Stinski v. Ford

DARRYL SCOTT STINSKI, Petitioner, v. WARDEN BENJAMIN FORD,¹ Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 4:18-cv-66

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

January 5, 2021

ORDER

In 2007, following a trial in the Superior Court of Chatham County, a jury convicted Petitioner Darryl Stinski of two counts of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and other related crimes for the murders of Susan Pittman and her thirteen-year-old daughter, Kimberly Pittman. (Doc. 7-11, pp. 34-37.) Petitioner was sentenced to death on June 13, 2007. (Doc. 8-1, pp. 210-15.) After the completion of his direct appeal and state habeas corpus proceedings, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction and death sentence. (Doc. 1.) Presently before the Court are the parties' briefs on procedural default, cause and prejudice, and the fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Docs. 57, 58, 59.) After a careful review of the parties' briefs and the record, the Court DIRECTSPetitioner that he may brief, in accordance with the Scheduling Order: (1) the entirety of his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial (Claim I); and (2) his claim that his execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Claim III). The Court further DIRECTS Petitioner that he is not permitted to brief his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial (Claim II).

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The Supreme Court of Georgia set forth the facts of this case as follows:

Darryl Stinski and Dorian O'Kelley engaged in a crime spree that spanned April 10-12, 2002. On the night of April 10, two police officers observed two men dressed in black clothing in a convenience store. Later, the officers responded to two separate calls regarding the sounding of a burglar alarm at a nearby home and the officers returned to the store after responding to each call. Then, at approximately 5:00 a.m. on April 11, the officers noticed while leaving the store that "the sky was lit up." The officers discovered the victims' house fully engulfed in flames. As one of the officers moved the patrol vehicle to block traffic in preparation for the arrival of emergency vehicles, his headlights illuminated a wooded area where he observed the same two men that he and his partner had observed earlier in the convenience store. O'Kelley, as the neighbor living across the street from the burned house, gave an interview to a local television station. The officer saw the interview on television and identified O'Kelley as being one of the men he had seen in the convenience store and near the fire. The officer later identified both Stinski and O'Kelley in court.

Stinski and O'Kelley left items they had stolen with friends who lived nearby. The friends handed those items over to the police. Testimony showed that, before their arrest, O'Kelley had bragged about raping a girl and keeping one of her teeth as a memento and Stinski had laughed when he saw O'Kelley being interviewed on the news in front of the victims' house.

Stinski gave two videotaped interviews with investigators after his arrest, the second of which was suppressed on his motion. In the interview the jury heard, Stinski confessed to participating in the crime spree described below, which began with burglarizing a home and leaving when a motion detector in this first home set off an alarm. After their botched burglary of the first home, Stinski and O'Kelley turned off the electricity to the home of Susan Pittman and her 13-year-olddaughter, Kimberly Pittman, and entered as both victims slept. O'Kelley took a walking cane and began beating Susan Pittman, while Stinski held a large flashlight. Stinski beat Susan Pittman with the flashlight and then left the room to subdue Kimberly Pittman, who had awakened to her mother's screams. O'Kelley then beat Susan Pittman with a lamp and kicked her. At some point, Susan Pittman was also stabbed three to four times in the chest and abdomen. Stinski took Kimberly Pittman upstairs so she would not continue to hear her mother's screams. Susan Pittman eventually died from her attack. Stinski and O'Kelley then brought Kimberly Pittman back downstairs, drank beverages, and discussed "tak[ing] care of" her. Stinski took Kimberly Pittman back upstairs and bound and gagged her. As Stinski rummaged through the house downstairs, O'Kelley raped Kimberly Pittman. Stinski and O'Kelley then agreed that Stinski would begin beating Kimberly Pittman with a baseball bat when O'Kelley said a particular word. On cue, Stinski hit Kimberly Pittman in the head with the bat as she knelt on the floor, bloody from the rape and with her hands bound. O'Kelley then slit Kimberly Pittman's throat with a knife but she remained alive. Stinski went downstairs and came back upstairs when O'Kelley called him. Stinski then hit Kimberly Pittman in her knee with the bat as O'Kelley tried to suffocate her. O'Kelley then took another knife and stabbed her in the torso and legs. O'Kelley kicked her and threw objects at her head, but her groans indicated that she was still alive. Stinski and O'Kelley then set fires throughout the house and went to O'Kelley's house across the street to watch the fire. Kimberly Pittman died of smoke inhalation before the fire fully consumed the house. Later, in the early morning hours of April 12, Stinski and O'Kelley broke into numerous vehicles in the neighborhood.

Stinski v. State, 691 S.E.2d 854, 862-63 (Ga. 2010).

II. Procedural History

A Chatham County grand jury indicted Petitioner on two counts of malice murder, two counts of burglary, two counts of arson in the first degree, five counts of entering an automobile, one count of cruelty to children in the first degree, and one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. (Doc. 6-1, pp. 50-54.) Following a jury trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts and on two lesser-included counts of felony murder. (Doc. 7-11, pp. 34-37.)

After the sentencing phase of Petitioner's trial, the jury recommended the death sentence for the murders of Susan and Kimberly Pittman, finding that nine aggravating circumstances across the two murders warranted such a sentence:

(1) Petitioner was "engaged in the commission of a burglary" when murdering Susan Pittman;

(2) the murder of Susan Pittman "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved the depravity of mind of" Petitioner;

(3) the murder of Susan Pittman "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim before death[;]"

(4) Petitioner was committing "another capital felony" while murdering Kimberly Pittman;

(5) Petitioner "was engaged in the commission of a burglary" when murdering Kimberly Pittman;

(6) Petitioner "was engaged in the commission of arson in the first degree" when murdering Kimberly Pittman;

(7) the murder of Kimberly Pittman "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved tortur[ing] . . . the victim before death[;]"

(8) the murder of Kimberly Pittman "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved the depravity of mind of Petitioner; and

(9) the murder of Kimberly Pittman "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim before death."

(Doc. 8-1, pp. 210-13.) In addition to the death sentence, Petitioner was sentenced to a total of 140 years of confinement for his other crimes. (Id. at pp. 214-15.)

Shortly after the trial's sentencing phase, Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, which he subsequently amended. (Id. at pp. 219-21, 235-49; doc. 8-6, pp. 2-273.) After holding a hearing, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion, (doc. 8-6, pp. 309-54), and Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, (doc. 7-1, pp. 28-36). The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's death sentencesfor the murders. Stinski, 691 S.E.2d at 862. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the decision, (doc. 11-4, pp. 1-50), which the Georgia Supreme Court denied, (doc. 11-6). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, (doc. 11-11), which the Supreme Court denied, (doc. 11-15).

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, (doc. 11-19), and later amended the petition, (doc. 12-24). After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court denied the petition on January 15, 2017. (Doc. 27-20.) Petitioner then filed an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal ("CPC Application") in the Georgia Supreme Court, (doc. 27-22), which the Georgia Supreme Court denied, (doc. 27-24).

On March 26, 2018, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) In accordance with the Court's Scheduling Order, (doc. 37), Petitioner filed his brief regarding the issues of procedural default, cause and prejudice, and the fundamental miscarriage of justice, (doc. 57). Respondent then filed his Response, (doc. 58), to which Petitioner filed a Reply, (doc. 59).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The procedural default rule bars a federal court from reaching the merits of a claim on collateral review when the habeas petitioner failed to follow a state's procedural rules while presenting his federal claim in state court." Hammonds v. Allen, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82 (1977)). Procedural default arises in two circumstances to bar a petitioner's claims. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999). First, when a state court rejects a federal constitutional claim on procedural grounds and the ruling rests on an "independent and...