Stowe v. Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles

245 So.3d 610

Michael Darren STOWE

v.ALABAMA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES

2160313

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

August 18, 2017

Michael Darren Stowe, pro se.

Laura B. Mest, asst. atty. gen., Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, for appellee.

DONALDSON, Judge.

Michael Darren Stowe appeals from an order of the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial court") dismissing his action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment, albeit for reasons different than those expressed in the trial court's order.

Facts and Procedural History

Stowe filed a petition pursuant to § 41–9–645, Ala. Code 1975, seeking to purge information contained within a postsentence investigation report included within his records and relied upon by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board") and the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") for classification purposes.

According to the documents contained in the record, Stowe pleaded guilty to manslaughter and first-degree assault in the Coosa Circuit Court and was sentenced to serve 20 years in the custody of ADOC. Stowe waived a presentence investigation report, and the Board instead completed a postsentence investigation report ("the PSI report").¹ See § 13A–5–5, Ala. Code 1975 (requiring a "presentence or postsentence investigation report [to be] completed and filed on every defendant convicted of a felony offense").

In his petition to the trial court, Stowe claimed three instances of erroneous information that he asserts are contained within the PSI report. Stowe argued that the incorrect information has prevented Stowe from receiving a lower classification status with ADOC. Stowe did not provide a copy of the PSI report to the trial court or to this court on appeal.²

The Board filed a motion to dismiss Stowe's petition in the trial court in which it asserted, among other things, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that Stowe had waived the right to challenge the PSI report, that § 41–9–645 is inapplicable to presentence and postsentence reports, and that Stowe is barred by the doctrine of laches from challenging information contained in the PSI report that was completed six years earlier. The Board filed a proposed order along with its motion. Stowe filed a response in opposition to the Board's motion to dismiss, and on January 23, 2017, after a hearing, the trial court entered the following order dismissing Stowe's petition based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction:

"Petitioner comes before the Court seeking to have records expunged from a report prepared by the Parole Board's officer. Petitioner refers to these records as ‘criminal records’ that he seeks to have expunged, citing Ala. Code 41–9–645 [and]–646.

"The Parole Board responds arguing that the records Petitioner seeks to have expunged are actually ‘details of the offense’ that are included in a Report of Investigation (Postsentence Report) and do not fall under the definition of ‘criminal records’. The Board further argues that to challenge the ‘details of an offense’ the proper court to bring that challenge would be the county of conviction, in this case Coosa County Circuit Court.

"The Parole Board's arguments are well taken in that ‘details of an offense’ are not considered criminal record for the purpose of the statutes that Petitioner cites. There holding, it would appear that this Court would lack jurisdiction to review the ‘details of an offense’ committed in another county.

"For the foregoing reasons the Court ORDERS that this action be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, with cost taxed to the Petitioner."

(Capitalization in original.)

Stowe timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order, which the trial court denied. On February 27, 2017, Stowe timely filed a notice of appeal to this court. "An appeal from a judgment denying a request for relief under § 41–9–645 falls within the jurisdiction of this court." McMillian v. State, 175 So.3d 186, 187 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (citing Ex parte Teasley, 967 So.2d 732 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) ).

Standard of Review

"In Newman v. Savas, 878 So.2d 1147, [1148–49] (Ala. 2003), [the supreme court] set forth the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction:

" ‘A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). This Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So.2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002). Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the pleader may possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So.2d at 299.’ "

Hall v. Environmental Litig. Grp., P.C., 157 So.3d 876, 879 (Ala. 2014). See also Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc., 990 So.2d 344, 350 (Ala. 2008) ("[W]hen reviewing a trial court's ruling on motion to dismiss based on a facial challenge to the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, [an appellate court] must not afford the trial court's ruling a presumption of correctness and must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.").

Discussion

The statutes pertaining to the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center ("the ACJIC") and the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center Commission ("the ACJICC") are codified at § 41–9–590 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and contained within Article 23, which is entitled "Criminal Justice Information Center Commission." Section 41–9–645, entitled "Purging, modification or supplementation of criminal records—Applications to agencies by individuals; appeals to circuit courts upon refusal of agencies to act, etc.; costs," provides:

"[I]f an individual believes such information to be inaccurate or incomplete, he may request the original agency having custody or control of the detail records to purge, modify or supplement them and to so notify the ACJIC of such changes.

"Should the agency decline to so act or should the individual believe the agency's decision to be otherwise unsatisfactory, the individual or his attorney may within 30 days of such decision enter an appeal to the circuit court of the county of his residence or to the circuit court in the county where such agency exists, with notice to the agency, pursuant to acquiring an order by such court that the subject information be expunged, modified or supplemented by the agency of record. The court in each such case shall conduct a de novo hearing and may order such relief as it finds to be required by law. Such appeals shall be entered in the same manner as appeals are entered from the court of probate; except, that the appellant shall not be required to post bond nor pay the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person desires, the appeal may be heard by the judge at the first term or in chambers. A notice sent by registered or certified mail shall be sufficient service on the agency of disputed record that such appeal has been entered."³

Pursuant to § 41–9–594(a), Ala. Code 1975, which falls under the same article, the ACJICC is empowered to promulgate "rules, regulations, and policies for the performance of the responsibilities charged to it in this article." Alabama Admin. Code (ACJICC), Rule 265–X–2–.03., governs the procedural process for reviewing and challenging criminal history information pursuant to § 41–9–645. See McMillian v. State, 175 So.3d 186, 188 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (holding that a petitioner's failure to comply with the terms of § 41–9–645 prevented the invocation of the trial court's appellate jurisdiction).

On appeal, Stowe argues, among other things, that his challenge of the allegedly incorrect information contained in the PSI report is governed by § 41–9–645, which provides for an appeal to the circuit court in the county where the agency responsible for the records is located, and that, because the Board is located within Montgomery County, jurisdiction is proper in the Montgomery Circuit Court. The Board argues that Stowe is challenging the "details of the offense" portion of the PSI report and that jurisdiction is therefore proper in the Coosa Circuit Court. Assuming, without deciding that, Stowe's assertion is correct—i.e., that Stowe's challenge to the information in the PSI report is governed by § 41–9–645, this court must still determine whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because "jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu." Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987).

"Under the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act (AAPA) §§ 41–22–1 through –27, Ala. Code 1975, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an action." Ex parte Crestwood Hosp. & Nursing Home, Inc., 670 So.2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995).⁴

"Alabama provides statutory procedures in the [Alabama Administrative Procedure Act] for reviewing the actions of administrative agencies. It is a mainstay of administrative procedure that a party must exhaust all applicable administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts. § 41–22–20(a), Ala. Code 1975. The purpose of these administrative procedures is ‘[t]o simplify the process of judicial review of agency action as well as increase its ease and availability. In accomplishing its objectives, the intention of this chapter is to strike a fair balance between these purposes and the need for efficient, economical and effective government administration.’ § 41–22–2(b)(7), Ala. Code 1975. To allow a plaintiff to raise issues in court that have been addressed by an administrative agency, without having exhausted that administrative process, would frustrate the orderly administration of justice. See Ex parte Gadsden Country Club, 14 So.3d 830, 832 (Ala. 2009)."

Ex parte Worley, 46 So.3d 916, 921 (Ala. 2009).

In McMillian, supra, this court held that the trial court in that case lacked...