Stirling v. Salazar

1

JOHN PHILIP STIRLING, Petitioner, v. JOSIAS SALAZAR, Warden, FCI Sheridan, Respondent.

No. 3:20-cv-00712-SB

United States District Court, D. Oregon

November 15, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

HON STACIE F. BECKERMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner John Philip Stirling (“Stirling”) and nearly 200 current or former individuals in custody at Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Sheridan (“Sheridan”) (together “Petitioners”), bring this consolidated habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Section 2241”). Petitioners allege that the dangers presented by the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic combined with the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) insufficient response to the ongoing crisis, render their continued confinement unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Am. Compl. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (“Am. Pet.”) (ECF No. 16) at 16-22.^[1]) Respondent^[2] asserts that he has taken adequate and appropriate measures to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 at Sheridan. However, he argues that before reaching the merits of Petitioners' habeas claims, the Court must first resolve a threshold jurisdictional question to determine whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle by which an individual in custody may seek release based on an assertion that prison conditions are so unsafe that continued incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment. (Resp. Am. Pet. (ECF No. 35) at 8-12, 13-16.) That question is now before the Court. (See Resp't Renewed Resp. Am. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus & Renewed Request Ruling Jurisdictional Issues (ECF No. 107) (“Resp't Renewed Resp.”) at 2-5.)

The parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 43.) For the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 16) and denies as moot all pending motions.

BACKGROUND

The rise of COVID-19 marked a “once-in-a-century public health crisis.” Wilson v. Ponce, 465 F.Supp.3d 1037, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed, No 20-55760, 2020 WL 6293689 (9th Cir. 2020). The virus quickly found its way into jails, prisons, and other detention facilities in the United States, and corrections officials imposed various measures to prevent and control transmission among incarcerated populations. Although the measures Respondent imposed at Sheridan avoided the tragic death tolls at other prisons, Petitioners allege that the harshness of the protective measures violated the Eighth Amendment and therefore the Court must now release Petitioners from custody. The Court provides a summary of this litigation to explain why the Court is just now evaluating the threshold jurisdictional issue after over two years of litigation.

On April 30, 2020, Stirling, a pretrial detainee at Sheridan, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, naming the BOP, Sheridan Federal Detention Center (“Sheridan FDC”), and “Sheridan FDC Staff” as respondents. Stirling alleged in the petition that Sheridan officials were “needlessly exposing [him] to [COVID]-19” by housing newly incarcerated or transferred individuals in his unit without first placing them in quarantine; by refusing to wear appropriate protective equipment such as masks and gloves; and by keeping Sheridan residents “illegally . . . under lockdown for [nineteen] days cut of[f] from phones, showers, email and quality food.” (Pet. (ECF No. 1) at 2-3.) Troubled by Stirling's allegations, the Court appointed the Federal Public Defender (“FPD”) to represent Stirling and directed the FPD to file an amended petition naming Stirling's current custodian as the respondent. (ECF No. 4.)

On June 30, 2020, the FPD filed an “Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “amended petition”) on Stirling's behalf, who by then was serving a forty-month term of imprisonment.^[3] Stirling alleged in the amended petition that the BOP had failed to “de-densify its facilities” to ensure adequate social distancing and instead had kept Sheridan residents in their cells for up to twenty-three hours a day, sometimes three to a cell; canceled educational and rehabilitative programs; curtailed outside communications; served poor-quality food; reduced access to medical care; and spread misinformation about pandemic response measures. (Am. Pet. at 2.) Stirling further alleged that the BOP had failed to establish “consistent and effective safeguards”-such as universal testing of Sheridan residents and staff, access to personal protective equipment, effective quarantine procedures, and heightened sanitation protocols-to protect individuals in its custody against COVID-19. (Id. at 2.) Stirling claimed that, in light of the BOP's decision to use lockdowns instead of de-densifying Sheridan and the risk that he might nevertheless contract COVID-19, there were “no conditions of confinement at Sheridan [that could] meet constitutional requirements” and therefore the Eighth Amendment required his immediate release. (Id. at 17-22.)

Stirling also requested in the amended petition interim injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and permanent injunction to “(1) prohibit the BOP from bringing new inmates into the FDC Sheridan until the warden has demonstrated adequate testing and safety protocols to ensure the coronavirus is not introduced through arrivals; and (2) to prohibit [Stirling's] transportation out of the FDC Sheridan until the Warden can demonstrate the transportation, any place of quarantine, and the designated facility will be safe and subject him to infection from the coronavirus.” (Id. at 23.) Stirling requested that if the court could not immediately grant the writ, the court should enter an order of enlargement allowing him to serve his sentence in the community “until the conditions at Sheridan can be rendered safe” and order court-mandated fact-finding of the actual conditions at Sheridan. (Id. at 24.)

In light of Stirling's request for immediate injunctive relief, this case was reassigned to a district judge on July 6, 2020. (ECF No. 19.) At a hearing on July 22, 2020, ^[4] the district judge noted that it was unclear whether Stirling intended to proceed with civil rights or habeas claims, and that Stirling's request for a TRO barring new detainees from entering Sheridan was “not the sort of relief we would typically see in a habeas order.” (Tr. (ECF No. 44) at 7:5-15, 47:3-10.) The FPD clarified that Stirling intended to proceed in habeas and argued that his request for injunctive relief was proper. (Id. at 43:13-20, 48:11-51:2.) Turning to the merits of Stirling's request, the district judge considered the evidence in the record and determined that Stirling failed to show “a likelihood of success or even serious questions going to the merits” on his Eighth Amendment claims. (Id. at 52:23-53:5.) The district judge thus denied Stirling's request for a TRO but authorized expedited discovery concerning the conditions at Sheridan. (Id. 53:3-22.)

Soon thereafter, the district judge ordered Respondent to show cause why the Court should not grant relief. (Or. Show Cause (ECF No. 34) at 1.) Respondent filed a response on August 18, 2020, arguing that the Court should dismiss the amended petition because Stirling's claim is not cognizable in habeas and instead arises under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Resp. Am. Pet. (ECF No. 35) at 1.) Respondent further argued that even if Stirling's claim could proceed in habeas, Stirling is not entitled to relief because his claim is unexhausted and lacks merit. (Id.) In support, Respondent submitted extensive documentation describing the protocols and mitigation measures in place to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19 at Sheridan.

The case was reassigned to this Court on September 24, 2020, in light of the parties' full consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. (ECF No. 40.) Although the district judge had set an initial briefing schedule, the parties agreed to stay further briefing pending completion of discovery and, in the interim, to work cooperatively to address issues at Sheridan as they arose. (Joint Status Report dated Oct. 16. 2020 (ECF No. 46) ¶ 5.) Hoping to foster cooperation that might more quickly and effectively address the conditions at Sheridan, the Court allowed the parties flexibility in fashioning a case management schedule to accommodate their efforts. Thereafter, the parties relayed their progress to the Court in periodic status reports that detailed the changing conditions at Sheridan.

Meanwhile dozens of additional individuals in custody at Sheridan filed similar habeas petitions “challenging the fact of . . . confinement under the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and in particular the extended lockdown and the life-threatening conditions.” (See, e.g., Bodner v. Salazar, No. 3:20-cv-01743-SB, Pet. (ECF No. 1) at 2.) Each new petition “incorporate[d] by reference and adopt[ed] the pleadings” in Stirling, with some petitioners submitting individualized allegations concerning their personal health risks and experiences in lockdown. (Id. at 2, 10-13.) Many petitioners, however, simply adopted Stirling's general allegations without claiming that they personally were at high risk or that the conditions at Sheridan posed a specific danger to their individual health. In response to the influx of new petitions, and upon agreement by the parties, the Court ordered “all pending and future habeas petitions filed by individuals in custody at Sheridan relating to modified prison operations during the COVID-19 pandemic” to be consolidated with Stirling, and ordered that the Court will resolve all...