Stevens v. Schweitzer

KEVIN L. STEVENS, Petitioner, v. THOMAS SCHWEITZER, Warden, Respondent.

CASE NO. 3:17 CV 1245

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

October 29, 2019

JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Kevin L. Stevens ("Stevens" or "Petitioner"), a prisoner in state custody, has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutionality of his convictions and sentences in State v. Stevens, Case No. CR20130473. (R. 1.) On September 25, 2017, Respondent Warden Thomas Schweitzer ("Respondent") filed a return of writ. (R. 10.) On March 1, 2018, Stevens filed a traverse. (R. 19.) This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 72.2 for preparation of a report and recommendation on Stevens' petition. The undersigned recommends the petition be DENIED, as explained herein.

II. SUMMARY OF FACTS

In a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, factual determinations made by state courts are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir. 2012) ("State-court factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.") The Third District Court of Appeals ("state appellate court") summarized the facts underlying Stevens's conviction as follows:

{¶ 2} This case stems from incidents that occurred on October 8 and 9, 2013. On October 8, the victim invited Stevens to stay the night at her house. The victim went to sleep and awoke after Stevens raped her. On October 9, the victim again invited Stevens to her house to obtain Methadone from him. After the victim obtained the methadone, she asked Stevens to leave. However, because Stevens refused to leave, the victim's sister and her sister's boyfriend came to the victim's house to coax Stevens into leaving. After Stevens left, the victim took her prescribed sleeping medication and went to sleep. She again awoke to Stevens raping her. After discovering that Stevens gained entry into her house and raped her a second time, the victim tossed Stevens's jacket out the back door of her house and, when Stevens went after it, she locked the door behind him. Under the guise of searching for his keys, Stevens regained entry into the victim's house and physically assaulted her.

State v. Stevens, 2016-Ohio-466, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 384 (Ohio Ct. App., Feb. 8, 2016).

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Court Conviction

On December 12, 2013, an Allen County Grand Jury charged Stevens with two counts of rape in violation of Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C.") § 2907.02(A)(1)(c), (A)(2) and one count of aggravated burglary in violation of O.R.C. § 2911.11(A)(1). (R. 10-1, Ex. 1.) All three counts carried repeat-violent-offender specifications. (R. 10-1, Ex. 1.) Stevens entered pleas of not guilty to all charges. (R. 1 at 2.)

On September 2, 2014, the State filed a motion moving the trial court to issue an arrest warrant for the victim as a material witness. Stevens, 58 N.E.2d at 593. The trial court issued the warrant that same day. Id. A jury trial commenced on September 15, 2014. (R. 10-2 at 2.) The jury found Stevens guilty as charged, on September 19, 2014. (R. 10-1, Exs. 2, 3.) The trial court determined Stevens was a repeat violent offender; and, on November 12, 2014, imposed an eightyear sentence for the first rape conviction, eleven year sentence for the second rape conviction, five year sentence for the burglary conviction, and six year sentence for the repeat-violent-offender specification. (R. 10-1, Ex. 4.) The trial court imposed the terms to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of thirty years. (R. 10-1, Ex. 4.)

B. Direct Appeal

On December 15, 2014, Stevens, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal with the state appellate court. (R. 10-1, Ex. 5.) He raised the following assignments of error:

1. Appellant was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel and an impartial jury as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Article I § 10, and Article III § 2 of the Ohio Constitution.

2. Appellant was denied the due process of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article I § 16 of the Ohio Constitution based on prosecutorial misconduct.

3. Appellant was denied the fundamental due process of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I § 16 of the Ohio Constitution where a conviction stands absent sufficient evidence.

4. Appellant was denied his due process rights guaranteed him by the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article I § 16 of the Ohio Constitution when trial court abused it's [sic] discretion.

(R. 10-1, Ex. 6.) The state appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, on February 8, 2016. (R. 10-1, Ex. 8.)

On March 21, 2016, Stevens, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. (R. 10-1, Ex. 9.) He presented the following propositions of law in his memorandum in support of jurisdiction:

1. Whether appellant was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel and an impartial jury as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution[,] Article I § 10, and Article III § 2 of the Ohio Constitution.

2. Whether appellant was denied the due process of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I § 16 of the Ohio Constitution based on prosecutorial misconduct.

3. Whether appellant was denied the fundamental due process of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I § 16 of the Ohio Constitution where a conviction stands absent sufficient evidence.

4. Whether appellant was denied his due process rights guaranteed him by the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I § 16 of the Ohio Constitution when trial court abused it's [sic] discretion.

(R. 10-1, Ex. 10.) The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over the appeal, on June 15, 2016. (R. 10-1, Ex. 11.)¹

C. Federal Habeas Corpus

Petitioner's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus sets forth the following grounds for relief:

1. Petitioner was denied his guaranteed right to effective assistance of trial counsel and an impartial jury in accordance to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the State of Ohio Constitution.

2. Prosecutorial misconduct denied Petitioner the due process of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the State of Ohio Constitution.

3. Petitioner was denied his fundamental due process of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the State of Ohio Constitution where a conviction stands absent sufficient evidence.

4. Petitioner was denied his due process rights guaranteed hum [sic] by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the State of Ohio Constitution when the trial court abused its discretion.

(R. 1) (capitalization altered).

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. AEDPA Review

Stevens' petition for writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 2009). AEDPA, which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was enacted "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases, and 'to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.'" Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (quoting (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)). The Act "recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013). It therefore "erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Id.

One of AEDPA's most significant limitations on district courts' authority to grant writs of habeas corpus is found in § 2254(d). That provision forbids a federal court from grantinghabeas relief with respect to a "claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state-court decision either:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Habeas courts review the "last explained state-court judgment" on the federal claim at issue. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805 (1991) (emphasis original). A state court has adjudicated a claim "on the merits," and AEDPA deference applies, regardless of whether the state court provided little or no reasoning at all for its decision. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).

"Clearly established Federal law" for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) "is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). It includes "only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions." White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The state-court decision need not refer to relevant Supreme Court cases or even demonstrate an awareness of them; it is sufficient that the result and reasoning are consistent with Supreme Court pre...