Stoots v. Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc.

300 Va. 354

867 S.E.2d 40

Rebecca Ann STOOTS, Administrator of the Estate of Calvin Harmon Stoots

v.MARION LIFE SAVING CREW, INC., et al.

Record No. 201202

Supreme Court of Virginia.

DECEMBER 22, 2021

Mary Lynn Tate (Tate Law, on briefs), Abingdon, for appellant.

Johneal M. White, Roanoke, (Glenn Robinson Cathey Memmer & Skaff, on brief), for appellees.

Amicus Curiae: Virginia Trial Lawyers Association (Cory R. Ford ; Peter A. Pentony ; WilliamsFord, on brief), in support of appellant.

Amicus Curiae: Virginia Association of Defense Attorneys (Joseph R. Pope; Goodman Allen Donnelly, on brief), in support of appellees.

PRESENT: All the Justices

OPINION BY JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL

Rebecca Ann Stoots ("Stoots") appeals the decision of Circuit Court of Smyth County ruling that Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc. ("MLSC") and its paramedics were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to Code § 8.01-255(A)(5).

I. BACKGROUND

MLSC is a nonprofit entity qualified under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), whose primary purpose is to provide organized lifesaving and first aid services for Smyth County, Virginia. On February 12, 2013, the Smyth County Board of Supervisors adopted resolutions recognizing MLSC as an integral part of the official safety system of the county and as a designated emergency response agency. MLSC provided this service through its single salaried employee and volunteer crew members. Although MLSC engages in billing for its services to insurance and individuals, it does not engage in any collection activities for those unable to pay.

Additionally, MLSC had a "Membership Incentive Program"¹ ("MIP") whereby volunteers were eligible to receive payment, commensurate with the volunteer's level of experience, for each shift beyond the first three worked each month. The volunteers who chose to participate in the program filled out a timesheet at the end of each month and designated which shifts were paid and which shifts were volunteer. The payments were considered taxable income and MLSC issued IRS Form 1099s to the crew members reflecting the payments they received.

On February 9, 2014, forty-three-year-old Calvin Harmon Stoots ("Calvin") began having difficulty breathing at his home in Smyth County. He subsequently became unresponsive and, shortly thereafter his sister, Stoots, arrived. Noting Calvin's difficulty breathing, Stoots believed he was suffering from ketoacidosis associated with his diabetes and called 911 to seek emergency assistance. Two paramedics from MLSC, James Thompson ("Thompson") and Zachary Powell ("Powell"), responded. Upon arrival, they determined that Calvin was still breathing with a normal resting heart rate.

Stoots asked Powell and Thompson to take Calvin to the hospital and render care. She provided them with a Virginia Advance Directive for Health Care (the "Advance Directive"), which named Stoots as Calvin's medical agent and gave her the authority to request treatment on his behalf. Thompson looked briefly at the Advance Directive and saw that it was signed on the front and back pages. Thompson noted that the second page of the Advance Directive stated, "no extraordinary methods," and concluded that Calvin was "DNR,"² meaning that he did not want to be resuscitated by medical professionals. Thompson later acknowledged that he did not have time to fully read the Advance Directive. Thompson then handed the Advance Directive to Stoots and said, "We got to go."

Contrary to Thompson's interpretation of the Advance Directive, the second page does not say "no extraordinary methods" anywhere. Rather, the second page states, in relevant part:

1. I provide the following instructions in the event my attending physician determines that my death is imminent (very close) and medical treatment will not help me recover.

[Of the options provided, Calvin selected:]

I do not want any treatments to prolong my life. This includes tube feeding, IV fluids, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), ventilator/respirator (breathing machine), kidney dialysis, or antibiotics.

I understand I will receive treatment to relieve pain and make me comfortable.

2. I provide the following instructions if my condition makes me unaware of myself or my surroundings or unable to interact with others, and it is reasonably certain I will never recover this awareness or ability even with medical treatment:

[Of the options provided, Calvin selected:]

I want treatment for a period of time in the hope of some improvement in my condition. I suggest 2 days as the period of time after which such treatment should be stopped if my condition has not improved.

Stoots told Powell and Thompson that Calvin was not "DNR" and that, as his medical agent, she wanted him to be treated. Powell and Thompson then loaded Calvin into the ambulance and connected him to oxygen. Stoots rode in the front of the ambulance. They drove to the hospital in a non-emergency fashion (i.e., without lights and sirens and stopping to adhere to all traffic signals along their route). They also stopped to pick up Larry Chatham ("Chatham"), an Advanced EMT. This was done because Chatham could provide Advanced Life Support Services.

Calvin died in the ambulance on the way to the hospital.³ Upon arrival at the hospital, the emergency room staff were informed that no attempt to resuscitate Calvin was made because he had a Do Not Resuscitate Order. MLSC subsequently generated a "Billing Report" and billed Calvin's insurance for its services. Calvin's insurance paid an undisclosed amount to MLSC.

In 2016, Stoots brought a wrongful death action against Powell, Thompson, Chatham (collectively, the "Paramedics") and MLSC, alleging that their "reckless, wanton, negligent and grossly negligent conduct ... was the direct and proximate cause of the premature death of [Calvin]."⁴ In response, the Paramedics and MLSC filed a plea in bar asserting statutory immunity under Code § 8.01-225, as well as sovereign and charitable immunity.⁵ The stipulated facts established that Powell designated his February 9, 2014 shift as a volunteer shift. Additionally, in February 2014, he worked a total of five shifts and received $150 from the MIP. Thompson did not participate in the MIP, as he never worked more than three shifts per month. Chatham worked eight shifts in February 2014 and received $500 from the MIP. Chatham's timesheet for that month does not contain an entry for February 9, 2014, as he was not scheduled to work on that date.

In a letter opinion, the circuit court found that the Paramedics were "clearly negligent, and probably grossly negligent" in failing to thoroughly read the Advance Directive. However, it ruled that they were absolutely immune from liability under Code § 8.01-225(A)(5) because they rendered emergency care in good faith and were not compensated for the care they provided within the meaning of the statute. With regard to MLSC, the circuit court relied on Linhart v. Lawson , 261 Va. 30, 34, 540 S.E.2d 875 (2001), and ruled that MLSC was immune from liability because the Paramedics were immune from liability.⁶ Stoots moved the circuit court to reconsider its ruling, and, after oral argument, the circuit court issued a letter opinion reaffirming its decision.

Stoots appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Stoots argues that the circuit court erred in granting absolute immunity to MLSC and the Paramedics because Code § 8.01-225 does not apply to the present case. Specifically, Stoots claims that the statute is inapplicable due to the Paramedics' violation of several statutory provisions. She further insists that the circuit court misconstrued the "good faith" requirement of Code § 8.01-225. Finally, she claims that circuit court overlooked the fact that MLSC and the Paramedics were compensated and, therefore, the statute did not apply to them.

Our analysis of these issues begins by noting that, at common law, there is no general duty to rescue. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 56 at 375 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]he law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life."). Further, we have recognized " ‘[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.’ " Didato v. Strehler , 262 Va. 617, 628, 554 S.E.2d 42 (2001) (quoting Nolde Bros. v. Wray , 221 Va. 25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882 (1980) ). "[T]his common law principle is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323," which states:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or

(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.

Id. at 628-29, 554 S.E.2d 42.

Thus, at common law, if an individual undertook to perform rescue operations, that individual was held to a duty of ordinary care. It has been observed, however, that such a state of affairs offers no encouragement for individuals to volunteer to help another in danger; rather, it "operates as a real, and serious, deterrent to the giving of needed aid." Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 56, at 378. Indeed, "[t]he result of all this is that the good Samaritan who tries to help may find himself [punished with] damages, while the priest and the Levite who pass by on the other side go on their cheerful way rejoicing." Id.

To encourage voluntary rescue efforts, a majority of states have passed so-called "Good Samaritan" statutes which remove the fear of potential liability from individuals who render aid in emergency situations. Id. It is...