Stiffler v. Garland

583 F.Supp.3d 680

Thomas Lee STIFFLER, Plaintiff,

v.Merrick GARLAND and Marvin G. Richardson, Defendants.

2:20-CV-01120-CCW

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed February 2, 2022

Jesse D. Daniel, The Daniel Law Group PLLC, Indiana, PA, for Plaintiff.

Kezia Taylor, U.S. Attorney's Office, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND, United States District Judge Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Thomas Lee Stiffler and Defendants Merrick Garland (Attorney General of the United States) and Marvin G. Richardson (Acting Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) (collectively the "United States"). See ECF Nos. 24 & 26. Mr. Stiffler has also filed a related Motion to Strike certain of the United States’ submissions in support of summary judgment. See ECF No. 36. For the reasons that follow, Mr. Stiffler's Motion for Summary Judgment and his Motion to Strike will be denied, and the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.

I. Background

In 2004, Mr. Stiffler pled guilty to Unlawful Contact with a Minor, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 6318(a)(1). ECF No. 30 ¶ 1; ECF No. 33 ¶ 1. At the time, this offense was a first degree misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law,¹ punishable by a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. ECF No. 30 ¶ 1; ECF No. 33 ¶ 1; ECF No. 31 at 112. Mr. Stiffler received a custodial sentence for this offense.² ECF No. 30 ¶ 2; ECF No. 33 ¶ 2.

Since his 2004 offense, Mr. Stiffler has not been charged with, or convicted of, any additional criminal offenses. ECF No. 30 ¶ 15; ECF No. 33 ¶ 15.

Because of Mr. Stiffler's offense, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits him from possessing and owning a firearm. Mr. Stiffler now seeks a declaratory judgment that § 922(g) as applied to him violates the Second Amendment. The Court concludes that Mr. Stiffler's offense is "serious" as defined under Third Circuit precedent, and therefore, § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to him.

II. Standard of Review

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist. , 872 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "A factual dispute is ‘genuine’ if the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, (1986) ). "A factual dispute is ‘material’ if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ " Id. (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

The burden to establish that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact "remains with ‘the moving party regardless of which party would have the burden of persuasion at trial.’ " Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp. , 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc. , 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir. 1987) ). That said, "[i]f the non-moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, ‘the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry that burden.’ " Kaucher v. County of Bucks , 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wetzel v. Tucker , 139 F.3d 380, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998) ).

Once the moving party has carried its initial burden, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ " Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Thus, while "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor," Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, summary judgment "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings" and point to " ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citation omitted). But, while the court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor ... to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Burton v. Teleflex Inc. , 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). If the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial," Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment because such a failure "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Jakimas v. Hoffmann La Roche, Inc. , 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).

"Where, as here, cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, ‘the court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.’ " Reynolds v. Chesapeake & Del. Brewing Holdings, LLC , Civil Action No. 19-2184, 2020 WL 2404904 at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83633 at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2020) (quoting Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc. , 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) ).

III. Discussion

A. Analytical Framework for As-Applied Challenges to Second Amendment

Mr. Stiffler asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ’s firearm prohibition violates the Second Amendment as applied to him, because his underlying criminal offense is not sufficiently "serious" to warrant stripping him of his Second Amendment rights. ECF No. 25.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prohibits any person "who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" from possessing or owning a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). While § 922(g)(1) is "presumptively lawful" under the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), the Third Circuit has held that individuals may challenge the statute on an as applied basis. See, e.g. , United States v. Barton , 633 F.3d 168, 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) ; Binderup v. AG of United States , 836 F.3d 336, 345–46 (3d Cir. 2016) ; Pitsilides v. William Barr et al. , Civil Action No. 3:19-01736, 2021 WL 5441513 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2021).

In Binderup v. Attorney General of the United States , the Third Circuit adopted, with some modifications, United States v. Marzzarella ’s two-step approach to Second Amendment challenges. Binderup , 836 F.3d at 345–47 (citing United States v. Marzzarella , 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) ). At step one, the Court must consider whether Mr. Stiffler's conduct is sufficiently "serious" for him to lose his Second Amendment rights. Id. at 350–52. At step two, "the burden shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the regulation satisfies some sort of heightened scrutiny." Id. at 347.

B. Step One of the Marzzarella Framework

1. The Marzzarella Factors

In Binderup , the Third Circuit set out a nonexclusive four-factor test for determining whether a crime is sufficiently "serious" to deprive the challenger of his or her Second Amendment Rights: "(1) whether the crime of conviction was classified as a misdemeanor or felony, (2) whether the criminal offense involves violence or attempted violence as an element, (3) the sentence imposed, and (4) whether there is a cross-jurisdictional consensus as to the seriousness of the crime." Holloway v. Atty. Gen. United States , 948 F.3d. 164, 172 n.10 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Binderup , 836 F.3d at 351–52 ). After Binderup , the Third Circuit in Holloway added one more factor: (5) the potential for danger and risk of harm to self and others. Holloway , 948 F.3d at 173.

At Marzzarella step one, the burden rests with the challenger, who must make a " ‘strong’ showing ... that he has not committed a ‘serious’ crime." Holloway , 948 F.3d at 172 (quoting Binderup , 836 F.3d at 347 ). Although the Third Circuit did not describe how District Courts should weigh the nonexclusive factors, "it has implied that if a challenger fails to show that all factors favor his claim, the challenger's ability to meet the burden at Marzzarella ’s first step becomes correspondingly difficult." Pitsilides v. William Barr et al. , Civil Action No. 3:19-01376, 2021 WL 5441513, at *9–10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2021) (internal quotations omitted). A number of District Courts in our Circuit have found that a challenger cannot prevail at Marzzarella step one unless he or she favorably satisfies all of the factors. Laudenslager v. Sessions , No. 4:17-CV-00330, 2019 WL 587298, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23213 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2019) (collecting cases).

a. Pennsylvania's Classification of the Offense as Misdemeanor Favors Mr. Stiffler

Here, the first factor weighs in favor of Mr. Stiffler, because Pennsylvania classified his conviction for unlawful contact with a minor as a misdemeanor at the time he was convicted. ECF No. 25 at 9–10; ECF No. 34 at 3–4. The United States acknowledges the misdemeanor classification but contends this factor nonetheless favors the United States because the...