Stoss v. Kijakazi

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ALICE STOSS, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-01954

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

October 27, 2023

WILSON, J.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is an action brought under Section 1383(c) of the Social Security Act and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter, “the Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff Alice Stoss (“Stoss”)'s claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). The matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to prepare a report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons expressed herein, and upon detailed consideration of the arguments raised by the parties in their respective briefs, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.

I. Background and Procedural History

On July 8, 2020, Plaintiff Stoss protectively filed an application for Title II benefits, claiming disability beginning February 2, 2020, due to chronic back, neck, shoulder, knee, and hand/arm pain. (Doc. 8-2, at 17). The Social Security Administration initially denied Stoss's application on August 26, 2020, and upon reconsideration on December 23, 2020, prompting Stoss's request for a hearing, which Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Howard Kauffman held on October 13, 2021. (Doc. 8-2, at 17). In a written opinion dated November 12, 2021, the ALJ determined that Stoss was not disabled and therefore not entitled to the benefits sought. (Doc. 8-2, at 14). On October 5, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Stoss's request for review. (Doc. 8-2, at 2).

On December 9, 2022, Stoss filed the instant action. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded on February 10, 2023, providing the requisite transcripts from the disability proceedings. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Stoss alleging two errors warranted reversal or remand. (Doc. 9; Doc. 12; Doc. 13).

II. Standards of Review

To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).^[1] Additionally, to be eligible to receive Title II benefits, a claimant must be insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.

A. Administrative Review

In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the “Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now-familiar five-step analysis.” Hess v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2019). The “burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 201; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1).

B. Judicial Review

The Court's review of a determination denying an application for Title ii benefits is limited “to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Katz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The quantum of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Stoss is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that Stoss is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The [Commissioner]'s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). “In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If “the ALJ's findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. The ALJ's Decision

In his decision, the ALJ determined that Stoss “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from February 2, 2020, through the date of this decision.” (Doc. 8-2, at 28). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At the onset, the ALJ determined that Stoss meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2025. (Doc. 8-2, at 19).

A. Step One

At step one, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in SGA, the Regulations deem them not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). SGA is defined as work activity-requiring significant physical or mental activity-resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)-(b). In making this determination, the ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(2). Here, the ALJ determined that Stoss “has not engage in [SGA] since February 2, 2020, the alleged onset date.” (Doc. 8-2, at 19). Thus, the ALJ's analysis proceeded to step two.

B. Step Two

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment-or a combination of impairments-that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that a claimant does not have an “impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits” the claimant's “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If, however, a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ proceeds to consider step three. Here, the ALJ found that the medical evidence of record established the presence of the following medically determinable severe impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the cervical, thoracis, and lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the knees and left shoulder, and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.” (Doc. 8-2, at 19). The ALJ also noted the non-severe impairment of hyperlipidemia, hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). (Doc. 8-2, at 19-20).

C. Step Three

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1525, 404.1526. The sections in this appendix are commonly referred to as “listings.” If the ALJ determines the claimant's impairment or impairments meet a listing, then the claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Otherwise, the ALJ must proceed to the fourth step of the analysis. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(d). The ALJ determined that none of Stoss's impairments, considered individually or in combination, met or equaled a Listing. (Doc. 8-2, at 20). Specifically, the ALJ considered Listings 1.15 (disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in compromise of a nerve root(s)); 1.16 (lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in compromise of the cauda equina); and 1.18 (abnormality...