Stevenson v. Green

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JERMAINE STEVENSON, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN GREEN et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-217

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division

March 28, 2023

OPINION

Robert J. Jonker, United States District Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Warden Connie Horton, Grievance Coordinator M. McLean, Supervising Lieutenants Unknown Trotter and Unknown Bigger, Supervising Sergeant G. Blemke, and Corrections Officers Unknown Green and Unknown Snyder.

Plaintiff alleges that he is “a qualified individual with a mental health disability,” and that during all relevant times, he was “in voluntary outpatient treatment in the Corrections Mental Health Program (CMHP).” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Plaintiff states that he has a long history of outpatient mental health therapy and that he takes prescription medication for depression. (Id.)

In January of 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance “on various facility staff members,” alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights-specifically, deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Id., PageID.6.)

On February 3, 2021, Plaintiff left the chow hall after breakfast to return to his housing unit. (Id.) Immediately after Plaintiff left the chow hall, Defendant Green left the chow hall and directed Plaintiff to accompany him back inside. (Id.) Plaintiff did so, and once inside, Defendant Green asked, “Do you have anything on your person?” (Id.) Plaintiff responded that he did not. (Id.) Plaintiff then “proceeded to spread his legs, unzip his coat[,] and lift his arms to assume the traditional ‘pat-down' frisk position voluntarily.” (Id.) “Plaintiff's body was thoroughly frisked by an unnamed officer,” and his coat was removed and searched by an officer. (Id.) No contraband was found. (Id., PageID.7.)

The supervising sergeant directed Plaintiff to return to his housing unit, but Defendant Green instructed Plaintiff to remain where he was. (Id.) Defendant Green told the sergeant “that it looked like Plaintiff attempted to ‘ditch something' outside.” (Id.) Plaintiff told the sergeant that was not true. (Id.) The sergeant responded, “It doesn't matter, [Plaintiff] doesn't have any contraband on him, so he can go.” (Id.) As Plaintiff turned to leave, Defendant Green said, “No, I want to strip search him.” (Id.) The sergeant said, “Go ahead.” (Id.)

Defendant Green escorted Plaintiff to the annex building, where he informed Defendant Trotter that he was going to strip search Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Green told Defendant Trotter, “You know what this is about.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims this was a reference to the grievance Plaintiff had submitted about “deprivation of his prescribed anti-depressants.” (Id., PageID.8.) Defendant Trotter “nodded his head in approval and made no attempt to accompany [D]efendant Green for supervision.” (Id.)

Defendant Green took Plaintiff “into the ‘Deputy suite' instead of the designated nonroutine strip search room.” (Id.) He did not turn on the lights inside that room. (Id.) Plaintiff said, “This isn't where I was strip searched last time I was brought up here a few days ago.” (Id.) Defendant Green replied, “I don't give a f*** about what they did last time.” (Id.) Defendant Green directed Plaintiff “to strip naked in a public access ‘Deputy Suite' lobby area.” (Id.) He then directed Plaintiff to remove all clothing, open his mouth, allow examination of his ears, “lift his arms to expose his armpits, bend over and spread his buttocks to expose his anus to the frisking officer, and lift his testicles to expose the area” behind them. (Id.) During the strip search, Resident Unit Manager Lacrosse “walked through the lobby area to gain access to his office.” (Id.) Defendant Snyder also “walk[ed] into the lobby area, laughed, and then left the area.” (Id., PageID.9.) Defendant Green told Plaintiff that he did not “even know what true depression is yet,” and that “[officers could] do this every day.” (Id.) After the search, Defendant Green told Plaintiff to get dressed as he made “numerous copies of Plaintiff's identification card” using the copy machine. (Id.)

Plaintiff submitted a Step I grievance “alleging a PREA complaint” against Defendant Green on February 4, 2021. (Id.) Defendant McLean received the grievance on February 10, 2021, but failed to forward it to URF's PREA coordinator. (Id.) While conducting research, Plaintiff “discovered that there exists a separate process for which administration must process PREA claims which are filed through the institutional grievance process.” (Id., PageID.10.) After Plaintiff became aware of that process, he filed a grievance against Defendants Horton, Blemke, Bigger, and, McLean “for their first-hand knowledge of the unconstitutional acts committed by [D]efendant Green and their personal involvement in the review process of Plaintiff's complaint. (Id.)

Defendant McLean processed the PREA grievance through the regular grievance process “in violation of MDOC policies and customs.” (Id.) Defendant Blemke interviewed Plaintiff regarding his complaint. (Id.) Defendant Blemke asked Plaintiff to sign off his grievance, and Plaintiff refused. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Blemke failed to forward the PREA complaint to the PREA coordinator. (Id.) Defendant Bigger “conducted an unauthorized review of the PREA grievance” and also failed to forward it to the PREA coordinator. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to Defendant Horton, who failed to report the PREA grievance and denied Plaintiff's appeal, stating that there “was no violation of policy.” (Id., PageID.11.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts violations of his First Amendment right to be free from retaliation, Fourth Amendment rights, Eighth Amendment rights, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. (Id., PageID.12-15.) Given Plaintiffs reference to being a qualified individual with a disability, the Court also construes Plaintiff's complaint to assert claims against Defendants pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Additionally, the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to assert claims against Defendants McLean, Horton, Blemke, and Bigger premised upon their handling of Plaintiff's grievance and PREA complaint, as well as violations of MDOC policy against all Defendants. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., PageID.17.)

II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

A. ADA Claims

The Court has construed Plaintiff's complaint to assert ADA claims against all Defendants premised upon his allegation that he is a qualified individual with a disability. Title II of the ADA provides, in pertinent part, that no qualified individual with a disability shall, because of that disability, “be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). The Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA applies...