Stietz v. Frost

ROBERT J. STIETZ, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH J. FROST and NICK WEBSTER, Defendants.

19-cv-43-wmc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

July 9, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

In this case, plaintiff Robert Stietz brings suit against two Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") wardens, Joseph Frost and Nick Webster. Stietz alleges that defendants Frost and Webster violated his Second and Fourth Amendment Rights when they entered his property, demanded that he give up his rifle, and then seized both him and his rifle. Defendants have now moved to dismiss plaintiff's case for failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed below, the court will grant defendants' motion and dismiss the case.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

At the outset, the court must address defendants' argument that the court take judicial notice of the proceedings and findings of fact in State v. Stietz, 2017 WI 58, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 895 N.W.2d 796. That case involved the criminal prosecution of Stietz for his actions during the same event that forms the basis of the present lawsuit. After his initial conviction by a jury for resisting/obstructing a law enforcement officer and intentionally pointing a firearm at an officer, the Wisconsin Supreme Court awarded Stietz a new trial, finding that a jury instruction on self-defense was wrongly denied him and not harmless. Rather than re-try the case, however, Stietz pled no contest to a charge of resisting or obstructing a law enforcement officer. According to defendants, the court should take notice of these previous proceedings, as well as the findings of fact found in them. Indeed, defendants' summary of the facts cites not to plaintiff's complaint, but rather to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's findings of facts in Stietz's criminal case. While plaintiff also cites to portions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in his complaint, he objects to the defendant's suggestion that any facts outside of those alleged in his complaint should be judicially noticed. (Pl.'s Opp'n (dkt. #9) 10.)

Typically, when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint. Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2002) ("As a general rule, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider only the plaintiff's complaint."). As defendants rightly point out, however, a court may under some circumstances take judicial notice of certain matters of public record not contained within the complaint. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). In particular, "[a] court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is both 'not subject to reasonable dispute' and either 1) 'generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court' or 2) 'capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evidence 201(b)). Because judicial notice "substitutes the acceptance of a universal truth for the conventional method of introducing evidence," however, the Seventh Circuit understandably advises courts to exercise caution in employing this adjudicative device. Id.

Here, the existence of the previous case, its procedural history, and the fact that Stietz pled no contest to resisting or obstructing an officer are all facts that are not reasonably disputed and ascertainable from a source whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. See Opoka v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 1996) (court may take judicial notice of existence and outcome of related administrative proceeding); Fletcher v. Menard Corr. Ctr., 623 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of judge's ruling in prior proceeding involving the same litigant).

Defendants urge the court to go a step further and take judicial notice of the underlying findings of fact made by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. (See Defs.' Br. (dkt. #4) 8-10.). Previous cases have held that underlying findings of fact made by a previous court, unless indisputable, are not the proper subject of judicial notice. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (findings of fact from previous court records were subject to reasonable dispute and were not proper subject of judicial notice); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 128 F.3d at 1080 (same); Wright & Miller, 21B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5106.4 (2d ed.) ("[M]ost courts agree that Rule 201 does not permit courts to judicially notice the truth of findings of fact."). Here, the underlying judicial findings of fact cited by defendants are not "indisputable" -- indeed, they were the subject of a contested criminal trial and plaintiff has expressed disagreement with several of the facts cited by defendants. (See Pl.'s Opp'n (dkt. #9) 10.)

Defendants suggest that plaintiff's citation to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in his complaint incorporates the findings into his allegations. (Defs.' Br. (dkt. #4) 9.) For support, defendants point to Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Thompson,161 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 1998), which held that documents referred to in a complaint and central to its claims are considered part of the pleadings. Id. at 456. There, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin sought a declaration of its rights as set forth in a series of treaties. Id. at 452. The court held that, because the complaint referenced the treaties and were central to the claims at issue, judicial notice of the treaties was proper. Id. at 456. Here, by contrast, the previous criminal case is not central to plaintiff's claim. Cf. EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2007) (facts alleged in EEOC charge were not central to EEOC complaint even though charge was attached to the complaint). While the underlying facts may overlap, plaintiff's claims stand on their own even without reference to the previous proceedings. This certainly cannot be said of the treaties at issue in the Menominee case, which specifically sought a declaration of the rights enumerated within the treaties. Menominee, 161 F.3d at 452.

Having said that, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's majority opinion in State v. Stietz did set forth a set of facts established at trial viewing "the evidence from the defendant's perspective." 2017 WI ¶¶ 23-60. Although remanding for a new trial because of a legal error, and ultimately allowing defendant to plead no contest to the lesser of the two charges, to resisting/obstructing an officer, the defendant would seem to at least be estopped from asserting facts here that were more favorable than the most favorable before the Wisconsin courts. Cf. DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2013) (doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded plaintiff from alleging claims inconsistent with Wisconsin court decision finding no tax fraud). Regardless, he may not now take a position that would be inconsistent his criminal plea, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)(requiring dismissal of a suit that "would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence"), although at least arguably none of the claims here would necessarily require the invalidity of his no contest plea of resisting or obstructing a law enforcement officer, see Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining how conviction for resisting arrest is not incompatible with Fourth Amendment claims); Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook, 522 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).

Accordingly, in considering defendants' motion, the court will generally look only to facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and not to the findings of fact in the related criminal case unless wholly inconsistent with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's factual findings. In so doing, the court takes all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all inferences in plaintiff's favor again subject to this narrow limitation. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007).

Turning now to those facts, on the afternoon of November 25, 2012, plaintiff Stietz set out to inspect a 25 acre piece of property that he and his wife owned in rural Lafayette County, Wisconsin, which is surrounded by his uncle's land, over which he was given an easement to a nearby Highway 81. With gun hunting season for deer ending that day at 4:45pm, the purpose of Stietz's inspection was to see if any hunters or others were trespassing on his land, as had happened in previous deer seasons, as well as to ascertain any damage to the fence line around his property. Parking his car near the gate to his land about a quarter of a mile from Highway 81, Stietz began walking his property, carrying a loaded rifle, along with a pistol in his pants waistband.

Shortly after, DNR wardens Frost and Webster were driving on Highway 81 near Stietz's property, and spotted Stietz's parked car "a few minutes before the end of hunting season." (Compl. (dkt. #1-1) ¶ 10(a).) According to Stietz, they saw "no violations of any Wisconsin law nor any persons in the vicinity," (id. ¶ 10(b)), yet still decided to proceed through the gate into Stietz's property, without invitation or consent. "Within minutes" of entering the property, defendants Frost and Webster heard someone approaching. (Id. ¶ 12.) By this time of day in late fall, it was already completely dark, and they both shone bright long flashlights at the approaching person, who turned out to be Stietz. In the dark, Stietz was not able to see any DNR identification on Frost's or Webster's blaze clothing, nor was he able to hear or understand any statements they may have made to identify themselves as wardens. However, Stietz apparently did hear enough to respond to a question that he had seen several doe while walking on the property, although he was not hunting.

At that point, apparently believing that Stietz had been hunting for deer based on that...