Stone v. Author

LUCRETIA STONE, Petitioner, v. VALERIE AUTHOR, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 14-3697(MCA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

November 17, 2017

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

MADELINE COX ARLEO, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter has been opened to the Court by petitioner Lucretia Stone's ("Petitioner") filing of a pro se Petition (ECF No. 3) for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking an evidentiary hearing and a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the Court will deny the Petition and will also deny a certificate of appealability.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

A. Factual Background

Petitioner was indicted on charges growing out of a fire at a Jersey City multi-family dwelling in the early morning hours of May 30, 1997. She lived in the building's illegal basement apartment and had a contentious relationship with the resident landlords, Krishna and Arawattie Ramnanana. Although most apartment residents escaped the May 30 apartment blaze, three children who also lived in the building died in the fire. Investigators determined that thefire was set with the use of the accelerant gasoline, and there was testimony at trial that Petitioner purchased a small amount of gasoline in the early morning hours of May 30, 1997.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of three counts of second-degree reckless manslaughter, three counts of first-degree felony murder, and one count of arson and was acquitted on the charge of aggravated arson. The sentencing judge merged the reckless-manslaughter and arson convictions into the felony-murder convictions. After finding aggravating factors one and nine and mitigating factor seven, the judge sentenced her to three consecutive life terms in prison with a ninety-year period of parole ineligibility. (See ECF No. 18-45 at 1-2.)

B. Procedural History

Petitioner appealed her conviction and sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but modified the sentence to three concurrent terms of life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. See State v. Lucretia Stone, No. A-3307-99 (App. Div. Aug. 4, 2003). (ECF No. 18-20.) The Supreme Court denied Stone's petition for certification. State v. Stone, 178 N.J. 36 (2003). (ECF No. 18-21.)

In 2004, Stone filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). (ECF No. 18-22.) The trial court denied the petition in April 2006. (ECF Nos. 18-30, 18-31.) The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court on February 29, 2008. State v. Lucretia Stone, No. A-5317-05 (App. Div. Feb. 29, 2008). (ECF No. 18-39.) The Supreme Court denied Stone's petition for certification. State v. Stone, 195 N.J. 524 (2008). (ECF No. 18-41.)

On or about November 10, 2007, while her PCR appeal was still pending, Stone filed a pro se motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence ("New Trial Motion").² Thetrial court denied the motion on April 29, 2011 and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision on May 22, 2013. (ECF Nos. 18-42-18-45; 18-97; 18-47.)

Petitioner, currently incarcerated at Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, submitted her habeas petition to prison officials for filing on June 3, 2014. (ECF No. 1, Pet. at 16.) The matter was assigned to the Honorable Faith S. Hochberg. The Court administratively terminated the proceeding on July 14, 2014 for Petitioner's failure to comply with L. Civ. R. 81.2(a). (ECF No. 2.) Petitioner thereafter submitted an amended habeas petition to prison officials on August 5, 2014 on the correct form ("Amended Petition"). (ECF No. 3, Pet. at 22.) The Amended Petition with 44 pages and 2 addenda sets forth nine separate grounds for habeas relief. (ECF No. 3.)

The Court screened the Amended Petition and issued an Order to Show Cause on September 18, 2014, requiring Petitioner to explain why her Amended Petition should not be dismissed as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 ("AEDPA"). (ECF No. 4.) On October 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause, addressing the issue of the Amended Petition's timeliness. (ECF No. 5.)

On December 5, 3014, the matter was transferred to the undersigned. (ECF No. 6.) This Court reviewed Petitioner's October 23 submission and, on May 4, 2016, ordered the State to provide a full answer; the Court reserved decision on the issue of the Amended Petition's timeliness. (ECF No. 9.) On June 7, 2016, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Petition on timeliness grounds, arguing that the Petition was untimely because Petitioner was notentitled to statutory tolling for her New Trial Motion. (ECF No. 11.) On September 12, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 13.) On January 27, 2017 the Court denied Respondents' June 8, 2016 motion to dismiss finding that Respondents had not met their burden to show that the Petition is untimely, and ordered Respondent to provide a full and complete answer to the Petition. (ECF Nos. 14 and 15.) Respondents filed their full Answer on March 24, 2017.³ (ECF No. 18.) The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.

III. TIMELINESS

As noted above, on January 27, 2017, the Court denied Respondents' motion to dismiss, finding that Respondents had not met their burden to show that the Petition is untimely, and ordered Respondent to provide a full and complete answer to the Amended Petition. The Court's Memorandum Opinion set forth the Court's reasons for denying the motion to dismiss, which need not be recounted here. The Memorandum Opinion permitted Respondents to renew their timeliness arguments with proper supporting authority in their full Answer. In their full Answer, Respondents have not provided any additional analysis of the relevant issues. For that reason, the Court declines to find the Amended Petition untimely, and will proceed to the merits.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 2254(a) permits a court to entertain only claims alleging that a person is in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). Petitioner has the burden of establishing each claim in the petition. See Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by AEDPA (28 U.S.C. § 2244), federal courts in habeas corpus cases must give considerable deference to determinations of state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010).

Section 2254(d) sets the standard for granting or denying a writ of habeas corpus:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Where a state court adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits,⁴ a federal court "has no authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the [state c]ourt's decision 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40-41 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

"[C]learly established law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, asopposed to the dicta, of t[he Supreme Court's] decisions," as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). A decision is "contrary to" a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) if the state court "contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Under the "'unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e] [Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. As to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court must confine its examination to evidence in the record. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011).

Where a petitioner seeks habeas relief, pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), on the basis of an erroneous factual determination of the state court, two provisions of the AEDPA necessarily apply. First, the AEDPA provides that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and] [t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005). Second, the AEDPA precludes habeas relief unless the adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

In addition to the above requirements, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 unless the petitioner has "exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To do so, a...