Streza v. S. Nev. Culinary

1

ELIZABETH G. STREZA, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN NEVADA CULINARY AND BARTENDERS PENSION PLAN, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 22-cv-4019-NKL

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division

July 8, 2022

ORDER

NANETTE K. LAUGHREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants the Southern Nevada Culinary and Bartenders Pension Plan, Tracy Thompson, Ted Pappageorge, and the “Board of Directors.” Doc. 12. Also before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Elizabeth Streza's Motion to Amend her Complaint. Doc. 26. As discussed below, Ms. Streza's Motion to Amend is DENIED, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Elizabeth Streza is a vested participant in the Southern Nevada Culinary and Bartenders Pension Plan (“The Plan”), a defined benefit plan. Ms. Streza was covered by the Plan from 1993 to 1998. Doc. 13, at 216-17 (Ltr. from Plan Denying Ms. Streza's appeal). Ms. Streza alleges that, in 1998, Gabriela Tshudy-presumably an employee of the Plan's third-party administrator-told her that she “cannot collect [her] pension lump sum and monthly benefit until [she] turn[s] 55 years old.” Doc. 4 (Amended Complaint), at 5. Later, in 2011, Ms. Streza called the Plan, and was allegedly told that the retirement age had “changed” to 59. Finally, in May 2021, 1 Ms. Streza alleges the Plan told her that she must be 62 to retire, and that the monthly and lump sum options were significantly lower than she believed and had previously been told they would be.

In May of 2021, Ms. Streza made a claim to the Plan for a lump sum payment of $72,250- which represented her calculation of the full amount of contributions made on Ms. Streza's behalf plus interest. Doc. 13, at 216. The Plan denied the claim because, per the terms of the Plan, benefits are determined based on the number of hours worked in covered employment, not by calculating total employer contributions plus interest. Doc. 13, at 216. Furthermore, lump sum payments can only be of up to 50% of a participant's total benefit, and are only available when the participant reaches age 62. On January 15, 2022, Ms. Streza appealed the denial of benefits, and maintained that she was entitled to full payment of all contributions plus interest. Doc. 13, at 216. The Plan denied the appeal on March 15, 2022-after Ms. Streza first filed in this Court-and reiterated that, under the terms of the Plan, “benefits are determined based on hours worked and a set monthly benefit amount. They are not based on contributions or interest earned. Also, lump sum payments are only payable at age 62 and are limited to 50% of a participant's total benefit.” Doc. 13, at 216. The Plan's denial letter included a calculation of Ms. Streza's hours of covered employment and her monthly benefit amount. Because that amount was less than the minimum monthly payment amount provided by the Plan, it was rounded up to $175.00 per month. Doc. 13, at 217. The Plan further explained that, at age 62, Ms. Streza could elect to receive a monthly lifetime benefit of $175.00, or a lump sum payment of $10,655.75 and a monthly benefit of $87.50. The Plan also explained that Ms. Streza could elect to receive benefits before age 62, but doing so would result in a reduced monthly benefit without a lump sum payment option. Doc. 13, at 217. Finally, the Plan explained that retirement benefits are determined based on the terms of the Plan Documents in effect at the time a participant applies for benefits, but it noted that, except for a few increases in the monthly benefit amounts over the years, the relevant provisions of the Plan had not changed. Doc. 13, at 217.

Ms. Streza first filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis in this Court on February 14, 2022, Doc. 1, while her administrative appeal remained pending, and, after the Court gave her leave to proceed in forma pauperis, she filed her Complaint on February 22, 2022. See Doc. 1; Doc. 3. Ms. Streza amended her Complaint the next day. Doc. 4 (Amended Complaint). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 3, 2022, which Ms. Streza opposed. Docs. 14 & 15 (Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Suggestions); Docs. 15 & 20 (Ms. Streza's Opposition Filings).^[1]

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). That said, the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” just “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party . . . but [is] not bound to accept as true [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). When the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, she is held to a “lesser pleading standard,” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008)), and the Court must construe the pleadings “liberally.” Miles v. Ertl Co., 722 F.2d 434, 434 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).

Generally, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may not consider materials outside of the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., LLC, 543 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2008). However, it may consider materials that are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings” without treating the motion as one for summary judgment. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Documents referenced in a complaint and filed with the court while briefing a defendant's motion to dismiss are “embraced” by the complaint and therefore part of the “Rule 12 record.” Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that termination letter and memorandum of understanding referenced in complaint were necessarily embraced by the pleadings); Bendsen v. George Weston Bakeries Distrib. Inc., 08-cv-50, 2008 WL 4449435, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2008) (holding contracts and plans referenced in complaint and filed with motion to dismiss were necessarily embraced by complaint). In ERISA cases, this can include plan documents and official decisions of plan administrators that relate to a plaintiff's claims. Davis v. Washington Univ. in St. Louis, 960 F.3d 478, 484 n.3 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Like the district court, we consider the relevant fund prospectuses and plan disclosure documents because they are ‘embraced by the pleadings.'”

(citing Meiners v. Wells Fargo & Co., 898 F.3d 820, 823)).^[2]

Ms. Streza does not specifically cite to any legal source for her claims.^[3] As the Defendants correctly note, she does not have to so long as her Amended Complaint gives fair notice of her claims. See generally Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014). Ms. Streza generally argues that the Plan wrongfully denied her pension benefits and made material misrepresentations. Since the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preempts all state and common law causes of action relating to employee benefit plans-including those related to the processing of a participant's claims for benefits-the Court construes Ms. Streza's Amended Complaint to invoke only ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (establishing ERISA preemption); 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (establishing civil enforcement by a participant seeking to recover funds owned to the participant by a benefit plan); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (“Congress' specific reference to § 301 of the [Labor Management Relations Act] to describe the civil enforcement scheme of ERISA makes clear its intention that all suits brought by beneficiaries or participants asserting improper processing of claims under ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal questions governed by § 502(a).”) (internal citation omitted).

Read liberally and drawing all inferences in her favor, Ms. Streza's Amended Complaint attempts to state a claim under ERISA, specifically “to recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [her] plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B). Furthermore, the Amended Complaint includes allegations about the misrepresentations of employees associated with the Plan, which the Court construes as attempting to state a claim for fiduciary misrepresentation under ERISA. The Court will address each claim below.

i. Whether Ms. Streza's ERISA Claims Must Fail Because She Did Not Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies Before Filing in Federal Court

The Defendants argue that Ms. Streza's ERISA claims must fail because she did not properly exhaust the remedies provided for by the terms of the Plan. While ERISA itself does not require exhaustion, “[f]ederal courts applying ERISA have uniformly concluded that benefit claimants must exhaust the review procedures mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) before bringing claims for wrongful denial to court.” Kinkead v. Sw. Bell Corp. Sickness and Accident Disability Benefit Plan, 111 F.3d 67, 68 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). This means that when the relevant plan documents permit participants to appeal the denial of a claim for...