Case Law Stoffan v. S. New England Tel. Co.

Stoffan v. S. New England Tel. Co.

Document Cited Authorities (34) Cited in (20) Related

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Laurel Fedor, Taylor & Fedor, Westport, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Lori B. Alexander, Matthew K. Curtin, Littler Mendelson, P.C., New Haven, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ALVIN W. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Wayne Stoffan asserts claims against defendant Southern New England Telephone Company (SNET) for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Count One); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Two); breach of contract (Count Three); violations of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a–51 et seq. (Count Four); and unjust enrichment (Count Five). Wayne Stoffan's spouse, Alana Stoffan, asserts a derivative claim against SNET for loss of consortium (Count Six). The defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is being granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

SNET hired the plaintiff in 1995 as a provisional full-time installer repairman in its Network Services Department. At the time the plaintiff was hired, he signed a “Provisional Regular Employment Agreement” which stated,

I have been informed that the job I am accepting at SNET is classified as a Provisional Regular Full time position. I understand that this classification signifies that I have been engaged to meet a temporary situation that is expected to continue for more than one year, with the definite understanding that the employment is to terminate on or before resumption of normal conditions or the completion of the job unless my status is changed to regular. If this employment continues beyond three years, my classification will be changed to Regular.

I have been hired as a provisional Full time Installer Repairman in the Network Services Department, and understand that training for this position, which is approximately 4–5 weeks duration is to take place in TBD. Work location Stamford.

(Mem. Supp. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 136) Ex. F). On or about October 13, 1995, the plaintiff became a regular, as opposed to provisional, installer-repairman.

In 2005, the plaintiff was in a car accident in which his car was rear-ended; this resulted in significant injury to his back. He underwent spinal fusion surgery in 2006, but the surgery did not relieve all of his back pain. As a result, the plaintiff occasionally needed to take pain medications when his pain was severe. The plaintiff informed his manager at the time, Butch Haxhi (“Haxhi”), of his occasional need to take pain medications and requested that he be allowed to go home to take them because SNET prohibited employees from taking pain medication while at work due to safety concerns.

In approximately April 2008, the plaintiff accepted a position as a first-level Field Manager of Network Services for SNET's U–Verse Department. As a manager, the plaintiff's duties consisted of managing crews of technicians and their vehicles, communicating with crews regarding how to install DSL, ordering parts and supplies, “imputing and compiling data into the SNET computers,” and informing crews regarding company safety procedures and other policies. (Stoffan Aff. ¶ 4).

The plaintiff's new supervisor when he became a manager was Daniel Chantlos (“Chantlos”), who was an Area Manager of Network Services for U–Verse and a “second-level” manager. (Defendant's Local Rule 56(A)(1) Stmt. (Doc. No. 137) ¶ 6). At some point, Chantlos asked the plaintiff whether he was taking medications, and when the plaintiff replied that he was, Chantlos questioned whether he had informed Haxhi of his need to take medications. The plaintiff told Chantlos that, in accordance with SNET procedure, he had told Haxhi. Chantlos remained the plaintiff's supervisor until the termination of the plaintiff's employment with SNET in February 2010.

Occasionally while working for Chantlos, the plaintiff would need to go home to take pain medication if his back pain was too severe. Additionally, he sometimes had to leave work to attend doctors' appointments. When he needed to be away from work at these times, the plaintiff would ask Chantlos for permission. Chantlos never refused any of the plaintiff's requests to leave, but Chantlos did tell the plaintiff to keep his cellphone on.

The plaintiff states that his workload increased while he was working for Chantlos. Chantlos increased the plaintiff's number of consecutive working days, scheduled him to work most holidays, and increased the plaintiff's crew from fifteen technicians to between twenty and thirty technicians. The plaintiff felt overwhelmed by the workload, and in August 2008, his primary care physician recommended that he go to a hospital emergency room for a psychological examination because he was expressing symptoms of anxiety and depression. However, when he returned to his primary care physician in May 2009, the plaintiff did not tell his physician that he was still experiencing depressive symptoms.

In 2009, Chantlos transferred the plaintiff from his assignment as manager of SNET's Stratford garage to an assignment as manager of SNET's Stamford garage. The parties dispute the extent to which the transfer was voluntary. The defendant states that Chantlos suggested the transfer because he needed a manager in Stamford and because the transfer would separate the plaintiff and another employee with whom the plaintiff was having a personal issue. The defendant further states that the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to the transfer and expressed no reservation about the transfer to Chantlos. The plaintiff states that he objected to the transfer, but ultimately felt as though he did not have a choice in the matter.

Once the plaintiff completed his assignment at the Stamford garage, he was transferred to SNET's New Haven garage. The plaintiff worked out of the New Haven garage for the remainder of his employment with SNET.

On December 29, 2009, SNET's Asset Protection Client Services Group received an anonymous call which reported that the plaintiff had ordered certain equipment which SNET identified as not normally used by U–Verse employees. The equipment included large portable light stands with halogen lights and two axes. As a result of the call, Harry Bermas (“Bermas”), a Lead Analyst in Asset Protection, conducted an investigation into the allegations.

On January 25, 2010, Bermas spoke with Chantlos about what the anonymous caller had reported. Chantlos stated that he was not aware of the order and that it was not equipment normally ordered by a U–Verse manager. Chantlos told Bermas that they would have to determine whether there was an unusual circumstance that had warranted the plaintiff's order. Bermas obtained a copy of the equipment ordering history for Chantlos's managers, including the plaintiff. The history showed that the plaintiff had ordered two axes on September 7, 2009 and that he had ordered two portable light stands with halogen lights on September 9, 2009. The lights were delivered on September 28, 2009.

Bermas interviewed the plaintiff on February 4, 2010 in the presence of Chantlos. Bermas showed the plaintiff the order for the light stands and asked the plaintiff where the light stands were currently located. The plaintiff stated that the light stands were at his residence in Trumbull, but he later told Bermas that the light stands were located in a barn at his uncle's house in Monroe, Connecticut.1 The plaintiff told Bermas that approximately four months earlier he had gone to his uncle's home to fix his uncle's U–Verse service. The plaintiff acknowledged that did not go to his uncle's home as a result of a company appointment scheduled through SNET, but instead went as a favor to his uncle. He also stated that he did not want his uncle to have to make a service call because it would reflect negatively on the technician who had originally installed the equipment at his home. With regard to the two axes, the plaintiff stated that he had given one of the axes to another manager, Michael Pirro, and that he had ordered it for work related purposes.

At that time, Bermas stopped the interview so that he and the plaintiff could collect the light stands from the plaintiff's uncle's home. When they arrived at the plaintiff's uncle's home, the plaintiff led Bermas to a barn on the property. From the barn Bermas initially collected two tool bags full of SNET tools. The plaintiff then moved a blue tarp under which there were two boxes containing the light stands and the lights, a third tool bag containing SNET tools, a box of CAT–5 cable, a DeWalt drill box, and an axe, all of which were SNET property. Bermas collected all of the SNET property, and he and the plaintiff then returned to the SNET work center in New Haven where Bermas secured the equipment.

Bermas then continued the interview with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed he could not remember why he had left the equipment and tools at his uncle's house, but he believed it might have been because of a weather issue. He stated that the tool bags and drill had come from an employee's vehicle that he had cleaned out when the employee was terminated. However, the plaintiff could not recall any details about the employee or which truck the tools had come from. The plaintiff stated that until the interview with Bermas, he had forgotten that he had left the tools and equipment in his uncle's barn.

At the conclusion of the interview, SNET immediately suspended the plaintiff pending completion of Bermas's investigation. On February 10, 2010, Bermas issued an Asset Protection Report of Investigation, and based on his factual findings, SNET concluded that the plaintiff had stolen...

5 cases
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2015
Deangelo v. Yellowbook Inc.
"...concludes that the same issue of fact exists regarding whether he was disabled under the CFEPA. See Stoffan v. S. New England Tel. Co.,4 F.Supp.3d 364, 373 (D.Conn.2014); Dzubaty v. Milford Bd. of Educ.,No. CV065000824S, 2007 WL 2570413, at *3 (Conn.Super.Ct. Aug. 20, 2007)(“The Second Circ..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2019
Wade v. Elec. Boat Corp.
"...v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002) (ADA and RA), superseded by statute on other grounds; Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 3d 364, 373 (D. Conn. 2014) (ADA and CFEPA). The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Reg'l Econ., 294 F.3d..."
Document | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York – 2019
Kane v. City of Ithaca
"...Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds; Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 3d 364, 373 (D. Conn. 2014). The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA by a preponderance of t..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2017
Blackett v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.
"...the same burden-shifting legal framework. See McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013); Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 3d 364, 372 n.2 (D. Conn. 2014). A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of perceived disability discrimination if he can show by a prep..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2016
Green v. Cellco P'ship
"...on the basis of disability and apply the same legal framework to the discrimination analysis. See Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co. , 4 F.Supp.3d 364, 372 n. 2 (D. Conn. 2014). These claims of disability discrimination are subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard. Se..."

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5 cases
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2015
Deangelo v. Yellowbook Inc.
"...concludes that the same issue of fact exists regarding whether he was disabled under the CFEPA. See Stoffan v. S. New England Tel. Co.,4 F.Supp.3d 364, 373 (D.Conn.2014); Dzubaty v. Milford Bd. of Educ.,No. CV065000824S, 2007 WL 2570413, at *3 (Conn.Super.Ct. Aug. 20, 2007)(“The Second Circ..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2019
Wade v. Elec. Boat Corp.
"...v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002) (ADA and RA), superseded by statute on other grounds; Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 3d 364, 373 (D. Conn. 2014) (ADA and CFEPA). The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Reg'l Econ., 294 F.3d..."
Document | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York – 2019
Kane v. City of Ithaca
"...Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds; Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 3d 364, 373 (D. Conn. 2014). The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA by a preponderance of t..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2017
Blackett v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.
"...the same burden-shifting legal framework. See McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013); Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 3d 364, 372 n.2 (D. Conn. 2014). A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of perceived disability discrimination if he can show by a prep..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut – 2016
Green v. Cellco P'ship
"...on the basis of disability and apply the same legal framework to the discrimination analysis. See Stoffan v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co. , 4 F.Supp.3d 364, 372 n. 2 (D. Conn. 2014). These claims of disability discrimination are subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard. Se..."

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  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

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Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

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  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

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