Amendment claims). See, e.g, Winkelman ex rel. Winkelmann v. Parma City Schl. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 530-32 (2007); see also, Crozier for A.C. v. Westside Community School District, 973 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2020) and Jianjun Xie v. Oakland Unified School District, No. C 12-02950 CRB, 2013 WL 812425, *3 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2013). Accordingly, the Court found that any and all claims brought on behalf of D.S., were subject to dismissal.^[3]

Additionally the Court noted that plaintiff's claims under the IDEA did not appear to have been properly exhausted through the Missouri State Educational process. Thus, on February 17, 2023, plaintiff was ordered to show cause, no...