Stewart-Magee v. Snyder

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MARINA STEWART-MAGEE, as Administrator and Personal Representative of the Estate of Albina Agdasovna Sharifullina, Deceased Plaintiff, v. DANIEL B. SNYDER, Defendant.

No. 5:22-cv-00010-MHH

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division

May 27, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This case concerns an accident involving a Sea-Doo personal watercraft. While Albina Agdasovna Sharifullina and Daniel B Snyder were traveling on the Sea-Doo, they struck a dock. Mr Snyder was injured, and Ms. Sharifullina died in the accident. (Doc. 21). Among other things, the jury in this case must decide who was driving the Sea-Doo at the time of the accident. To carry her burden of proving that Mr. Snyder was operating the Sea-Doo, Marina Stewart-Magee, the administrator of Ms. Sharifullina's estate, relies on an investigation conducted by a marine police officer, Agent John Williams. Agent Williams has opined that Mr. Snyder was driving the Sea-Doo at the time of the accident.

Mr Snyder has asked the Court to exclude Agent Williams's opinions at trial.

(Doc. 13). Mr. Snyder argues that Agent Williams is not qualified to express the opinions that he offers in this case and that the methodology Agent Williams used to reach his opinions is unreliable. This opinion resolves Mr. Snyder's motion to exclude Agent Williams's expert testimony.

Rule 702 Standard for Admissibility of Expert Opinions

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, an expert may be qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” and an expert may testify at trial and offer an expert opinion if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REQUIRES DISTRICT COURTS TO APPLY A “RIGOROUS THREE-PART INQUIRY” WHEN CONSIDERING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT testimony under Rule 702. A district court must determine whether:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). All three prongs “are distinct concepts that courts and litigants must take care not to conflate.” Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). The party offering expert testimony must demonstrate that the anticipated testimony is admissible under Rule 702. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260.

Agent Williams's opinions concern his investigation and reconstruction of the accident. (Doc. 13-5, p. 6, ¶ 17); (Doc. 17, pp. 5-14). The Court, exercising its gatekeeping function under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), first considers Agent Williams's qualifications and then examines the sufficiency of Agent Williams's data and the reliability of the methods he used to reach his opinions in this case.^[1]

Agent Williams's Qualifications

Under Rule 702, “[w]hile scientific training or education may provide possible means to qualify, experience in a field may offer another path to expert status.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260-61. The standard for admissibility under the qualifications prong is not stringent. Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., 255 F.R.D. 568, 578 (N.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[S]o long as the expert is at least minimally qualified, gaps in his qualifications generally will not preclude admission of his testimony, as this relates more to witness credibility and thus the weight of the expert's testimony, than to its admissibility.” Hendrix, 255 F.R.D. at 578 (citation omitted).

Agent Williams's qualifications are these: he graduated from the Northeast Alabama Law Enforcement Academy at Jacksonville State University in 2008, where he completed 480 hours of basic training to become a law enforcement officer. (Doc. 13-5, p. 2, ¶ 3); (Doc. 54, pp. 33-37). After graduating from the law enforcement academy, Agent Williams completed a 10-week Marine Patrol School in Orange Beach, Alabama. (Doc. 13-5, p. 2, ¶ 3); (Doc. 54, pp. 33, 125-26). From 2008 through 2015, Agent Williams served as a marine police officer for the Department of Conservation & Natural Resources. (Doc. 13-5, p. 2, ¶ 4); (Doc. 54, p. 31). In 2015, Agent Williams became a senior trooper for the Marine Patrol Division of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency. (Doc. 13-5, p. 2, ¶ 2). In 2018 and 2019, Agent Williams completed a level one Comprehensive Boating Incident Investigation course and a level two Boating Incident Reconstruction and Analysis course, both offered by the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators. (Doc. 54, pp. 41-43, 126, 144); (Doc. 13-5, p. 3, ¶ 5).

According to Agent Williams, he has experience and specialized training in boating accident investigation and reconstruction. He has investigated more than 60 boating and personal watercraft accidents, including accidents involving fatalities. Agent Williams asserts that he has investigated cases to determine who was driving a personal watercraft at the time of an accident. (Doc. 13-5, p. 3, ¶¶ 5-6); (Doc. 172, p. 9, tp. 32).

In his deposition, Agent Williams testified that during investigations, he reconstructs accidents. (Doc. 17-2, p. 34, tpp. 130-31). During his time in Marine Patrol School, Agent Williams learned to reconstruct accidents using measurements, photographs, and other evidence. (Doc. 17-2, p. 8, tp. 28). From 2016 through 2018, Agent Williams taught accident investigation and reconstruction to recruits at the Marine Patrol School. (Doc. 54, p. 45).

During Marine Patrol School, Agent Williams learned what the “marine environment . . . does to a person when they are ejected through boats and docks and land and water.” (Doc. 17-2, p. 8, tp. 28). Agent Williams states that he has “knowledge of the type of injuries, bruising and/or markings consistent with and sustained to the bodies of individuals who are involved in a PWC collision and more specifically, who are seated in the front/driver's seat of a PWC at the time of impact.” (Doc. 13-5, p. 3); (Doc. 17-2, p. 9, tpp. 29-30). According to Agent Williams, he has experience observing injuries and markings on a person's body to determine the cause of the injuries. (Doc. 17-2, p. 9, tp. 30).

Based on this information, Ms. Stewart-Magee has established that Agent Williams's training and experience in investigating marine accidents and injuries may qualify him as an expert in this case. For purposes of this opinion, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Agent Williams's training and experience qualify him to render opinions in this case.^[2]

Reliability of Agent Williams's Methodology

Experience alone is not sufficient to “render[] reliable any conceivable opinion [an] expert may express.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (emphasis in Frazier). “‘If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply taking the expert's word for it.'” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment) (emphasis in Frazier).

To evaluate the reliability of scientific and non-scientific experience based-testimony, courts may consider, “to the extent possible: (1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.” Quiet Tech DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1341 (citations omitted); Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262 (“The same criteria that are used to assess the reliability of a scientific opinion may be used to evaluate the reliability of non-scientific, experience-based testimony.”) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). Also relevant to the reliability inquiry is “‘[w]hether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion'” and “‘[w]hether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations.'” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1297 n. 13 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment).

The reliability inquiry is flexible, and a court has “considerable leeway in deciding . . . how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. In assessing reliability, a court focuses “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580.

Agent Williams conducted a “damage pattern analysis” to reach his conclusions in this case. (Doc. 54, pp. 55-56). Agent Williams explained that a damage pattern analysis consists of “surveying] the vessel and then...