Stoller v. Dart

LEO STOLLER, Plaintiff,

v.THOMAS DART, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 12 C 4928

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

Date: May 17, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

On May 22, 2012, Plaintiff Leo Stoller filed a twenty-count Third Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Law Division, alleging that Defendants had violated his constitutional rights, as well as state law claims. On June 21, 2012, Defendants Cook County, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, Cook County Department of Corrections (the "Cook County Defendants"), the Village of Elmwood ("Elmwood Park"), and the Village of River Grove ("River Grove"), along with the individual named Defendants, removed this lawsuit pursuant to the Court's original and supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a).

Before the Court are River Grove's, Elmwood Park's, and the Cook County Defendants' motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court only addresses Defendants' challenges to Stoller's state law claims in the present order. The Court will address Stoller's constitutional claims in a separate order. After that order issues, the Court will set a deadline for Stoller to amend his pleadings accordingly.

For the following reasons, the Court grants in part with prejudice, grants in part without prejudice, and denies in part Defendants' motions to dismiss Stoller's state law claims. Morespecifically, the Court grants River Grove's and Elmwood Park's motions to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim alleged in Count XVII, the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in Counts XVIII and XIX , and the defamation claim in Count XX with prejudice. The Court also grants the County Defendants' motion to dismiss Stoller's defamation claim as alleged in Count XX and malicious prosecution claims as alleged in Counts XIV and XVII without prejudice and grants Stoller leave to amend his these allegations — if possible under counsel's Rule 11 obligations. Further, the Court denies the County Defendants' motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim alleged in Count XVI. The Court also strikes Stoller's punitive damages allegations against River Grove, Elmwood Park, and the County Defendants, except for the named Cook County Correctional Officers. See 745 ILCS 10/2-102.

Furthermore, the Court dismisses John Doe Defendants 1-7 with prejudice from this lawsuit. Because the Court is dismissing John Doe Defendants 1-7, the Cook County Defendants, Elmwood Park, and River Grove must file supplemental briefs in light of this ruling in the context of the remaining claims against them by no later than May 31, 2013. At that time, the County Defendants must develop their argument — made for the first time in their reply brief — that Stoller did not properly serve certain named officers. Stoller's response to the supplemental briefs shall be filed on or before June 14, 2013. Thereafter, the Court will rule on Defendants' motions to dismiss Stoller's constitutional claims.

LEGAL STANDARDS

"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader isentitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, [courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff's favor." AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011).

Courts construe pro se allegations liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff has retained counsel, although counsel admits that his client drafted the Third Amended Complaint. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff does not get the advantage of the Court applying the more generous standard for pro se litigants. See, e.g., Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court reminds Plaintiff's counsel of their duties and obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, including that by presenting Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint to the Court, counsel certified that Plaintiff's allegations (1) "are not being presented for any improper purpose, (2) the claims and contentions arewarranted by existing law, and (3) the allegations and factual contentions have evidentiary support." United States Bank Nat'l Ass'n, N.D. v. Sullivan-Moore, 406 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2005).

BACKGROUND

Construing his allegations in Stoller's favor, he maintains that his lawsuit arises from three separate incidents of arrest and detainment in the Cook County Jail for the following time periods: (1) on or about February 25, 2009 through March 8, 2009; (2) on or about June 8, 2009 through July 15, 2009; and (3) on or about January 26, 2011 through April 6, 2011. (R. 1, Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 12, 67-73.) The Court discusses each incident separately.

I. First Incident

First, Stoller alleges that on February 25, 2009, Cook County Sheriff Deputies apprehended him in the Honorable Renee Goldfarb's courtroom in the Circuit Court of Cook County pursuant to a court order issued by Judge Goldfarb. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.) The order, which concerned a contempt charge against Stoller, stated in full:

In the case of the amended third petition for adjudication of indirect criminal contempt, after hearing testimony and argument by counsel, it is hereby ordered that Leo Stoller be remanded to the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections for an immediate evaluation (BCX)¹ to be performed at Cermak Hospital. Leo Stoller is to be released from the Cook County Department of Corrections immediately upon the completion of the BCX evaluation. The report is due on the next court date of March 23, 2009 at 9:30 a.m.

(Id. ¶ 16; see Ex. 1.)

Stoller further maintains that officers of the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC") took him from Judge Goldfarb's courtroom to the Cook County Jail, Division 2, at26th and California Streets in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 19.) He alleges that he was confined for the next nine days during which he never received a BCX evaluation. (Id.) Instead, shortly after his arrival, the head psychologist for Cook County Jail informed Stoller that "Cermak Hospital does not perform BCX examinations." (Id. ¶ 15.) Stoller then showed Judge Goldfarb's order to an officer at Cook County Jail, who responded, "That piece of paper does not mean anything to us!" (Id. ¶ 17.)

While in custody on February 27, 2009, Stoller complained of chest pains and was taken to Cermak Hospital. (Id. ¶ 111.) When he arrived, Stoller showed the order to an individual named Officer Cobbs, who responded, "Cermak Hospital does not have to obey any court orders!" (Id. ¶ 18.) CCDOC personnel then transported Stoller to John H. Stroger Hospital of Cook County, where nurses and doctors treated him for chest pains and heart palpitations. (Id. ¶ 23; see Ex. 3.) On February 28, 2009, CCDOC personnel transported Stoller back to Cook County Jail where he remained until Judge Goldfarb terminated her court order on or around March 6, 2009. (Id. ¶ 95.)

II. Second Incident

Next, Stoller alleges that he was arrested on June 8, 2009 and held in Cook County Jail until July 15, 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 67-73, 81-86.) Stoller maintains that when he arrived, he was strip-searched. (Id. ¶ 90.) Shortly thereafter, Stoller contends that an individual named Officer Cano confiscated his glasses. (Id. ¶ 83.) Stoller's attorney, Barry Boykin, attempted to bring Stoller another pair of glasses, but jail officers prevented Boykin from giving the glasses to Stoller. (Id.) As a result, Stoller could not read while in custody. (Id.) In addition, Stoller maintains that jail officers denied him access to the law library and that the loud music in the jail causedhim to have chest pains. (Id. ¶¶ 85-86.)

III. Third Incident

Stoller asserts that on January 21, 2011, his ex-wife Nancy Reich filed a false complaint against him stating the he had violated an order of protection. (Id. ¶ 20.) Stoller further contends that on January 26, 2011, Elmwood Park police officers arrested him in response to Reich's complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 20-21, 42; see Ex. 4.) According to Stoller, River Grove and Elmwood Park police officers John Does 2-7 falsely arrested him and incarcerated him on January 26, 2011 by using a River Grove Water Department work truck to gain access to him at his office. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 28.) He claims that on January 26, 2011, authorities issued a $100,000 cash bond and transported him to the Cook County Jail. (Id. ¶ 21.) Stoller further states that he was released on or around April 5, 2011. (Id.) Also, he alleges that he was involved in a jury trial in Maywood, Illinois and that on April 6, 2011...