Stover v. Ocala Auto. Mgmt., LLC, Case No: 5:15-cv-538-Oc-30PRL

KELLY STOVER, Plaintiff, v. OCALA AUTOMOTIVE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendant.

Case No: 5:15-cv-538-Oc-30PRL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

September 9, 2016

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion for Summary Final Judgment (Doc. 17), Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 22), and Defendant's reply (Doc. 25). The Court, having considered the motion, response, reply, and record evidence, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, concludes that Defendant's motion should be granted in part.

RELEVANT FACTS

This case involves an employment dispute between Plaintiff, Kelly Stover, and Defendant, Ocala Automotive Management, LLC d/b/a Honda of Ocala. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a vehicle exchange specialist ("VES") in 2013, and continued to work in the VES department until August 2015. By all accounts, Plaintiff was a model employee who worked hard and was successful at her job. Plaintiff was promoted several times and offered a salaried position paying $40,000 per year, plus bonuses based on her individual performance, and provided a demonstrator vehicle by Defendant.

In May and June 2015, Plaintiff requested time off for an illness under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Defendant approved Plaintiff's requested leave, and Plaintiff remained on leave until she was released back to work by her physicians.

While Plaintiff was on leave, Andrew Vislosky was named Defendant's new general manager. Mr. Vislosky undertook several cost-cutting measures that affected the VES department as well as others. As part of those measures, Mr. Vislosky reduced the pay for Plaintiff's position from $40,000 per year to $12.50 per hour, the same as the other VES employee. Mr. Vislosky also restructured the bonus incentive such that it was based on the performance of the VES department as a whole instead of individual performance. Finally, Mr. Vislosky terminated the VES department's administrative assistant.

Similar cost-cutting measures were also taken outside the VES department. Specifically, Mr. Vislosky terminated a manager making $250,000, and reduced the pay of a director from $200,000 to $80,000.

Plaintiff returned to work on August 3, 2015, and was informed of Mr. Vislosky's cost-cutting measures in the VES department. Plaintiff, rather than accepting the pay decrease and bonus restructuring, took the matter to Defendant's CEO. Following a discussion with the CEO, Plaintiff decided to end her employment with Defendant rather than accept the new terms. This lawsuit followed.

As part of this lawsuit, Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to pay her two $1,000 bonuses she earned in January and March 2015. Plaintiff testified that she submitted therequired documentation to receive the bonuses to Defendant, but that Defendant never provided the payment. In the summary judgment record, Defendant never addresses whether Plaintiff was entitled to those bonuses or whether such bonuses were paid.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; "the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.

Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). "[I]f factual issues are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial." Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983). A dispute about a material fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir.1990). However, there must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question. Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims Defendant violated the FMLA in Count I, and claims Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff two bonuses in Count II. For the reasons below, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to the FMLA claims in Count I, but is not entitled to summary judgment as to the unpaid wages claim in Count II.

1. Plaintiff's FMLA Claims

Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the FMLA when it failed to reinstate her to her prior position upon her return from FMLA leave.¹ The FMLA requires an employerreinstate an employee who is returning from leave to the position she held when her leave began, or to another position that is equivalent in terms of benefits, pay, and other relevant conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (2012); Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2010). It is unlawful for "any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise" an employee's right to reinstatement after leave. § 2615(a). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that § 2615(a) creates two types of claims: "interference claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer denied or otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the [FMLA], and retaliation claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer discriminated against him because he engaged in activity protected by the [FMLA]." Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care System, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff's Complaint raises both a claim for interference and retaliation.

a. Plaintiff's claim for interference

To establish an FMLA interference claim, "an employee need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to the benefit denied." Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd. of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (11th Cir.2001)). The intent of the employer is irrelevant. Id.

An employee's rights, however, are not absolute. An employee who takes leave is not entitled to "any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave." § 2614(a)(3)(B). In other words, an "employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed with the company during the FMLA leave period." Parris v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 216 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000). As such, "an employer is not liable for failing to reinstate an employee after she has taken FMLA leave if it can show that it refused to reinstate her for a reason unrelated to FMLA leave." Thomas v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 645 Fed. Appx. 948, 952 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Krutzig, 602 F.3d at 1236).

It is beyond dispute that Plaintiff was not reinstated to her prior position upon return from leave. Plaintiff's $40,000 salary was reduced to $12.50/hour. Defendant also concedes that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action upon her return. Plaintiff, therefore, has stated a prima facie case for interference, and the burden shifts to Defendant to show the reason for Plaintiff not being reinstated was unrelated to her FMLA leave.

Defendant met its burden by providing ample evidence for this Court to conclude that its reason for failing to reinstate Plaintiff was unrelated to her FMLA leave. Defendant's general manager, who took over while Plaintiff was on leave, restructured the VES program to cut costs in a way that affected all the employees in the department, including those who did not take FMLA leave. These measures included terminating an administrative assistance and restructuring the department's bonuses. Moreover,Defendant implemented cost-cutting measures in other departments. Plaintiff presented no evidence that these cost-cutting measures were related to her FMLA leave. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

b. Plaintiff's claim for retaliation

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, an employee needs to show the following: (1) the employee engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal connection between the two. Krutzig, 602 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010). To prove a causal connection, "a plaintiff need only show that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated." Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected conduct, i.e. the taking of FMLA leave, or that Plaintiff...