Stewart v. Tice

1

SHAWN A. STEWART Petitioner, v. ERIC W. TICE, et al. Respondents.

CIVIL No. 1:19-CV-1294

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 4, 2022

Brann Chief Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

Shawn Stewart, a state inmate serving a 17.5-to-35-year sentence at the State Correctional Institute (“SCI”) in Somerset, Pennsylvania, has filed the instant petition for habeas corpus. In his petition, he challenges his jury-determined convictions, which stem from an armed break-in occurring at his romantic partner's house, an episode which resulted in Stewart's prosecution for robbery, burglary, and conspiracy.

Stewart posits that he was prejudiced at trial as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. He further claims that he was denied due process as a result of insufficient evidence and a verdict against the weight of the evidence, as well as the trial court's allowance of alleged false testimony into the record. However, after a review of the record, we conclude that Stewart's petition fails on its merits under the deferential standards which govern such petitions. Accordingly, we will recommend that the petition be denied.^[1]

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

The factual background of the instant case was aptly summarized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision affirming Stewart's conviction and sentence:

Briefly, in the two years leading up to early January 2014, [Stewart] and Sandra Matos (“Sandra”) were engaged in a “friends with benefits” relationship. As of January 2014, Sandra lived in a Middletown, Pennsylvania townhome with her 13-year old twin sons. In the two months leading up to January 6, 2014, Sandra's father, Samuel Matos (“Matos”), lived with Sandra and her sons after moving to Middletown from Puerto Rico.

On the morning of Monday, January 6, 2014, Sandra was at work and her sons were at school when Matos heard a knock on the front door of the townhome. He opened the door to find two males and one female who asked for Sandra. When Matos explained she was not there, the three entered the home uninvited. One intruder put a gun to Matos' chest, ordered him to the floor, zip-tied his wrists behind him, and placed an item over his head. The other two intruders went upstairs and ransacked Sandra's bedroom and Matos' bedroom before leaving the home with a small blue suitcase belonging to Matos.

Matos was able to leave the home and summon assistance from a neighbor who called the police. The police, in turn, called Sandra who returned to the home. In the course of discussions with the police, Sandra explained that she had fabricated a story-playing to [Stewart's] perpetual interest in money-telling [Stewart] she was traveling to Puerto Rico over the January 3-5 weekend to conduct business for her father and she was returning to Middletown with $87, 000 in a locked bag.

Following a police investigation, [Stewart] was arrested and charged with burglary, robbery, conspiracy and other crimes. Following trial, a jury found [Stewart] guilty of all ten counts against him.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, No. 1622 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (Doc. 8-3, at 1).

The Superior Court affirmed Stewart's initial sentence of 28 to 56 years on direct appeal. However, Stewart filed a timely petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., on August 22, 2017. On the subsequent June 11, 2019 appeal, the Superior Court vacated Stewart's sentence and remanded for resentencing; however, it affirmed Stewart's convictions, leaving them untouched for the purposes of a habeas petition. The Superior Court's ruling became final on July 11, 2019.

Stewart then filed the instant habeas petition on July 25, 2019, challenging the convictions affirmed by the Superior Court. (Doc. 1). The petition raises seven grounds upon which Stewart believes he is entitled to relief. On this score, Stewart asserts five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that counsel failed to: object to the prosecution's closing argument; object to witness Detective Appleby's testimony; call witnesses on his behalf; request a Kloiber instruction; and impeach a witness, Sandra Matos. Stewart also asserts claims that he was denied due process because the verdict was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and because the trial court admitted alleged false and prejudicial testimony. (Id.) In their response, the respondents argue that Stewart's petition is both time-barred and meritless. (Doc. 19).

After a careful review of the record, we agree with the respondents that Stewart's petition is time-barred and, further, that his claims are without merit. Accordingly, we will recommend that Stewart's petition be denied.

III. Standard of Review

A. State Prisoner Habeas Relief-The Legal Standard.

(1) Substantive Standards

In order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must satisfy the standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides in part as follows:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that- (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;

..........

(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b).

As this statutory text implies, state prisoners must meet exacting substantive and procedural benchmarks in order to obtain habeas corpus relief. At the outset, a petition must satisfy exacting substantive standards to warrant relief. Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). By limiting habeas relief to state conduct which violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, ” § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings led to a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to § 2254 relief, absent a showing that those violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Priester v. Vaughan, 382 F.3d 394, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).

(2) Deference Owed to State Courts

These same principles which inform the standard of review in habeas petitions and limit habeas relief to errors of a constitutional dimension also call upon federal courts to give an appropriate degree of deference to the factual findings and legal rulings made by the state courts in the course of state criminal proceedings. There are two critical components to this deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

First, with respect to legal rulings by state courts, under § 2254(d), habeas relief is not available to a petitioner for any claim that has been adjudicated on its merits in the state courts unless it can be shown that the decision was either: (1) “contrary to” or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established case law; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) was “based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts, ” see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Applying this deferential standard of review, federal courts frequently decline invitations by habeas petitioners to substitute their legal judgments for the considered views of the state trial and appellate courts. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); see also Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2006); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2002).

In addition, § 2254(e) provides that the determination of a factual issue by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding was erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption in favor of the correctness of state court factual findings has been extended to a host of factual findings made in the course of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (per curiam); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734-35 (1990). This principle applies to state court factual findings made both by the trial court and state appellate courts. Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671 (3d Cir.2006). Thus, we may not re-assess credibility determinations made by the state courts, and we must give equal deference to both the explicit and implicit factual findings made by the state courts. Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, in a case such as this, where a state court judgment rests upon factual findings, it is well-settled that:

A state court decision based on a factual determination, ..., will not be overturned on factual grounds unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state p

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