Stockton v. Belk, Inc.

HEATHER STOCKTON, Plaintiff, v. BELK, INC., Defendant.

No. 19-cv-00332

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga Division

August 20, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JON P McCALLA JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Belk, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on December 1, 2020. (ECF No. 21.) Belk argues that Plaintiff Heather Stockton cannot prove the duty or causation elements of her negligence claim as a matter of law and that therefore Belk is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 216.)

Stockton filed a Response on December 21, 2020. (ECF No. 23.) Stockton argues that Belk had a duty because it negligently placed an advertising sign in an area of the store that created a dangerous condition for the customers. (See generally id.) Stockton further argues that the third party who knocked the sign over and into Stockton was not included in the pleadings and that Belk cannot attribute fault to him or her. (Id. at PageID 228.)

Belk filed a Reply on January 4, 2021. (ECF No. 29.) Belk argues that the sign was not placed improperly for purposes of customer safety, that the sign was not inherently dangerous and that the cases on which Stockton relies are distinguishable. (See generally id.)

For the reasons set forth below, Belk's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Stockton and her daughter went to the Athens, Tennessee Belk store (“the Store”) for a Black Friday shopping event on or about November 22, 2018.^[1] (ECF No. 22 at PageID 206.) At approximately 5:00 p.m., Stockton and her daughter got in line in the men's department to purchase some items. (Id. at PagelD 207.) Approximately eight to ten minutes later, “an unknown lady walking through the men's department with an armful of merchandise ran into a circular clothing rack.” (Id.) The circular clothing rack hit an advertising sign, causing it to fall. (Id.) At the same time, Stockton's daughter got her attention and, as Stockton turned to respond to her daughter, the falling sign hit her. (Id.) “The lady who caused the sign to fall then threw her merchandise down, said ‘oh, my gosh,' and walked away.” (Id.)

Stockton filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for McMinn County, Tennessee on October 21, 2019, asserting that Belk breached its duty of care to keep the premises of the Store in a reasonably safe condition and that Belk negligently failed to correct a dangerous condition that it knew or should have known existed. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 8-9.) Belk removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on November 21, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) As previously noted, Belk filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on December 1, 2020. (ECF No. 21.) Stockton filed a Response on December 21, 2020. (ECF No. 23.) Belk filed a Reply on January 4, 2021. (ECF No. 29.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material' for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense.” Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012).

“In considering a motion for summary judgment, [the] court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact.” Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448-49; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “When the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper.” Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In order to “show that a fact is, or is not, genuinely disputed, ” a party must do so by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, ” “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, ” or showing “that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3); Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 776 (alterations in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)); see also Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448 (“To support its motion, the moving party may show ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325)). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]” Martinez, 703 F.3d at 914 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). “[T]he district court has no ‘duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Pharos Capital Partners, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 535 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2008), abrogation recognized by Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2015)).

The decisive “question is whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [fact finder] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52). Summary judgment “‘shall be entered' against the non-moving party unless affidavits or other evidence ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Employee Servs., LLC, No. 1:08CV02815, 2012 WL 3648835, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2012) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 884 (1990)). “[A] mere ‘scintilla' of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party must present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in her favor.” Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251). “[I]n order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present ‘affirmative evidence' to support his/her position.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-254; Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989)). “[C]onclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts made in affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment, are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Rachells, 2012 WL 3648835, at *2 (quoting Thomas v. Christ Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 328 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2003)). Statements contained in an affidavit that are “nothing more than rumors, conclusory allegations and subjective beliefs” are insufficient. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584-85.

III. ANALYSIS

“[A] negligence claim requires a plaintiff to prove the following elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the standard of care amounting to a breach of the duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate causation.” Rice v. Sabir, 979 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998). “The first element of a negligence claim - the duty owed plaintiff - ‘is a question of law to be determined by the court.'” Wood v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. 3:11-1081, 2013 WL 3010698, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 2013) (quoting McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)). Belk asserts that Stockton's negligence claim against it fails because Stockton cannot prove that Belk owed or breached a duty of care or that Belk's alleged negligence caused the accident. (ECF No. 22.)

A. Duty

“[A] business owner breaches the duty of care owed to its customers when it allows a dangerous condition or defect to exist on the premises if that condition or defect was created by the owner, operator or his agent; or, if the condition is created by someone else, when the business owner had actual or constructive notice that the dangerous condition or defect existed prior to the injury.” Morris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 330 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2003). “A duty may even be owed where the condition causing the injury is ‘open and obvious,' but ‘[t]he duty imposed on the premises owner... does not include the responsibility to remove or warn against conditions from which no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated, or from those which the occupier neither knew about nor could have discovered with reasonable care.” Shaw v. Metro Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 596 S.W.3d 726, 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Rice, 979 S.W.2d at 308-09). “‘[A]nything that in fact causes harm is to some degree dangerous; but to impose liability, the thing must be dangerous according to common experience.'” Id. (quo...