Stop Blight Inc. v. Dinardo

303 A.3d 516

STOP BLIGHT INC., Appellant v. Marcia M. DINARDO

No. 251 WDA 2022

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: March 20, 2023

Filed: September 29, 2023

Mathew S. Feinman, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Rodney B. Jones, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Jennie Shnayder, Feasterville, for United States Financial Enterprises, participant.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Stop Blight Inc. ("SBI") appeals from the January 12, 2022 order sustaining the preliminary objections of United States Financial Enterprises, LLC ("Intervenor") and dismissing SBI's conservatorship action, which had been filed pursuant to the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act ("the Act") regarding a property owned by Marcia M. Dinardo, located at 177 45 ^th Street in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ("the property"). ¹ We affirm.

SBI commenced the underlying action on January 1, 2021, by filing a petition to appoint SBI as conservator over the property. The Act sets forth specific conditions that must be met before a court may appoint a conservator. See 68 P.S. § 1105(d). In that regard, SBI averred in its petition, among other things, that the property was not subject to a pending mortgage foreclosure action. Intervenor filed preliminary objections asking the court to dismiss the petition based upon Intervenor's pending mortgage foreclosure against the property. SBI filed preliminary objections and a response. Following oral argument, ² the trial court agreed with Intervenor regarding the status of the foreclosure action, sustained Intervenor's preliminary objections, and dismissed SBI's petition with prejudice. The trial court thereafter denied SBI's motion to reconsider.

This timely appeal followed. Both SBI and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. ³ SBI raises the following issues for our consideration:

A. Whether the trial court incorrectly determined that the Intervenor's foreclosure case was "pending," as defined by § 1105(d)(3) of the ... Act, despite the fact that the Intervenor had already obtained a judgment in their foreclosure case?

B. Whether the trial court incorrectly determined that the Intervenor's foreclosure case was "pending," as defined by § 1105(d)(3) of the ... Act, despite the fact that the Intervenor had already obtained a judgment in their foreclosure case and there was no active writ of execution, nor a pending sheriff sale?

SBI's brief at 4 (cleaned up).

Although raised in the context of an order that granted preliminary objections, ⁴ SBI's issues, at their core, require us to interpret the language of § 1105(d)(3). Since "the construction of the language of the Act is a question of law," our standard of review is de novo . Scioli Turco, Inc. v. Prioleau , 207 A.3d 346, 350 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). We undertake this task pursuant to the following legal framework. First, the Statutory Construction Act provides as follows:

(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.

(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:

(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.

(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.

(3) The mischief to be remedied.

(4) The object to be attained.

(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.

(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.

(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.

(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. This Court has explained that

[o]nly if we determine that the statutory text is ambiguous may we look to considerations beyond the text such as the mischief to be remedied by the statute or what gave rise to its enactment. In determining whether language is clear and unambiguous, we must assess it in the context of the overall statutory scheme, construing all sections with reference to each other, not simply examining language in isolation. A term is ambiguous if, when it is read in context, it has more than one reasonable interpretation.

Scioli , supra at 350-51 (cleaned up).

SBI asks this Court to interpret the meaning of "pending foreclosure action" within the Act. In that regard, we first set forth the pertinent portion of the Act:

(a) General rule.-- The court shall act upon a petition submitted by holding a hearing within 60 days of receipt of the petition and by rendering a decision no later than 30 days after completion of the hearing.

(b) Intervention.-- A party in interest may intervene in the proceeding and be heard with respect to the petition, the requested relief or any other matter which may come before the court in connection with the proceeding.

(c) Hearing.-- At the hearing, any party in interest shall be permitted to present evidence to support or contest the petition, including, but not limited to, the schedule of encumbrances.

(d) Conditions for conservatorship.-- If a petition is filed under section 4, the court may appoint a conservator if all of the following apply as of the date of filing:

....

(3) The property is not subject to a pending foreclosure action by an individual or nongovernmental entity.

....

68 P.S. § 1105 (footnote omitted).

The Act does not define the phrase "pending foreclosure action." See 68 P.S. § 1103. Nonetheless, our legislature has provided specific guidance for construing the words and phrases contained within a statute:

(a) Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in this part, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.

(b) General words shall be construed to take their meanings and be restricted by preceding particular words.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1903. "Courts also must not interpret a statute in a manner that leads to an absurd result." Scioli , supra at 351 (cleaned up).

Here, the trial court concluded that the mortgage foreclosure action remained pending at the time SBI sought to be appointed conservator. In support of this finding, the trial court offered the following history, which is undisputed. Ms. Dinardo executed a mortgage on the property in 2009. Thereafter, she defaulted on the mortgage and, on June 22, 2015, Intervenor initiated the pertinent mortgage foreclosure action. A judgment was entered in favor of Intervenor on January 24, 2018. Intervenor scheduled a sheriff's sale of the property for June 1, 2020, but the sale was stayed as a result of Ms. Dinardo filing for bankruptcy in February 2020. The bankruptcy action was dismissed on December 14, 2020, and Intervenor filed a writ of execution on July 19, 2021, re-listing the property for sheriff's sale. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/22, at unnumbered 2. In the interim, SBI filed the conservatorship action.

SBI argues that for a mortgage foreclosure action to be pending, it must still be in progress. See SBI's brief at 14-15. Relying on the legislature's amendment changing the language in § 1105(d)(3) from "existing" to "pending," ⁵ SBI contends that a foreclosure action is pending within the context of the Act when it "either has not yet reached a judgment, or ... has an active writ of execution." Id . at 18. Based on this interpretation of "pending," SBI maintains that the subject foreclosure action transitioned from "pending" to "completed" on January 24, 2018, when Intervenor obtained a final judgment. Id . at 15. While the July 2021 writ of execution may have returned the mortgage foreclosure action to pending status, SBI filed its petition for appointment of a conservator several months prior. Thus, SBI argues that the trial court erred in deeming the foreclosure action pending where, at the time SBI filed its petition, Intervenor had obtained a final judgment in the mortgage foreclosure action and there were no active writs. See id . at 16-19.

The trial court disagreed. The court acknowledged that the simple filing of a mortgage action does not permit the action to be "pending" indefinitely and that a mortgagor "cannot be allowed to sit on their rights forever[.]" Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/22, at unnumbered 3. However, it found that was not the situation in this case:

The foreclosure action experienced a number of continuances and ultimately a stay after [Ms.] Dinardo filed for bankruptcy. [SBI's] argument, taken to its natural end, that the only instance where a foreclosure case is "pending" is if there is a valid writ of execution is simply inapposite to how foreclosure cases proceed in real time. [Intervenor's] mere seven-month delay after the termination of [Ms.] Dinardo's bankruptcy in filing for a new writ is entirely reasonable and does not render this case inactive.

Id . at unnumbered 3-4 (cleaned up). Since the court determined that SBI would be unable to show that there was not a pending foreclosure action, it held that § 1105(d)(3) could not be satisfied. Id . at unnumbered 4.

We begin our de novo review of the trial court's ruling with the plan meaning of the words at issue. Black's Law Dictionary defines "pending" as: "Remaining undecided; awaiting decision[.]" ⁶ Pending, Black's Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019). This Court has also defined "pending" as an action that is "begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment. Thus, an action or suit is ‘pending’ from its inception until the rendition of...