Stewart v. Morgan State Univ.

46 F.Supp.3d 590

Troy STEWART

v.MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 11–3605.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Filed Sept. 3, 2014.

Troy Stewart, Bowie, MD, pro se.

Sally Lotz Swann, Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, MD, for Morgan State University, et al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this discrimination case is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Morgan State University (“Morgan State”), Dallas R. Evans, Warren Hayman, Martin R. Resnick, T. Joan Robinson, Benjamin Welsh, and David Wilson. (ECF No. 34). Also pending is Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 37). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. Defendants' motion to strike will be denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Troy Stewart, proceeding pro se, claims that he was discriminated against on the basis of race when he was dismissed from his graduate program at Morgan State, a historically-black college. Plaintiff brings claims for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., breach of contract, and constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In the spring semester of 2010, Plaintiff Troy Stewart, an African–American male, enrolled at Morgan State University, where he began pursuing an Ed.D Degree in Urban Educational Leadership. (ECF No. 36, at 4–5). The graduate program in which Plaintiff enrolled required Ed.D candidates to complete a minimum of sixty credit hours, with an overall 3.0 grade point average, with the grade of “C” as the minimum acceptable grade. (ECF No. 12–3, at 8)¹ . The program requirements indicate that “[a] student who receives two C's will be dismissed from the [Ed.D] program.” (Id. ).

Plaintiff was enrolled in three traditional lecture classes and one internship course in the spring semester of 2010. (ECF No. 36–1, at 2). Dr. Benjamin Welsh, a Caucasian male, served as Plaintiff's supervisor for his internship course, EDAD 603, Administration and Social Policy, and taught two other courses in which Plaintiff was enrolled: EDAD 601, Theories and Practices of Urban Educational Leadership, and ASLP 602, Philosophy of Education. (ECF No. 12–3, at 4). At the outset of the internship, Dr. Welsh and Plaintiff both signed a “Statement of Agreement” on January 27, 2010, outlining the objectives and requirements of the internship. (ECF No. 12–2). The Statement of Agreement states:

Internship Objectives (Learning Experiences):

To identify, research, and get an idea on how many grants are out here for at- risk youths! I will dedicate at least 30 hours per week for 7 weeks, which will be equivalent to 210 hours of grant research experience completing my first internship experience in seven weeks. This research could help in identifying a future grant.

I will perform and conduct independent research from my home-based location and research libraries. I will search federal and state databases to get an idea of the types of grants that are being offered. I will look at sites such as http://www.grants.gov/. This will give me an idea of what is being offered in the field of education for at-risk youths. I will consult with Dr. Benjamin Welsh, my on-site supervisor. I will consult with him during my internship about my findings.

This will give me experience in searching, identifying, and researching grants. It will also show me the current social policy grants mainly in the field of education. This internship will give me further understanding of federal and state grants.

(ECF No. 12–2, at 2).

Difficulties and differences of opinion developed in Plaintiff's relationship and interactions with Dr. Welsh. Eventually, Plaintiff altered the focus of his internship and appealed some of his grades. After the grades were upheld, which included two “C” grades and an incomplete for the internship, Plaintiff was dismissed from the program by November 2010.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC made no findings and issued him a right to sue letter on October 12, 2011. (ECF No. 1–1). Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 15, 2011 against Morgan State University; Benjamin Welsh, associate professor in the Urban Educational Leadership Doctoral program; Dallas Evans and Martin Resnik, members of Morgan State's Board of Regents; Warren Hayman, interim coordinator of the Urban Educational Leadership Doctoral Program; Joan Robinson, Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs; and David Wilson, President. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff's complaint alleged counts for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII; violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and breach of contract.

On March 1, 2012, all of the Defendants, except Dallas Evans, moved to dismiss (ECF No. 10); Mr. Evans moved to dismiss on January 11, 2013 (ECF No. 17). The motions to dismiss were granted in part by memorandum opinion and order issued on February 1, 2013. The claims remaining in this case include: (1) Title VII claims against Morgan State; (2) breach of contract claims for injunctive relief; and (3) Section 1983 claims against the individual Defendants. Defendants answered on February 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a corrected complaint on March 29, 2013, and Defendants filed an amended answer on April 11, 2013. (ECF Nos. 22, 24, & 25).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 11, 2013 and Plaintiff opposed the motion on October 30, 2013. (ECF Nos. 34 & 36). Defendants subsequently filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's opposition, suspecting that Mr. Stewart was using a “ghost attorney.” (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff opposed this motion. (ECF No. 38).²

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) which provides that: “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court of the United States has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion: “[b]y its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). “The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in [his] favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility.” See Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644–45 (4th Cir.2002). The court must, however, also abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” See Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir.1993) and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ).

III. Analysis

A. Title VII Claims

Morgan State first argues that Title VII only governs employment relationships, and Plaintiff was not an employee at Morgan State within the meaning of Title VII. (ECF No. 34–1, at 7–8). Alternatively, Morgan State contends that Plaintiff's dismissal was a purely academic decision. (ECF No. 34–1, at 7).

1. Employment Status

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual in his employment based on that person's race.³ The statute defines employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees” and “any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). Title VII defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). The Fourth Circuit has adopted a two-part test to determine whether an individual constitutes an employee for purposes of Title VII. See Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir.1993). First, the putative employee must demonstrate the existence of an employment relationship. Bender v. Suburban Hosp., 998 F.Supp. 631, 634 (D.Md.1998)(finding it to be “axiomatic that a plaintiff must allege the existence of an employment relationship in order to state a Title VII claim.”). Specifically, the employee must demonstrate that compensation was received in exchange for the service provided to the employer. Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir.1990) (“Central to the meaning of [employee] is the idea of compensation in exchange for services: an employer is someone who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary or other compensation to the person who provides services-that person being the employee.”). Second, after compensation is proven, employment status “is properly determined by analyzing the facts of each employment relationship under a standard that incorporates both the common law test derived from principles of agency and the so-called ‘economic realities' test.” Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220 (citation omitted). “[U]nder the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by...