Stilwell v. Lewis

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GARRETT D. STILWELL, Appellant, v. DAVID T. LEWIS, III, in his capacity as Kitsap County Clerk and Clerk of the Kitsap County Superior Court, Respondent.

No. 59048-4-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

September 10, 2024

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PRICE J.

Garrett Stilwell appeals the superior court's dismissal of his case against the Kitsap County Superior Court Clerk, David Lewis, III. Stilwell had filed a declaratory judgment action in which he argued he was entitled to access to his juvenile dependency records. Lewis responded by moving to dismiss the case under CR 12(b)(6). Lewis argued that Stilwell had other adequate statutory remedies and declaratory judgment should therefore not have been available to him. The superior court agreed with Lewis and dismissed Stilwell's case.

Stilwell appeals, arguing that the other statutory remedies cited by Lewis do not apply and that declaratory judgment is still an appropriate vehicle for his relief. We agree with Stilwell we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

Many years ago, while he was a juvenile, Stilwell was apparently involved in a dependency case in the Kitsap County Superior Court. In March 2023, as an adult, Stilwell went to the Kitsap County Superior Court Clerk's office to request the records related to this dependency case. He discussed his request directly with Lewis and explained that he believed there were juvenile records about him held by the clerk's office. Lewis refused to provide records unless Stilwell could also provide the cause number for the dependency case, which Stilwell was unable to do. Lewis did not perform a search for Stilwell's name to find the cause number. Stilwell left without his records.

One month later, Stilwell filed a lawsuit against Lewis. He framed his complaint as a declaratory judgment action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA), chapter 7.24 RCW, and requested an injunction that would require Lewis to provide access to the records. Stilwell supported his action by arguing he had a right to his dependency records under RCW 13.50.100(7), which states that a juvenile "shall be given access to" their records retained by a juvenile care agency upon request.

Lewis filed a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), arguing that Stilwell was not entitled to declaratory relief under the UDJA because Stilwell had other adequate statutory remedies under chapter 13.50 RCW. Specifically, Lewis referenced two provisions-RCW 13.50.100(8) ("A juvenile . . . denied access to any records following an agency determination under subsection (7) of this section may file a motion in juvenile court requesting access to the records.") and RCW 13.50.010(5) ("Any person who has reasonable cause to believe information concerning that person is included in the records of a juvenile justice or care agency and who has been denied access to those records by the agency may make a motion to the court for an order authorizing that person to inspect the juvenile justice or care agency record concerning that person.").

Relatedly Lewis argued that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to hear Stilwell's declaratory judgment because there was not a "justiciable controversy." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 11. Lewis reasoned that Stilwell's case was not "an actual, present, and existing dispute . . . [because] [Stilwell had] not yet availed himself of his statutory remedy ...." CP at 12.

Lewis also questioned whether Stilwell had made an appropriate request for his records. Lewis argued that the county clerk was not included in the definition of a "juvenile . . . care agency" under chapter 13.50 RCW and, therefore, Stilwell should have made his request to the superior court (which is included in the definition). CP at 15. Lewis also pointed out that chapter 13.50 RCW appears to require a "determination" about whether release would cause Stilwell" 'severe psychological or physical harm,'" and he contended that, as the county clerk, he was not the correct person to make this "determination." CP at 15. Critically, Lewis did not argue that Stilwell lacked a right to his records; rather, he argued that Stilwell had either not requested his records correctly or had not sought judicial review of the denial correctly.

Stilwell responded that the two statutory remedies in chapter 13.50 RCW referenced by Lewis did not apply to his situation. And, in any event, even if there were alternative remedies under chapter 13.50 RCW, Stilwell argued that his right to declaratory relief was not barred.

The superior court granted Lewis' motion and dismissed Stilwell's lawsuit, apparently determining that because chapter 13.50 RCW provided adequate mechanisms for Stilwell's relief, there was no justiciable controversy as required for an action under the UDJA.

Stilwell appeals.

ANALYSIS

Stilwell argues the superior court erred; he contends that the statutory provisions included in chapter 13.50 RCW do not clearly apply to him and, therefore, declaratory relief is available as a remedy. Further, based upon Lewis' response to Stilwell's lawsuit, in which Lewis challenges the procedures Stilwell attempted to use, Stilwell contends the UDJA is well-suited to clarify the procedures of chapter 13.50 RCW and resolve this dispute. We agree.

I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND CR 12(b)(6) DISMISSALS

We review a decision to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) de novo. Jackson v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 186 Wn.App. 838, 843, 347 P.3d 487, review denied, 184 Wn.2d 1011 (2015). Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is appropriate when the plaintiff cannot prove a set of facts consistent with the complaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id." '[A]ny hypothetical situation conceivably raised by the complaint defeats a CR 12(b)(6) motion if it is legally sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim.'" Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wn.2d 745, 750, 888 P.2d 147 (1995)).

B. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Issues of statutory construction are also reviewed do novo. Id. at 844. The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Langhorst v. Dep't of Labor &Indus., 25 Wn.App. 2d 1, 8, 522 P.3d 60 (2022), review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1010 (2023). To determine the legislature's intent, we first look at the plain language of the statute. Id. at 9. "To decipher the plain language, we look at the meaning of the provisions in question as well as the context of the statute and related statutes." Id. If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, we accept the unambiguous meaning and our statutory construction analysis ends. Id. at 10.

C. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

The UDJA grants courts the power to declare rights, status and other legal relations with declaratory judgment. RCW 7.24.010. The purpose of the UDJA "is to 'settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations[.]'" Bloome v. Haverly, 154 Wn.App. 129, 140, 225 P.3d 330 (2010) (quoting RCW 7.24.120). Courts liberally construe and administer the UDJA. Id.

A party seeking relief under the UDJA must meet "certain threshold requirements," including showing that a "justiciable controversy" exists between the parties. Id. In the context of a declaratory judgment, a "justiciable controversy" requires the following four elements:

"(1) . . . an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive."

Id. at 140-41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 144 Wn.2d 403, 411, 27 P.3d 1149 (2001)).

Declaratory judgment is meant to be an additional, alternative form of relief, and the existence of another remedy does not preclude declaratory judgment. Ronken v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Snohomish County, 89 Wn.2d 304, 310, 572 P.2d 1 (1977); Donald v. City of Vancouver, 43 Wn.App. 880, 883 n.2, 719 P.2d 966 (1986) (argument that plaintiff could not seek declaratory relief because he could have sought another remedy was "not well taken").

But a declaratory judgment action is not intended to apply to every question arising from any justiciable controversy. 26 C.J.S. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 9 (2022). Even though the existence of an alternative remedy to declaratory judgment does not bar relief under the UDJA, "courts will be circumspect in granting such relief." Ronken, 89 Wn.2d at 310. Put another way, "under ordinary circumstances, if a plaintiff has another adequate remedy available, the plaintiff 'should not proceed by way of a declaratory judgment action; but declaratory relief may be appropriate in some situations, notwithstanding the availability of another remedy.'" Sifferman v. Chelan County, 19 Wn.App. 2d 631, 649, 496 P.3d 329 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wagers v. Goodwin, 92 Wn.App. 876, 880, 964 P.2d 1214 (1998)), review denied, 502 P.3d 860 (2022).

II. APPLICATION

Lewis does not appear to challenge Stilwell's fundamental entitlement to his juvenile records, but he objects to the use of the UDJA for Stilwell's demand for them. Lewis contends that Stilwell should have used remedies already included in chapter 13.50 RCW and not the UDJA. Specifically Lewis asserts that Stilwell should have requested his records under RCW 13.50.100(8) or, perhaps, under RCW 13.50.100(10). Lewis contends that because chapter 13.50 RCW already...