Stout v. United States

LANCE STOUT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-379-WPJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

December 15, 2016

ORDER DENYING INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING UNITED STATES' AND INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b)

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon United States' and Individual Defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) (Doc. 98), and Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Summary Judgment (Doc. 99), filed October 3, 2016. Having reviewed the relevant pleadings of the parties and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendants' Motions are not well-taken and therefore DENIED as herein described.

BACKGROUND¹

On April 9, 2013, Christopher Stout and his girlfriend, Stacey Stout, were shot and killed, during the course of the execution of a felony arrest warrant upon Mr. Stout by the seven Individual Defendants who were all officers participating as members of the U.S. Marshal's Metro Fugitive Task Force. Mr. Stout had been suspected of committing a burglary. The U.S. Marshal's Task Force alleged he attempted to make a getaway in his vehicle as officers attempted to serve the felony warrant at a motel in Oklahoma City. As Mr. Stout was drivingaway from the motel with Ms. Stout as a passenger, Individual Defendants performed a tactical vehicle intervention maneuver, stopping Mr. Stout's car and surrounding him with their own cars. According to the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Stout and Ms. Stout, realizing the Individual Defendants were law enforcement, immediately threw their hands into the air with open palms facing the windshield. The Individual Defendants then exited their vehicles, and began firing approximately 75 bullets into the car. Mr. Stout and Ms. Stout were both unarmed. Mr. Stout was pronounced dead at the scene. Ms. Stout was transported to a hospital where she was pronounced dead. The couple is survived by their young daughter.

Given the voluminous filings to date, the Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the procedural history underlying this action; however, the Court highlights several recent developments. On December 15, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claim against the United States, without prejudice. See Doc. 112.² Plaintiffs had alleged under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), that the United States was liable for failure to intervene and prevent law enforcement officers from using excessive force, resulting in Ms. Stout's death. See Doc. 45. In dismissing the FTCA claim, the Court specifically found Oklahoma law does not recognize a "failure to intervene" tort claim for a private party, a requirement of FTCA jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674. See Doc. 112, at 7-8. The Court explained federal courts only have jurisdiction over claims for damages under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Correspondingly, Plaintiffs failed to invoke this Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendants the United States and James Leone, Ed Grimes, Kevin Johnson, Chad Pope, Danny Long, Callen Stevens, and Taran Groom ("Individual Defendants") filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) (Doc. 98) on October 3, 2016. Individual Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Summary Judgment (Doc. 99) on October 3, 2016. Plaintiffs filed a Combined Response (Doc. 109) on November 14, 2016. Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 110) on November 21, 2016.

LEGAL STANDARD

"The purpose of Rule 54(b) 'is to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in entering judgment on a distinctly separate claim or as to fewer than all of the parties until the final adjudication of the entire case by making an immediate appeal available.'" Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting 10 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2654 at 33 (1982)). Rule 54(b) also exists to preserve "the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals." Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956)).

A certification under Rule 54(b) is only appropriate when a district court makes two express determinations. First, the district court must determine that the order it is certifying is a final order. Second, the district court must determine that there is no just reason to delay review of the final order until it has conclusively ruled on all claims presented by the parties to the case. Oklahoma Turnpike, 259 F.3d at 1242 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

"[T]he district court should act as a 'dispatcher' weighing Rule 54(b)'s policy of preventing piecemeal appeals against the inequities that could result from delaying an appeal." Stockman's Water Co., LLC v. Vaca Partners, L.P., 425 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980)).

"Rule 54(b) entries are not to be made routinely . . . Indeed, trial courts should be reluctant to enter Rule 54(b) orders since the purpose of this rule is a limited one: to provide a recourse for litigants when dismissal of less than all their claims will create undue hardships." Oklahoma Turnpike, 259 F.3d at 1242 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The United States And Individual Defendants Are Not Entitled To Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b).

The Court denies the Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) because Defendants are not entitled to a finding that there is "no just reason for delay" in entering final judgment in favor of the United States on Plaintiffs' FTCA claim.

The United States and Individual Defendants move the Court to enter final judgment in favor of the United States under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on Plaintiffs' FTCA claim, evidently in an attempt to trigger the FTCA's judgment bar provision.³ Defendants argue the Court's dismissal of the FTCA claim constitutes a complete bar to Plaintiffs' claims against Individual Defendants, thus there is no just reason to delay entry of judgment in favor of the United States under Rule 54(b). Defendants contend the interests of justice compel entry of final judgment on behalf of the United States to avoid unnecessary proceedings and piecemeal litigation. Defendants' position is basically that because they believe the FTCA judgment bar will ultimately preclude Plaintiff's individual claims, there is no just reason to delay entry of final judgment on Plaintiffs' claim against the United States.

Defendants further argue if the Court does not enter judgment, duplicative and piecemeal litigation will ensue. They insist that if Plaintiffs successfully appealed the Court's dismissal ofthe United States after a verdict for or against Individual Defendants, any remand would be for further proceedings after proceedings had already occurred for the claims against the Individual Defendants. Defendants argue Rule 54(b) is intended to remedy such results. Moreover, Defendants point out that the Court dismissed the claim against the United States regarding an "isolated legal issue" that is not otherwise at issue in this case. As such, the issues would not overlap with other issues remaining in this litigation. Defendants also contend that even if there were some overlapping issues, it is mitigated by the benefit of early review of the United States' dismissal. Defendants again argue that if the dismissal of the United States is appealed and then affirmed, there is no benefit to proceed through prolonged litigation on Plaintiffs' claim that will be barred even if it is successful.

In response, Plaintiffs first argue the reasons advanced by Defendants supporting entry of final judgment are founded on their meritless argument that Plaintiffs' claims against Individual Defendants are precluded by the FTCA judgment bar. Second, Plaintiffs point out the United States has failed to identify any hardship or injustice it might suffer absent the entry of final judgment. Third, entry of final judgment here would "guarantee a confusing array of litigation that will ultimately delay the final resolution of this case." More specifically, Plaintiffs argue entering final judgment on behalf of the United States and allowing it to proceed on appeal, while the remainder of the case proceeds in the district court, "makes no sense" and presents the type of fragmented litigation that Rule 54(b) is designed to prevent. Plaintiffs argue if this matter proceeds to trial against Individual Defendants and the City of Oklahoma City and results in a judgment favorable to Plaintiffs, the entire suit could be presented at once and resolved at that point. Similarly, if trial results in a judgment not favorable to Plaintiffs, the entire mattercould be resolved at that point in a unified appeal. Plaintiffs urge this Court not to permit fragmented appeals.

Defendants argue in the Reply that failure to grant the Rule 54(b) request would "necessitate a piecemeal approach at the trial level." See United Bank of Pueblo v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 529 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1976). Defendants contend failure to enter final judgment on behalf of the United States will result in "successive rounds of discovery, trials, and appeals."

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and declines to enter judgment under Rule 54(b). The Court is not convinced by Defendants' circular argument that it should enter judgment because Plaintiffs' claims will ultimately be precluded under the FTCA judgment bar. Defendants' entire argument in this regard is based on a Rule 54 judgment that does not exist. See Doc. 98, at 8 ("[G]iven the eventual application of the judgment bar,...