Stiner v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc.

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STACIA STINER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 17-cv-03962-HSG

United States District Court, N.D. California

July 22, 2024

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF SUBCLASSES AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S MARCH 30, 2023 ORDER RE: DKT. NOS. 740, 782

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' motion for certification of subclasses, Dkt. No. 740, and Defendants' motion for clarification of the Court's March 30, 2023 order, Dkt No. 782. The Court held a hearing on the motion for certification on June 27, 2024. See Dkt. No. 814. The Court finds Defendants' motion for clarification appropriate for disposition without oral argument and deems the matter submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Given the long-running nature of this case and the parties' familiarity with its details, the Court provides only a brief recapitulation of the facts relevant to the instant motions.

On March 30, 2023, the Court ruled on Plaintiffs' then-pending motion for class certification, which sought certification of three classes. The Court declined to certify either the proposed Disabilities Class or the Misleading Statements and Omissions Class. Dkt. No. 593 at 61, 73-74.^[1] It also did not certify the Mobility and Vision Impaired Class to pursue their ADA and Unruh Act claims for allegedly unlawful access barriers in the facilities. Id. at 43. The Court did, however, certify a subclass of the Mobility and Vision Impaired Class - the Wheelchair and Scooter Users Subclass - under Rule 23(b)(2) to pursue claims concerning the Fleet Safety Policy theory. Id. at 48.

On October 19, 2023, Plaintiffs timely filed a motion for leave to file a motion for certification of subclasses - specifically, of six facility-based access barrier subclasses to pursue ADA and Unruh Act claims, and two Misleading Statements and Omissions Claims subclasses to pursue UCL and CLRA claims. Dkt. No. 650. The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to seek certification for their access barrier facility-based subclasses on their ADA and Unruh Act claims, but ruled that they could not seek class certification for their misleading statements and omissions claims. Dkt. No. 733. On February 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their motion seeking certification of facility-level access subclasses. Dkt. No. 740 (“Cert. Mot.”). It is now fully briefed and was argued before the Court on June 27, 2024. See Dkt. Nos. 783 (“Cert. Opp.”), 805 (“Cert. Reply”), 814 (hearing minutes).

Meanwhile, on May 13, 2024, Defendants filed a motion requesting that the Court clarify two aspects of its March 30, 2023 order. Dkt. No. 782 (“Clarification Mot.”). Specifically, Defendants seek confirmation that the Court (1) did not include manual wheelchair users in the certified Wheelchair and Scooter Users Subclass (“the Subclass”) and (2) did not include former residents in the Subclass. If the Court did define the Subclass to include either kind of resident, Defendants move to modify the Subclass definition to only include current residents who use a motorized wheelchair, scooter, or other powered mobility device. Plaintiffs timely opposed, Dkt. No. 793 (“Clarification Opp.”), and Defendants replied, Dkt. No. 803 (“Clarification Reply.”).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Subclasses

Plaintiffs move to certify six subclasses of current and former residents of six Brookdale facilities to pursue ADA and Unruh Act claims related to access barriers for persons with mobility and/or vision disabilities. Specifically, they seek to certify Rule 23(b)(3) subclasses on behalf of certain residents at the San Ramon, Scotts Valley, Brookhurst, Fountaingrove, Tracy, and Hemet facilities (the “Facilities”), and Rule 23(b)(2) subclasses on behalf of certain residents at only the San Ramon, Scott Valley, and Brookhurst facilities. The San Ramon, Scotts Valley, Brookhurst, and Tracy subclasses are identically defined but for the relevant facility name:

All persons with disabilities who use wheelchairs, scooters, or other mobility aids or who have vision disabilities and who reside or have resided at the [Facility Name] residential care facility for the elderly located in California and owned, operated and/or managed by Brookdale during the three years prior to the filing of the Complaint herein through the conclusion of this action, including their successors-in-interest if deceased, excluding any persons who are subject to arbitration.

Cert. Mot. at 10 (alterations added). The subclasses for the Fountaingrove and Hemet facilities are defined almost identically to the others:

All persons with disabilities who use wheelchairs, scooters, or other mobility aids or who have vision disabilities and who resided at the [Facility Name] residential care facility for the elderly located in California that was owned, operated and/or managed by Brookdale during the three years prior to the filing of the Complaint herein through the conclusion of this action, including their successors-in-interest if deceased, excluding any persons who are subject to arbitration.

Cert. Mot. at 10 (alterations added).^[2]

Plaintiffs seek minimum statutory damages for their proposed Rule 23(b)(3) subclasses, and injunctive and declaratory relief for their proposed Rule 23(b)(2) subclasses. The Court will GRANT the motion in part and DENY it in part.

i. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions, including the issue of class certification. Class certification is a two-step process. To warrant class certification, a plaintiff “bears the burden of demonstrating that she has met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).” Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate [her] compliance with the Rule ....”).

Rule 23(a) provides that a district court may certify a class only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). That is, the class must satisfy the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation to maintain a class action. See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022).

If the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, a court also must find that the plaintiff “satisf[ies] through evidentiary proof” one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). Plaintiffs assert that they meet the requirements of both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). See Dkt. No. 740. Rule 23(b)(2) provides for certification where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3), in turn, applies where there is both “predominance” and “superiority,” meaning “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). To determine whether a putative class action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), courts consider:

(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).

The Court's “class-certification analysis must be ‘rigorous' and may ‘entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim.'” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465-66 (2013) (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350-51); see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district court must consider the merits if they overlap with the Rule 23(a) requirements.”) (emphasis in original). However, “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage,” and “[m]erits questions may be considered to the extent - but only to the extent - that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc., 568 U.S. at 466. At bottom, the issue to be decided on a certification motion is whether the case should be “conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only” or as a class. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 348.

ii. Analysis

a. Standing

Plaintiffs argue that all of the proffered subclass representatives have standing for the types of relief sought.^[3] The subclass representatives state that they were or are residents with disabilities who have...