Stevenson v. Commonwealth

CHRISTIAN LINDALE STEVENSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 1614-19-1

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

NOVEMBER 24, 2020

UNPUBLISHED

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Malveaux and Athey

Argued by videoconference

MEMORANDUM OPINION^* BY JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON

Michael A. Gaten, Judge¹

Charles E. Haden for appellant.

Matthew P. Dullaghan, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Christian Lindale Stevenson ("appellant") entered conditional Alford pleas² to the charges of shooting into an occupied vehicle, in violation of Code § 18.2-154, attempted robbery, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-26 and -58, maiming, in violation of Code § 18.2-51, aggravated maiming, in violation of Code § 18.2-51.2, and three counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress certain statements made to law enforcement that were obtained in the absence of a Miranda³ warning and in the absence of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

"In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial." Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016)). In doing so, we discard any of appellant's conflicting evidence, and regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence. Id. at 473. This applies to the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at trial. Tirado v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 15, 24 (2018).

On June 1, 2018, City of Hampton Police Investigator David Giles was investigating an incident at a Zaxby's restaurant, in which two persons were shot in the parking lot. While at the crime scene, Investigator Giles received a call from Officer Lucy that a walk-in gunshot wound patient had arrived at Sentara CarePlex. Giles went to the hospital and encountered appellant, who had a gunshot wound to his buttocks area.

Investigator Giles testified that when he entered appellant's hospital room to talk with him, he was still trying to determine what had happened at Zaxby's and was unsure if appellant was the victim or the perpetrator in the shooting. Giles had "[v]ery briefly" spoken with two people who had been injured in the shooting at Zaxby's before they were transported to Riverside Hospital. However, he had not yet reviewed any security camera footage from the scene of the shooting.

Investigator Giles questioned appellant about his involvement in the shooting. Appellant initially said that he had been shot in Newport News, but Giles told him that he knew appellant had been at Zaxby's.

Giles told appellant that police were going to collect a gunshot residue kit from his hands, and they did so. Giles testified that the test would have been conducted regardless as to whetherappellant was the suspect in or victim of the shooting. Giles also asked appellant if he would pass a polygraph test.

Detective Raines was working with Giles and had arrived at the Sentara CarePlex with him. Officer Ramirez had responded to the hospital in response to the gunshot victim's arrival. These two officers remained in the room with Giles during the entire questioning. Two additional officers, Detectives Lawrence and Healy, were in and out of the hospital room while Investigator Giles spoke with appellant. Officer Lucy, who was working "overtime extra-duty security" for the hospital, was in the hallway.

Giles, Raines, and Lawrence were dressed in civilian clothing. Ramirez, Lucy, and Healy were in uniform.

Giles testified as to the officers' positioning in the room when he began to question appellant. He noted that he was leaning against the railing of the bed while Detective Raines was on the other side of the bed. Detective Lawrence was located at the foot of appellant's bed but did not stay in the room the entire time. Officer Ramirez was standing near the door but was "not guarding the door or stopping the door."

Giles testified that appellant was not restrained, was not told that he was under arrest, and was not told that he was not free to leave. Hospital personnel continued to provide medical treatment to and collect insurance information from appellant while the law enforcement officers were in the room. Investigator Giles stated that the officers "stepped away whenever they came in to do something."

One of appellant's family members also arrived at the hospital and stayed in appellant's room for "quite a while." Giles testified that he would not have allowed the family member to remain in the room if he thought appellant was a suspect.

At one point, a hospital employee asked appellant for his insurance information. Appellant directed the employee to a bag on the floor containing his belongings. The employee removed appellant's pants from the bag, and several unfìred bullets fell out of the pants pocket to the hospital floor. Ramirez told the employee to step away from the clothing and told appellant's family member to leave the room. Giles then asked appellant about the bullets. Giles did not testify as to any response given by appellant.

Investigator Giles testified that he believed that his questioning did not prolong appellant's stay at the hospital because the medical staff was able to continue treating appellant. Giles estimated that he questioned appellant for fifteen to twenty minutes, and Giles left the hospital while appellant was still receiving treatment and prior to his discharge from the hospital.

After Investigator Giles left the Sentara CarePlex, he went to Riverside Hospital and re-interviewed the two shooting victims before he returned to the police station. Arrest warrants for appellant were obtained sometime after Giles arrived at the police station.

Once appellant was discharged, Officer Ramirez transported him from the hospital to the police department, where Giles advised appellant of his Miranda rights. Appellant was still in his hospital gown, as his clothing remained in police custody. Investigator Giles did not believe that appellant was transported in handcuffs, and appellant was not in handcuffs when Giles spoke with him at the police station.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made at the hospital to police. The trial court denied the motion, stating that it did not see the "facts and circumstances" surrounding appellant's hospitalization to be "coercive and suggestive." The trial court found that appellant voluntarily went to the hospital for treatment which he was receiving at the time the police were there and that the police did not interfere with appellant's treatment. Further, police were there investigating a shooting "with substantial confusion about who was a victim and who may havebeen a perpetrator." According to the trial court, nothing Investigator Giles testified to "should have suggested to [appellant] that he was in custody when he was not." The trial court concluded that appellant was not in custody at the hospital and that his statements made at the Hampton Police Department were not the result of coercive behavior.

II. ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain statements that were obtained in the absence of a Miranda warning and in the absence of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.

When challenging the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the appellant bears the burden of establishing that reversible error occurred. Glenn v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 123, 130 (2008). At this juncture, the Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and affords it the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from that evidence. Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 367 (2016). Appellant must show "that even when the evidence is reviewed in that light, denying the motion to suppress was reversible error." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 182, 186 (2019) (quoting Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517, 520 (2010)).

"Whether the circumstances of [a police interview] were such as to require Miranda warnings is a mixed question of law and fact." Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 33 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Spinner v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 384, 392 (2019)). In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we are "bound by [its] findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong,' and we 'give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts' by the trial judge and law enforcement." Salahuddin v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 190, 202 (2017) (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198 (1997) (en banc)). "We review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the particular facts of the case." Taylor, 70 Va. App. at 186.

"The right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation is an axiom of American law expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny." Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 135 (2009). "Where an accused in a criminal case is subjected to custodial police interrogation, he first must be advised of his Fifth Amendment rights as defined in Miranda . . . for any statement he makes to be admissible in evidence." Commonwealth v. Thornton, 24 Va. App. 478, 488 (1997).

"[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). "Miranda warnings are not required when the interviewee's freedom has not been so restricted as to render him or her 'in custody.'" Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 618, 641 (2004) (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564 (1998)). A determination of...