Strano v. Warden

RONALD STRANO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.

Case No. 3:11cv1810(AWT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Dated: January 30, 2014

PRISONER

RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Ronald Strano is an inmate currently confined at the MacDougall Correctional Institution in Suffield, Connecticut. He brings this action pro se for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2000 convictions for robbery and attempted robbery.

Federal habeas corpus statutes impose a one year statute of limitations on federal petitions for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a judgment of conviction imposed by a state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period begins on the completion of the direct appeal or the conclusion of the time within which an appeal could have been filed and may be tolled for the period during which a properly filed state habeas petition is pending. See id.; Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001). The district court has the discretion to raise the timeliness of a federal habeas petition sua sponte. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209-10 (2006).

The limitations period is not a "jurisdictional bar." Smithv. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Consequently, the court may equitably toll the limitations period. See id. Equitable tolling may be applied in habeas cases only in extraordinary and rare circumstances and requires the petitioner to show that he has been pursuing his rights diligently but extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing his petition. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Diaz v. Conway, 555 U.S. 870 (2008). The threshold for establishing equitable tolling is very high. See Smith, 208 F.3d at 17 (acknowledging high threshold for establishing equitable tolling).

The standard for determining whether a petitioner diligently pursued his rights is reasonable diligence. The court must determine whether the petitioner has shown that he "act[ed] as diligently as reasonably could have been expected under the circumstances" throughout the entire time period he seeks to have the court equitably toll. Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original).

When considering whether extraordinary circumstances are present, the court considers "how severe an obstacle it is for the prisoner endeavoring to comply with the . . . limitations period" set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Diaz, 515 F.3d at 154. The inquiries into extraordinary circumstances and reasonable diligence are related. The petitioner must show "a causalrelationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing." Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). A petitioner cannot establish the required causal relationship if, "acting with reasonable diligence," he "could have timely filed his petition notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances." Id.

On August 22, 2002, in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Tolland, the petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to fifteen counts of robbery in the second degree, one count of attempted robbery in the second degree and sixteen counts of committing a felony with a firearm. See State v. Strano, 85 Conn. App. 212, 224, 855 A.2d 1028, 1036, cert denied, 271 Conn. 946, 861 A.2d 1179 (2004). The pleas were conditioned on the petitioner's right to appeal from the court's denial of his motions to suppress. See id. On December 5, 2002, a judge sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of forty years of imprisonment. See id. On September 21, 2004, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. See id. On November 10, 2004, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied the petition for certification to appeal from the decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court. See State v. Strano, 271 Conn. 946, 861 A.2d 1179 (2004).

The petitioner's conviction became final and the limitations period began to run on February 9, 2005, at the conclusion of theninety-day period of time within which petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari at the United States Supreme Court. See Williams, 237 F.3d at 151 (holding in case where petitioner had appealed to state's highest court, direct appeal also included filing petition for writ of certiorari in Supreme Court or the expiration of time within which to file petition), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001). The statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of a state habeas petition filed by the petitioner in December 2004 in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Tolland challenging his 2002 convictions.

On March 5, 2008, after an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court Judge issued a decision denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Strano v. Warden, No. CV044000230, 2008 WL 803419 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2008). On November 17, 2009, the Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in a per curiam opinion. See Strano v. Commissioner of Correction 118 Conn. App. 901, 982 A.2d 658 (2009). On December 17, 2009, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal the decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court. See Strano v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 923, 984 A.2d 1083 (2009).

The petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run on December 18, 2009, the day after the Connecticut Supreme Court denied the petition for certification to appeal thedenial of the state habeas petition. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329, 334 (2007) (habeas petition is not "pending" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) when state courts have entered a final judgment but a petition for certiorari has been filed in U.S. Supreme Court); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2001) ("ninety-day period during which a petitioner could have but did not file a certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court from the denial of a state post-conviction petition" is excluded from tolling under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2)). The limitations period expired a year later on December 17, 2010.

The present petition is dated August 22, 2011. The court deems the petition for writ of habeas corpus to have been filed in this court on August 22, 2011, the date the petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison officials for mailing to the Clerk. See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir. 1993) (Second Circuit has held that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988)). Thus, the petition was filed more than eight months after the limitations period expired.

On October 31, 2012, the court ordered the petitioner to show cause why the habeas petition should not be dismissed as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. On November 27, 2012, the petitioner filed a response to the court's order.

The petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. He states that the State of Connecticut Department of Correction does not have law libraries in its prison facilities. Instead, the Department relies on the Office of the Public Defender to provide legal assistance to inmates who are appealing their convictions or collaterally attacking their convictions via petitions for writ of habeas corpus. He claims that the public defender who represented him in his state habeas petition would not advise him regarding the filing of a federal habeas petition. The petitioner contends that these facts warrant tolling of the limitations period.

Ignorance of the law does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance to excuse the untimely filing of a federal habeas petition. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and district courts within this circuit are consistent in holding that neither a petitioner's pro se status, nor his unfamiliarity with the law, nor his lack of access to legal materials/assistance constitute an extraordinary circumstance that provides a basis to toll the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Smith, 208 F.3d at 18 (pro se status does not merit equitable tolling); Diaz, 515 F.3d at 154 (prison officials' failure to provide habeas information in the prisoners' language did not constitute extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling because prisoners made no efforts to contactanyone inside or outside prison to assist them, in their language, in learning legal requirements for filing federal petition); Adkins v. Warden, 585 F. Supp. 2d 286, 297 (D. Conn. 2008) (solitary confinement, lack of physical access to a law library, unfamiliarity with the law and legal rights and limited high school education did not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant tolling of limitations period), aff'd, 534 Fed. Appx. 564 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Adkins v. Semple, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 262 (2010); Walker v. McLaughlin, No. 04-cv-6172(VEB), 2008 WL 941719, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2008) (citing cases holding that ignorance of the law, illiteracy, lack of access to law clerks, and lack of fluency in English are not extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling); Martinez v. Kuhlmann, No. 99 Civ. 1094(MBM)(AJP), 1999 WL 1565177, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1999)("[D]ifficulty obtaining assistance in legal research from other prisoners or prison staff, is not sufficiently extraordinary to merit equitably tolling the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, since these are disabilities common to many prisoners."). Thus, the fact that the Department of Correction may not have provided the petitioner with access to a law...