Stolfo v. Kindercare Learning Ctrs., Inc.

51 N.E.3d 906

402 Ill.Dec. 154

Dennis James STOLFO, Petitioner–Appellant

v.KINDERCARE LEARNING CENTERS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Arnetta Terry, John Ranieri and Christina Yarco, Respondents–Appellees (Mary Iacovetti, Plaintiff, and KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Arnetta Terry, John Ranieri and Christina Yarco, Defendants).

No. 1–14–2396.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

March 14, 2016.

Stolfo Law Offices, Chicago (Dennis James Stolfo, of counsel), for appellant.

Wentzel Law Offices, Chicago (David F. Wentzel, of counsel), for appellees.

OPINION

Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Petitioner-appellant Dennis James Stolfo, an attorney, appeals from the dismissal of his petition pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2012) ), which sought to vacate a November 3, 2011 judgment of the trial court that imposed sanctions against Stolfo for pursuing frivolous claims in an underlying lawsuit against the respondents-appellees. We conclude that dismissal of the section 2–1401 petition was proper under the doctrine of res judicata. Moreover, as Stolfo has persisted in filing frivolous submissions in the trial court as well as in this court despite numerous warnings and sanctions, we also impose sanctions against him for prosecution of this current appeal.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 This appeal is the latest of many attempts by Stolfo, an attorney, to avoid the effect of a November 2011 trial court order which imposed sanctions against him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137. Those sanctions arose from Stolfo's representation of Mary Iacovetti (who is not a party to this appeal) in Iacovetti's lawsuit against the respondents-appellees herein, which include Iacovetti's former employer, KinderCare Learning Center, Inc. (KinderCare), and certain KinderCare employees, Arnetta Terry, John Ranieri, and Christina Yarco (collectively, the respondents). Iacovetti had been terminated from her position as a director of a KinderCare childcare center, based on incidents in which Iacovetti had allegedly failed to adequately monitor children in her care. Among other claims, Iacovetti's lawsuit against the respondents claimed defamation and false light, alleging that the respondents had falsely accused her of the incidents in question. However, deposition testimony, including Iacovetti's admissions, established that the incidents had, in fact, occurred. Thus, the respondents obtained summary judgment dismissing Iacovetti's lawsuit in May 2009.

¶ 4 Stolfo filed an appeal from the grant of summary judgment. Our court affirmed the trial court on September 15, 2011, in an order which deemed the appeal frivolous and without merit. Iacovetti v. KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091541–U, 2011 WL 9692699. In that order we stated that we were “tempted” to award sanctions and advised Stolfo to be “much more circumspect in bringing matters before this court.” Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 5 In the meantime, in June 2009, the respondents filed a motion in the trial court seeking sanctions against Stolfo pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137. Ill. S.Ct. R. 137 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). In April 2011, the trial court awarded $139,992.64 in sanctions because Stolfo “continued to prosecute a cause of action after his client's deposition testimony shut the door to any possibility of recovery.” The trial court explained that the amount represented legal fees incurred by the respondents after Stolfo “knew or should have known that [his client's] case was hopeless.”

¶ 6 Although the April 2011 order of the trial court was a nonfinal order, on May 10, 2011, Stolfo filed a notice of appeal. On September 12, 2011, our appellate court granted the respondents' motion to strike that appeal and further awarded the respondents' attorney fees in the amount of $4,083.

¶ 7 On November 3, 2011, the trial court entered a “final judgment order” (the November 2011 judgment) confirming its prior determination of Rule 137 sanctions in the amount of $139,992.64. Stolfo filed a direct appeal from the November 2011 judgment (No. 1–11–3550). In that appeal, Stolfo filed a “Rule 361(h) Dispositive Motion” in which he asserted numerous arguments as to why the November 2011 judgment should be vacated. Among other arguments, he claimed that the November 2011 judgment was “void ab initio” because, on May 2, 2011, KinderCare had converted from a Delaware corporation to a Delaware limited liability company (LLC). Stolfo's motion urged that as a result of the change in corporate form, the KinderCare party who had been awarded sanctions had “ceased to exist” and that the “trial court and the Appellate Court * * * were divested of subject matter jurisdiction.”

¶ 8 On June 22, 2012, our appellate court found that it had jurisdiction, denied Stolfo's “Dispositive Motion,” and dismissed his direct appeal from the November 2011 judgment. We noted that Stolfo's motion violated a prior order “wherein we advised [Stolfo] that Supreme Court Rule 375 sanctions will be considered by this Court” if Stolfo were to “file another patently frivolous motion.” We found that Stolfo's direct appeal “demonstrates an improper purpose where the primary purpose of the appeal was to delay, harass or cause needless expense,” and therefore we dismissed the appeal as a sanction.

¶ 9 On October 31, 2013, Stolfo filed a petition pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2012) ) seeking to vacate the November 2011 judgment. The petition raised numerous challenges asserting that the November 2011 judgment was void or otherwise erroneous. Among other claims, Stolfo's petition again contended that the November 2011 order was void in light of KinderCare's May 2011 conversion to an LLC. He claimed that the corporate entity to which sanctions had been awarded ceased to exist, and that KinderCare, in its LLC form, was not a proper “party” to the proceeding, and could not enforce the November 2011 judgment. Thus he argued that the judgment was a “ity.”

¶ 10 Stolfo also claimed that the trial court “lacked justiciability” to impose attorney fee sanctions under Rule 137, because the legal fees incurred by KinderCare's attorneys, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, had been paid by a separate entity. Specifically, Stolfo claimed that Seyfarth Shaw's fees were paid by a nonparty, Knowledge Learning Corporation. Stolfo urged that Rule 137 sanctions may only include attorney fees paid by a party, and thus there was no “justiciable matter” to support sanctions. Stolfo thus claimed that the trial court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the November 2011 judgment awarding sanctions.

¶ 11 Separately, the section 2–1401 petition claimed that KinderCare had failed to sufficiently allege, or prove, any specific filings or statements made by Stolfo in the underlying lawsuit that violated Rule 137. Rather, he contended that the trial court had “presumed” that sanctions should be awarded. Stolfo also claimed that his procedural due process rights had been violated because he was denied an evidentiary hearing at which he could challenge the basis for the Rule 137 sanctions.

¶ 12 On February 20, 2014, Stolfo filed a “motion for summary judgment” which urged that the respondents lacked “standing” to continue to appear or participate in the section 2–1401 proceeding, due to KinderCare's conversion from a Delaware corporation to an LLC.

¶ 13 On March 14, 2014, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss Stolfo's petition. Among other arguments, the respondents urged that dismissal was warranted under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel, as Stolfo had on several prior occasions (including his direct appeal) unsuccessfully argued that the November 2011 judgment was void or otherwise unenforceable due to KinderCare's LLC conversion.

¶ 14 On July 16, 2014, the trial court granted the respondents' motion and dismissed Stolfo's section 2–1401 petition with prejudice. In the same order, the court also denied Stolfo's motion for summary judgment. Stolfo filed a notice of appeal on August 5, 2014.

¶ 15 While this appeal was pending, on September 24, 2015, the respondents filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375, requesting that we dismiss Stolfo's appeal, impose a fine on him, and also award the respondents' expenses, including their attorney fees, relating to this appeal. On September 29, 2015, Stolfo filed a response which largely repeated his arguments that the respondents lacked “standing” to challenge his section 2–1401 petition as a result of KinderCare's conversion to an LLC. We consider the respondents' motion for sanctions along with our disposition of the case.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 We note that we have appellate jurisdiction because this is an appeal from an order denying relief sought in a section 2–1401 petition. Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(b)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2006).

¶ 18 Before we address the merits, we note that Stolfo's appellate brief fails to comply with the Supreme Court Rules. Stolfo's statement of facts, which is less than one page and contains no citations to the record, does not “contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case” as required under Rule 341. Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. July 1, 2008). Moreover, much of the argument in his appellate briefing is rambling, repetitious, and consists of jumbled run-on sentences, many of which are not decipherable.¹

¶ 19 When an appellant's brief does not comply with our supreme court's rules, the reviewing court has the authority to strike the brief and disregard its arguments. See In re Estate of Jackson, 354 Ill.App.3d 616, 620, 290 Ill.Dec. 625, 821 N.E.2d 1199 (2004). However, because we are able to ascertain the relevant facts from the respondents' brief and the record on appeal, we may reach the merits. See Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill.App.3d 509, 511, 254 Ill.Dec....