Stoss v. Estock, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-1479

ARTHUR F. STOSS, Petitioner v. SUPERINTENDENT ESTOCK and PA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-1479

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 19, 2021

(Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Arthur F. Stoss ("Stoss") filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a conviction and judgment imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny the petition.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

In March 2011, Stoss was charged with first-degree murder and criminal homicide. Commonwealth v. Stoss, No. CP-40-CR-0001540-2011 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Cnty.). At the conclusion of a five-day trial, a jury convicted Stoss of first-degree murder. Id. On June 12, 2012, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. Stoss filed a timely direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Stoss, No. 1374 MDA 2011 (Pa. Super. Ct.). On August 7, 2013, the Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Stoss, 2013 WL 11256473, No. 1374 MDA 2012 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2013). On September 5, 2013, Stoss filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Stoss, No. 676 MAL 2013 (Pa. 2013). On January 21, 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Stoss, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2014) (table decision).

On March 10, 2014, Stoss filed his first pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq., collaterally attacking his conviction. Commonwealth v. Stoss, No. CP-40-CR-0001540-2011 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Cnty.). The PCRA court appointed counsel, and PCRA counsel filed a supplemental petition on November 13, 2014. See Commonwealth v. Stoss, 2016 WL 5930533, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2016). On April 21, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on Stoss's PCRA petition. See id. On September 14, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. See id. PCRA counsel filed a timely appeal. Commonwealth v. Stoss, No. 1869 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. Ct.). On September 8, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's order denying post-conviction relief. Id.

On January 20, 2017, Stoss filed a second pro se PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Stoss, No. CP-40-CR-0001540-2011 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Cnty.). On January 18, 2018, the PCRA court denied the petition. (Doc. 13-2, at 46-57, Commonwealth v. Stoss, No. 1540 of 2011, PCRA Court Opinion and Order).

On July 7, 2018, Stoss filed the instant federal habeas petition. (Doc. 1). By Memorandum and Order dated May 17, 2019, the court found that Stoss did not properly exhaust claims raised in his second PCRA petition and dismissed all ofthem.¹ (Docs. 15, 16). On the other hand, the court further found that Stoss had fully exhausted the following claims: the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statements to the Pennsylvania State Police, failing to suppress evidence seized without his consent, and failing to give a missing witness instruction; and, trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present an alibi defense, failing to object to the prosecution's closing statement, and failing to present any evidence that another individual confessed to killing someone on the same night Stoss was accused of the murder. (Id.) These claims are presently before the court for disposition.

II. Legal Standards

The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). A habeas corpus petition pursuant to § 2254 is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Rather, federal habeas review is restricted to claims based "on the ground that [petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68.

A. Merits Standard

Once a court has determined that the exhaustion requirement is met² and, therefore, that review on the merits of the issues presented in a habeas petition is warranted, the scope of that review is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d) provides, in pertinent part, that an application for a writ of habeas corpus premised on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in state court shall not be granted unless

(1) [the decision] was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) [the decision] was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To establish that the decision was contrary to federal law "it is not sufficient for the petitioner to show merely that his interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is more plausible than the state court's; rather, the petitioner must demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent requires the contrary outcome." Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 888 (3d Cir. 1999). Similarly, a federal court will only find a state court decision to be an unreasonable application of federal law if the decision, "evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent." Id.

Further, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a federal court is required to presume that a state court's findings of fact are correct. A petitioner may only rebut thispresumption with clear and convincing evidence of the state court's error. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (stating that the clear and convincing standard in § 2254(e)(1) applies to factual issues, whereas the unreasonable application standard of § 2254(d)(2) applies to factual decisions); Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888; Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 492, 497-98 (3d Cir. 2005). This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact. Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000). Consequently, a habeas petitioner "must clear a high hurdle before a federal court will set aside any of the state court's factual findings." Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590, 597-98 (1st Cir. 2001).

Like the "unreasonable application" prong of paragraph (1), a factual determination should be adjudged "unreasonable" under paragraph (2) only if the court finds that a rational jurist could not reach the same finding on the basis of the evidence in the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Porter v. Horn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 278, 296 (E.D. Pa. 2003); see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000); cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). "This provision essentially requires the district court to step into the shoes of an appellate tribunal, examining the record below to ascertain whether sufficient evidence existed to support the findings of fact material to the conviction." Breighner v. Chesney, 301 F. Supp. 2d354, 364 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (f)³). Mere disagreement with an inferential leap or credibility judgment of the state court is insufficient to permit relief. Porter, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 296; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 408-09 (2000); Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2001). Only when the finding lacks evidentiary support in the state court record or is plainly controverted by evidence therein should the federal habeas court overturn a state court's factual determination. Porter, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 296; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). This right to effective assistance of counsel also extends to the first appeal. Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646, 656 (3d Cir. 2004). In Strickland, the Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test in assessing whether a petitioner has been denied the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A petitioner must demonstrate (1) that his counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that such defective performance caused the petitioner prejudice. See id.

In evaluating the first prong of the Strickland test, the court must be "highly deferential" toward counsel's conduct. Id. at 689. There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professionalassistance. Id. ("It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable."). "Strickland and its progeny make clear that counsel's strategic choices will not be second-guessed by post-hoc determinations that a different trial strategy would have fared better." Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 681-82 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689). Notably, courts will not deem counsel ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; United States v. Saunders, 165 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1999).

To satisfy the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable...