Stoltzfus v. Green Line Labs, LLC

303 A.3d 447

Samuel A. and Susan J. STOLTZFUS, H/W, Appellants v. GREEN LINE LABS, LLC

No. 1323 MDA 2022

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued August 29, 2023

Filed September 25, 2023

Jill M. Laskowitz, Lancaster, for appellant.

Kelsey L. Schwartz, Trevose, for appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. ^*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:

Samuel A. and Susan J. Stoltzfus, husband and wife (Appellants), appeal from the order striking the confessed judgment against their tenant, Green Line Labs, LLC (GLL). We affirm.

On June 1, 2020, GLL leased from Appellants a 10,000 square-foot space, known as "The Greenhouse," and four parking spaces (with one space at the loading dock) (the Property). ¹ Lease, 6/1/20, Preamble, ¶ 1. Under the Lease, GLL agreed to pay Appellants $55,000 per year, with monthly payments of $4,583.33. Id. ¶ 2. GLL leased the Property for use as a "hemp genetics cultivation facility." Id. ¶ 5.

The trial court explained what next transpired:

This case commenced on August 6, 2021, when Appellants filed [a] Complaint for Confession of Judgment for Money and in Ejectment for Possession of Real Property ("Complaint") against [GLL] .... See Complaint. Therein, Appellants assert[ed] the following: failure to pay rent when due, using leased premises beyond the uses permitted in the lease, altering the leased premises without approval, unauthorized storage, engaging in activities not permitted in the lease, and failure to provide proof of liability insurance. Complaint[, 8/6/21,] at 2.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/22, at 2. Appellants claimed past rent, accelerated rent, and counsel fees totaling $110,766.17. Complaint, 8/6/21, at 2.

At the same time, Appellants confessed judgment for past-due rent, accelerated rent, and possession of the Property. Confession and Ejectment, 8/6/21, at 1. Appellants additionally filed Pa.R.C.P. 2958.1 Notice of Judgment and Execution Thereon. On October 12, 2021,

Appellants filed [a] Praecipe for Writ of Possession Upon a Confessed Judgment, declaring that notice required under Pa.R.C.P. 2973.3 was served more than thirty days prior; a Writ of Possession was filed in tandem with the praecipe. On November 11, 2021, [GLL] contacted [c]ounsel for Appellants [(Counsel)] in an attempt to settle the matter. [GLL] asserts that Counsel responded on November 16, 2021, with the following conditions: [GLL] must pay all past due rent and rent through the end of the year totaling $23,291.65[;] [GLL] must pay legal fees and costs totaling $10,750.00[;] all storage must by cleaned up and removed[;] and [Appellants] provided a "less than 24-hour deadline" to do so. [GLL] states [it] was unable to secure the amount of money requested on such short notice and offered to pay $10,000.00 the following day in good faith, with the remaining funds to be tendered to Appellants on November 24, 2021[.] Counsel for Appellants refused the counteroffer.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/22, at 3-4 (citations omitted).

On November 17, 2021, Appellants ejected GLL from the Property:

Appellants filed [a] Praecipe for Writ of Execution. On November 23, 2021, and December 16, 2021, [GLL] contacted Counsel for Appellants to request access to the [Property] so [GLL] could remove rented equipment which needed to be returned to its owner, Plant Productions. [GLL] state[d] both requests were denied, and as a result, Plant Productions filed criminal charges for theft. On March 23, 2022, Appellants brought [GLL's] goods, inventory, equipment, fixtures, and other assets to public auction, where, according to [GLL], neither the auction company nor Appellants verified ownership of the assets.

Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).

Relevant to this appeal,

[o]n June 17, 2022, [GLL] filed [a] Petition to Strike and/or Open Judgment Entered by Confession[,] alleging the record in this matter is fatally flawed and has irregularities on its face[;] the docket does not reflect proper service[;] there is no relation between the cognovit clause in the Lease and [GLL's] signature[;] and Appellants are attempting double recovery for a single wrong. In response, Appellants countered, inter alia , that a revised Sheriffs Notice of Service, attached to their answer, showed all documents were served on [GLL] as required[;] [GLL's] Petition was time[-]barred and did not provide any explanation for the delay[;] and [GLL] admitted to default in their Petition and action was taken pursuant to the Lease.

Thereafter, [GLL] filed a reply alleging the Sheriff's Notice of Service from filed [ sic ] September 10, 2021, and the Sheriff's Notice of Service provided by Appellants in the Answer/New Matter[,] significantly differ, and that the matter of effective service is unclear. Moreover, [GLL] assert[ed] Appellants improperly entered judgment for possession and accelerated rent simultaneously, and failed to address this issue in the Answer/New Matter, beyond [stating the issue is] a conclusion of law. As a result, [GLL] contends, Appellants have waived [ ] any possible defense or objection pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2959(c).

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added, citations omitted). In its reply, GLL requested only that the court grant its petition to strike. GLL's Sur Reply to Appellants’ Answer in Opposition, 8/2/22, at 3 (unnumbered).

On August 22, 2022, the trial court granted GLL's petition to strike the confessed judgment. Order, 8/22/22. Thereafter, Appellants filed the instant timely appeal. Appellants and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Before we consider Appellants’ substantive issues, we address whether this appeal is properly before us. "The appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order." Estate of Considine v. Wachovia Bank , 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. Super. 2009). "[T]his Court has the power to inquire at any time, sua sponte , whether an order is appealable." ² Id.

Under Pa.R.A.P. 341, a final order disposes of all parties and all claims, is expressly defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a final order pursuant to the trial court's determination under Rule 341(c). Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1)-(3).

[W]here an order is issued that grants a motion to strike a judgment, such an order is generally not appealable, i.e. , it is not an interlocutory order from which an appeal as of right may lie. Such an order anticipates further litigation because the parties are placed back in the position they were in prior to the entry of the judgment. ... [However, when] the order striking the judgment ends the litigation as to all parties and all claims[, it is] a final order as defined in Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) and an appeal may be taken as of right.

United Parcel Serv. v. Hohider , 954 A.2d 13, 16 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, we consider whether the trial court's order striking the confessed judgment ends all litigation between Appellants and GLL. See id.

Our review discloses that Appellants’ Complaint sought the following relief:

Judgment in ejectment in [Appellants’] favor and against [GLL] for property located at 5541 Old Philadelphia Pike, Gap, Pennsylvania[,] 17527; and Judgment for $110,766.17.

Complaint, 8/6/21, at 3. Appellants confessed judgment against GLL for $110,766.17 and "ejectment in favor of [Appellants] for [the Property]." Confession and Ejectment, 8/6/21.

On August 22, 2022, the trial court entered the order granting GLL's petition to strike, stating, "The judgment previously entered in this matter on behalf of [Appellants] is stricken." Order, 8/22/22. Thus, the trial court's order struck the confessed judgment in its entirety. See id. Although the trial court's order is not marked as "final," it neither directs nor suggests further proceedings. Our review discloses no pending action before the trial court. No further proceedings are scheduled. Under these circumstances, we conclude the order is final and therefore appealable. See id.

Appellants present the following issues:

A. If it is determined that Appellants are not entitled to judgments for both possession and accelerated rent, did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its discretion in striking both judgments, as [Appellants] are entitled to some remedy where [GLL] admitted to defaulting under the lease between the parties?

B. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion in not denying [GLL's] Petition to Strike Judgment, which was untimely filed, and where [GLL] gave no compelling reason for its delay?

C. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion in ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over [GLL] to enter confessed judgments for possession and money damages, where [GLL] submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction to enter such judgments in the lease between the parties?

D. Whether the warrant of attorney to confess judgment is sufficient where it is in writing in bold, capital letters in the lease between the parties, signed by the person bound by it, and such signature bears a direct relation to the warrant?

Appellants’ Brief at 3-4 (issues reordered, punctuation modified).

We review a trial court's ruling on a petition to strike a confessed judgment for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Ferrick v. Bianchini , 69 A.3d 642, 647 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Appellants first challenge the trial court's order striking both the confessed judgment for money damages and for possession of the property. Appellants’ Brief at 22. Appellants claim they "should have been permitted to pursue at least a judgment of possession with a judgment for rent and other sums due to date or a judgment for accelerated rent." Id. Quoting this Court's decision in Homart Dev. Co. v. Sgrenci , 443 Pa.Super. 538, 662 A.2d 1092 (1995), Appellants assert, "When the judgment is entered for possession, the landlord is ... entitled to recover ... those losses which he suffers in attempting to relet the...