Strattan v. Sec'y

ALAN STRATTAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:16-cv-1174-J-32JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

January 2, 2019

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Alan Strattan, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action with the assistance of counsel by filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) on September 15, 2016. Strattan is proceeding on an Amended Petition filed by counsel on September 22, 2016. See Doc. 4 (Petition). Strattan challenges a 2012 state court (Columbia County, Florida) judgment of conviction for which he is serving a life term of incarceration. Respondents filed a Response to the Petition. See Doc. 13 (Resp.) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Strattan, through counsel, filed a Reply. See Doc. 14 (Reply). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On March 28, 2012, Strattan entered a negotiated plea of guilty to three counts of "first degree murder while armed" (counts one, three, and four) and "killing of unborn quick child" (count two). Resp. Ex. M. That same day, the trial court sentenced Strattan in conformance with his negotiated disposition to a term of life on each count, with all counts to run consecutive. Id. Strattan did not seek a direct appeal of his judgment and sentences.

Strattan filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief on March 21, 2013. Resp. Ex. B at 1-38. On December 15, 2015, the trial court entered an order summarily denying Strattan's Rule 3.850 motion. Id. at 107-25. The First District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed the trial court's order of denial without a written opinion on June 27, 2016. Resp. Ex. E. The mandate was issued on August 17, 2016. Resp. Ex. H. This action followed.

III. Governing Legal Principals

A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision toqualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's factual findings are "presumed to be correct" unless rebutted "by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It bears repeating thateven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 ("The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness."); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) ("[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.").

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations modified).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

"The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defense." Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a person must show that: (1) counsel's performance was outside the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Notably, there is no "iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other." Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a SixthAmendment violation, "a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa." Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." 466 U.S. at 697.

"The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is "any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard," then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). "Reviewing courts apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "When this presumption is combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling on counsel's performance." Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).

IV. Analysis

Strattan raises one ground for relief. He claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of a viable "state of mind defense" prior to his pleas of guilty. Doc. 4 at 5. Strattan contends that he did not commit the murders with "aforethought," but instead committed the murders because he believed the victims were robbing him and that shooting them was necessary to defend himself and his property. Id. at 19. According to Strattan, had he known his conduct only amounted to a lesser included offense of first degree murder, he would not have entered pleas of guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id.

Strattan raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. B at 1-10. The trial court summarily denied the claim, finding in pertinent part:

The Defendant argues that, had he gone to trial, first degree murder would have been difficult for the State to prove. The Defendant goes on to raise a highly speculative argument that, in the scenario in which a jury may have found the Defendant guilty of a lesser included offense, the Defendant would have then had the opportunity to present mitigating factors whereby the Defendant could possibly have received some punishment less than life in prison. The Defendant also argues that his counsel should have informed Defendant about the rare, and in this case, especially unlikely event of a jury pardon.

As explained, the Defendant in this case entered a plea agreement with the State whereby the Defendant would plead guilty to the crimes as charged, and in exchange, the Defendant would avoid the death penalty for murdering three individuals and an unborn child. As a part of entering a plea agreement, in order for that plea to be voluntary, an attorney must adequately advise a defendant of certain things. However, that

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