Stevens v. State

312 So.3d 1205

Jason D. STEVENS a/k/a Jason Daniel Stevens a/k/a Jason Stevens, Appellant,

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2020-KA-00102-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

March 9, 2021

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART, Jackson

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jason Stevens was convicted of grand larceny for stealing a concrete saw and other tools from a construction site. On appeal, Stevens argues that the trial judge erred by overruling his hearsay objections to testimony and evidence that "LeadsOnline," an online database of pawnshop transactions, showed that Stevens pawned a concrete saw several weeks after the subject offense. He also argues that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by allowing him to be tried in jail attire (a yellow jumpsuit) and by not requesting jury instructions regarding his jail attire and the LeadsOnline evidence. Finally, he argues that the evidence did not support his conviction because the jury instructions incorrectly identified the owner of the stolen tools. We find no reversible error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In March 2018, Craig Construction Company was building a power substation in Neshoba County. On Thursday, March 8, 2018, work ended for the week, and Craig Construction's employees stored their tools in a locked trailer on the construction site. The site was surrounded by a chain-link fence with a locked gate.

¶3. On March 12, 2018, Lucas Hale, an employee of Craig Construction, arrived at the construction site and discovered that someone had cut a hole in the chain-link fence and had cut the padlock off the trailer. Hale discovered that several tools were missing from the trailer, including a Husqvarna K760 concrete saw, a nail gun, a circular saw, four drills, an impact wrench, and miscellaneous other tools. Hale estimated that the stolen tools were worth between $2,000 and $2,500.

¶4. A person who lived nearby had seen a "suspicious" vehicle parked at the construction site and had written down the tag number. Investigator Derek Wyatt of the Neshoba County Sheriff's Department determined that the tag number was associated with a vehicle registered to Jason Stevens. Wyatt contacted Stevens, but Stevens told Wyatt that he no longer owned the vehicle. Stevens said he had scrapped the vehicle after hitting a deer.

¶5. Wyatt then ran Stevens's name in "LeadsOnline," an online database of pawnshop transactions. Wyatt testified—over Stevens's hearsay objection—that LeadsOnline showed that on May 1, 2018, Stevens had pawned a Husqvarna K760 concrete saw at AAA Jewelry & Loan, a pawnshop in Starkville. The trial judge overruled Stevens's hearsay objection, noting that Wyatt was "testifying from his investigation." A "LeadsOnline Ticket" for the transaction was also admitted into evidence, again over Stevens's hearsay objection.

¶6. Wyatt subsequently interviewed Stevens at the Neshoba County jail. After signing a Miranda¹ waiver, Stevens admitted that he stole the concrete saw and other tools from the construction site. He also admitted that he pawned the concrete saw at AAA Jewelry & Loan in Starkville. Stevens stated "that he did not know where [the other tools] had gotten off to. That over time they had disappeared here and there." He told Wyatt "that he wasn't a bad person. It was just simply when he was on drugs, that he stole things." Stevens only wanted to give an oral statement and refused to give a written statement.

¶7. Hale and Wyatt were the State's only witnesses. Stevens did not testify or call any witnesses. The jury found Stevens guilty of grand larceny, and the court sentenced him to serve five years in the custody of the Department of Corrections as a nonviolent habitual offender.² Stevens filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, and a notice of appeal. On appeal, he raises the three issues noted in the opening paragraph of this opinion.

ANALYSIS

I. LeadsOnline Evidence

¶8. Stevens first argues that the trial judge erred by allowing Wyatt to testify that LeadsOnline showed that Stevens had pawned the Husqvarna K760 concrete saw and then by admitting the "LeadsOnline Ticket" documenting the transaction. The State argues that the testimony and evidence was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to explain why Wyatt took the next steps in his investigation, i.e., to explain why he interviewed Stevens at the Neshoba County jail. "We employ an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing claims that the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay." White v. State , 48 So. 3d 454, 456 (¶9) (Miss. 2010) (footnote omitted).

¶9. An out-of-court statement is hearsay if it is offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted." M.R.E. 801(c). Thus, to determine whether a statement is hearsay we must first determine the purpose for which it was offered and admitted. Smith v. State , 258 So. 3d 292, 309 (¶50) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Our Supreme Court and this Court have held repeatedly that out-of-court "[s]tatements do not constitute hearsay when admitted" not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather "to explain an officer's course of investigation or motivation for the next investigatory step by that officer." Eubanks v. State , 291 So. 3d 309, 322-23 (¶51) (Miss. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith , 258 So. 3d at 309 (¶52) (quoting Fullilove v. State , 101 So. 3d 669, 675 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) )).

¶10. In this case, Wyatt testified that he ran Stevens's name in the LeadsOnline database and found that he had pawned a concrete saw in order to explain why he focused on Stevens as his "main suspect" and why he then interviewed Stevens about the theft at the Neshoba County jail. In other words, his testimony was offered "to explain [the] course of [his] investigation" and his "motivation for [his] next investigatory step." Id. Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by overruling Stevens's initial hearsay objection.

¶11. Nonetheless, we do find that the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting the "LeadsOnline Ticket" documenting the transaction into evidence. By the time the document was offered into evidence—and Stevens again objected—Wyatt had already explained why his investigation focused on Stevens as the main suspect. There was no need to offer further documentary evidence of the pawnshop transaction. At that point, the only purpose of the additional evidence was to show that Stevens had, in fact, pawned a Husqvarna concrete saw at a pawnshop in Starkville several weeks after the construction site theft—i.e., to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Accordingly, the document was hearsay and should not have been admitted.

¶12. Although the document was admitted in error, we conclude that the error was harmless and does not require reversal. See Chaupette v. State , 136 So. 3d 1041, 1047 (¶12) (Miss. 2014) ("We will not reverse a conviction based on a harmless error."). "For a case to be reversed on the admission or exclusion of evidence, it must result in prejudice and harm or adversely affect a substantial right of a party." Jackson v. State , 245 So. 3d 433, 439 (¶32) (Miss. 2018) (quoting Pham v. State , 716 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (¶12) (Miss. 1998) ). The error in this case was harmless because the document admitted into evidence was essentially cumulative of other admissible evidence. Wyatt properly testified that Stevens himself admitted that he pawned the Husqvarna concrete saw at the Starkville pawnshop. Given that Stevens's car was seen parked at the construction site and that Stevens subsequently confessed both to the theft and to pawning the saw, we cannot say that the admission of the LeadsOnline ticket prejudiced his defense or adversely affected his substantial rights.³

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶13. The defendant's constitutional "right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be asserted on direct appeal if the defendant is represented by appellate counsel who did not represent him at trial. Ellis v. State , 281 So. 3d 1092, 1099 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). "Generally," however, such "claims are more appropriately brought during post-conviction proceedings." Ross v. State , 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶29) (Miss. 2020) (brackets omitted). "This Court will address such claims on direct appeal when [1] the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or [2] the parties stipulate that the record is adequate and the Court determines that the findings of fact by a trial judge able to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc., are not needed." Id. (quotation marks and other brackets omitted). In addition, we may address such "claims on direct appeal when the record affirmatively shows that the claims are without merit." Id.

¶14. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must show both (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient"—i.e., "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment"—and (2) that he was prejudiced as a result—i.e., "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant "bears the burden of proving both prongs of Strickland ." Ravencraft v. State , 989 So. 2d 437, 443 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). "If either prong is not met, the claim fails." Havard v. State , 928 So. 2d 771, 781 (¶8) (Miss. 2006).

¶15. Courts must "indulge a strong presumption that couns...